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A B S T R A C T 
Buitna functions as a l ink between the two big countries 
of East, India and China. I t is true tha t insp i t e of Burma 
being governed for a long period as a par t of Indian Empire, 
one knows very l i t t l e about th i s country, Burma gradually 
achieved grea t importance not only for India but also for 
Southeast Asia and Singapore, 
Burma is of great importance for the defence system 
of India and Southeast Asia, I t was a great puzzle for the 
outside world. I t s aloofness from i t s neighbour and I t s 
self imposed i so la t ion was an enigma for i t s neighbours, 
Burma road and the use of the port of Rangoon acquired great 
s t r a t e g i c importance. The c losing of t h i s road had a great 
effect on China, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union and hence 
provoked many sided p ro t e s t . 
The main feature of Burma is tha t i t is an isola ted 
country both p o l i t i c a l l y and geographically, NAgas >*io l ived 
on the borders, repeatedly created a great t rouble for the 
Indian government. Hence I t Is necessary for India that the 
government of Burma should be neu t ra l and amenable to the 
In te res t s of I t s neighbours, 
Oua to the formation of a new s t a t e of Pakistan in 
1947, great danger to the defence of India was posed by the 
h o s t i l e posture of th i s new s t a t e . I t i s however advantageous 
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for India tha t Bangla Desh as a f r iendly s t a t e has emerged 
on the eas tern border of India and tiie danger has been par t ly 
removed. I t should hoyever, be noted t h a t the creation of 
Bangla Desh has introduced another uncertain element. Much 
of i t would depend upon the independent role^' Bangla Desh 
plays in world p o l i t i c s . 
In 1044 the Hirma's f i r s t na t ional kingdom of Pagan 
was founded by the ru l e r Anawrahta, In the 19th century Burma 
came under the Br i t i sh Empire as a province of India u n t i l 
1937 and then i t became a separate colony, Burmese po l i t i c i ans 
were influenced by the a c t i v i t i e s of the Congress party of 
India and th i s brought nationalism in Burma, But true nation-
alism came from Burmese themselves while they founded "The 
Young Man Buddhist Association** in 1908. 
When Burma was a par t of India, many changes in the 
pa t te rn of government took place, Minto-Motley and Montague-
Chelmsford reforms had a lso been introduced in Burma j u s t in 
the same manner as in India, The Simon Commission of 1923 
gave i t s repor t in favour of the separat ion of Burma from 
India, because the Burmese r e a l i s e d tha t t he i r country might 
onQ day become a 'vassa l s t a t e ' of India, 
\i/hen Japan assumed author i ty over Burma in the Ilnd 
Vbrld l^ r , Burma declared herse l f an indepoident s t a t e , 
receiving recognit ion from a l l the axis powers. But af ter 
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the defeat of Japan and the reoccupation by Br i ta in , the rea l 
adminis t ra t ion of Burma was handed over to the Supreme-Allied 
Commander of Southeast Asia, Admiral Mountbatten. The NU-
Att lee agreement declared the republic of the Uniod of Burma 
as a fu l ly independent sovereign s t a t e on January 4, 1948, 
The new union of Burma plunged into c i v i l war, a f t e r 
gaining independence. But the rebels f a i l ed in the i r attempt 
before the AFPFL (Anti-Facis t People 's Federation League) 
government under the Premiership of UNU, Isiien AFPFL pa r t ly 
became divided into two, the s i t u a t i o n became worse. UNU d4d 
not control the s i t u a t i o n . He cal led Ne Win for Premiership, 
who was elected without any opposi t ion. The main reason of 
t h i s coup was the re l ig ious policy of UNU, Ne win government 
was a mi l i t a ry adminis t ra t ion . 
But in the general e lec t ion of T96o, came overwhelming 
v ic tory for UNU and his par ty , -Sat-General Ne win took over 
power in March 1962, and UNU was a r r e s t ed . Power came in the 
hands of Revolutionary Council which was formed under the 
Chairmanship of General Ne win. The General Ne win government 
was bas ica l ly t o t a l i t a r i a n . The Revolutionary government is 
based on a system of S o c i a l i s t democracy and s o c i a l i s t economy. 
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In cont ras t to India , Burma l e f t the Br i t i sh Common-
wealth due to the fac t tha t Burmese leaders thought tha t the 
Burmese freedom would not be secure in Commonwealth, Many 
times, the Burmese government received f inanc ia l aid from the 
Commonwealth count r ies . The Commonwealth Conference of Delhi 
solved the "karen" (a t r i b e ) problems through Commonwealth 
mediation through a good offices committee of Commonwealth 
representa t ives in Rangoon, Burma's r e l a t ions with Commonwealth 
countr ies remained good. 
Since independence, Burma's foreign policy was based 
upon neutral ism, Burma se t s a good example of how a small 
nat ion is able to keep up i t s independence in a world ruled 
by two r i v a l power bloc; and clashing ideologies , Burma is 
a major cosmopolitian centre in Southeast Asia, The Revolu-
t ionary Council has balanced Eastern and Western influences in 
Burma, Because Burmese want to avoid the agony of a Vietnam 
type "ffcr of National Libera t ion ." Burma believed that the 
Asian conf l ic t s such as Vietnam, Kashmir, Malasia, Indonesia, 
should be solved dnr peaceful set t lement , on the basis of the 
1964 Geneva accords and a new Geneva type Conference, Burma 
has X^sympathy towards Yugoslavia, Israel ,Laos and Combodia, 
A. short time back, Burma took a n e u t r a l i s t stand in Indo-
Pakistan conf l ic t over Bangla Desh. But when Bangla Desh came 
as a p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y , Burma was among those f i r s t few countries 
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vhich recognised I t even a t the r i sk of diplomatic rupture 
with Pakistan, Burma also agreed with recent Simla Agreement 
and believed tha t i t was a contr ibution to peace for Asia 
as a whole. 
The most important aspect of Burma's foreign policy 
has been the manner in vtoich the ^c)rld powers l ike China, 
Russia and U.S.A. has maintained good re la t ions tov^ards Burma, 
Burma i s one of the Ckslombo pov/ers, to expand the area of peace 
and economic progress in the f i e lds of cooperation and develop-
ment. Burma believes in f r iendly r e l a t i ons with other coun-
t r i e s . The non-alignment with power blocs, and the policy of 
n e u t r a l i t y is defensive. Burma has fr iendly re la t ions with 
India, Pakistan, Geylon and China, Being close to Communist 
China geographically, Burmese farreign policy makers attached 
great importance to the i r r e l a t i ons with China, 
Burma has remained aloof from SEATO, because i t has no 
f a i th that the defence organisa t ion l i k e SEATO well be succ-
ess fu l . This type of regional arrangement only increases the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of conf l ic t instead of peace and secur i ty . On 
account of her aloofness from a l l types of mi l i t a ry a l l i ances 
and her n e u t r a l i s t ^ stand, she enjoys world-wide confidence, 
Burma i s not gett ing s izeable economic axd from the U.S.A., and 
U,S.S,IU because of her absolute ly n e u t r a l i s t pol icy. 
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Burma's r e l a t ions with Ctoina have always depended upon 
five pr inciples of peaceful co-existence v^iich en^Join cordial 
r e l a t i ons between s t a t e s with d i f fer ing p o l i t i c a l and socia l 
systems on the basis of mutual respect for each others sovere-
ignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , mutual non-aggression, non-
interference in each o t h e r ' s i n t e rna l a f f a i r s and settlement 
of conf l ic ts between nations by peaceful means. A t rea ty of 
fr iendship was signed between the two countries in accordance 
with the 'Five Pr inc ip les of peaceful co-exis tence ' (Panch-
Sheel) j o in t l y i n i t i a t e d by both countr ies . 
In 1967 a r i f t in Burma-China r e l a t ions was prec ip i -
ta ted by the Chinese. I t was due to Pacing 's f rus t r a t ion 
which was caused by the f a i l u r e in becoming p o l i t i c a l l y or 
economically dominant in Burma. Rangoon signed the t e s t Ban 
Treaty of 1963^which was opposed by Peking. Burma has recog-
nised the v a l i d i t y of an Indian t e r r i t o r y claimed by China 
on the Sino-Indian border dispute,, Burma favoured the formation 
of Malaysia but China attacked i t as a new co lon i l ^ l s t p lo t 
and supported Indonesia 's **confrontation po l icy ." 
Burma remained neutral .China has been ant i -U.S. and 
Pro-NLF and North Vietnam. Rangoon maintains fr iendly re la t ions 
with M6SC0W while Peking remains indi f ferent from Foscow on 
^ a c c o u n t of deep ideological differences and the aggressive 
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stance of U.S.S.R,. F ina l ly , Burma is neu t ra l on the Laotian 
i ssue , vhi le Gomraunist China supports the Pathet Lao regime. 
I t i s not easy to explain Peking's aim in supporting 
'Cul tu ra l Revolution' in Burma. I t s 'Red guard' diplomacy 
may have been an unintended aspect of i t s own chaotic in te rna l 
revolutionary s i t u a t i o n . Peking's aim may have been to force 
Ne win to accept Communist pa r t i c ipa t ion in a united front 
governmoit. 
After 1967 the r e l a t i o n s between the two countries 
have improved. Since than the r e l a t i ons between the two 
countries have remained neu t r a l , Burma'done remarkably well 
in diminishing Chinese and other foreign influences. The 
ideological basis of China's foreign pol icy, i t s expansionst 
aims, i t s s e n s i t i v i t y to the developments in th i s par t of 
hemisphere, and Burmas mi l i t a ry vu lne rab i l i t y continue to 
introduce so many unpredictable factors t h a t nothing can be 
forecast for future re la t ions between these two countr ies . 
After gaining independence, Burma became the member of 
the U.N. and other U,N. spec ia l ized agencies, Burma's ro le 
in the U.N, as an imcommitted, an t i - co lon ia l and under-developed 
nat ion i s what one might expect of a newly independent Asian 
country. Burma's ef for ts In the U.N, i s to follow an 
independent policy and estimates each case on the basis of 
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merits as i t comes-up on Korean -war. On Korean war Burma 
supported the U.M, but the cost of decision paid by Burma 
was heavy. 
Burma's stand in the U.N. has been closely a l l i e d to 
tha t of o ther i^.rab and Afro-Asian na t ions . The former Sec-
r e t a ry General of the U.N. U Thant of Burma played a very 
important ro le in solving many in te rna t iona l problems. The 
KMT problem haj( been brought before the U.N,, -^rough the 
ef for ts of the U.N. Commission, t h i s problem was solved. Burma 
cannot hope to enter the race of nuclear disarmaments or in-
fluence i t s po l ic ies due to i t s economic backwardness and 
inadequacy of s c i e n t i f i c advancement. 
Burma is a close neighbour of India i€ Southeast Asia 
and i t i s a lso c losely r e l a t ed with India since ancient times. 
The migration of Indians into Burma i s as old as the h i s to iy 
of these two countries vtiich goes back to p r e - h i s t o r i c a l age. 
Indians were very much affected by the Burmese policy 
of Burm^zation. Under the immigration policy of Burma, thou-
sands of Indians have been forced out of business and so out 
of the country. The Indian leaders remained s i l e n t because 
they wanted to have f r iendly re la t ions with Burma. In r e a l i t y 
the Burmizatlon programme has been one s ided and p a r t i a l . I t 
has not been applied with equal force agains t the people of 
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Communist countr ies l i k e China, The f ron t i e r re la t ions between 
India and Burma have not acquired much importance. After the i r 
independence both India and Burma have followed the policy 
of non-alignment and n e u t r a l i t y . I t i s generally known that 
Nehru and UNU were pr inc ipa l a r ch i t ec t s of the policy of the 
non-alignment for the newly independent na t ions . Some obser-
vers do not h e s i t a t e to say tha t "Burma's foreign policy is 
near ly a dupl icat ion or carbon copy of I nd i a ' s foreign pol icy," 
But t h i s i s not wholly cor rec t , because Burma does not follow 
India in a l l respects such as the membership of the Common-
wealth e t c . In view of strong t i e s between two countries a 
t r ea ty of f r iendship was signed between them in 1961. India 
t r i e d her best to e s t ab l i sh extensive diplomatic re la t ions 
with Burma and to s t rengthen the economic and commercial 
contacts with her . 
The mi l i t a ry coup in Burma shocked and surprised India 
very much^ liov^ever, she welcomed the declara t ions of the 
Revolutionary Council with regard to domestic po l i c i e s , India 
and Burma s incere ly desired to avoid war and to maintain the i r 
s o l i d a r i t y with Arabs and Afro-Asian world. Burma's foreign 
policy based upon Gandhian t r a d i t i o n of non-violence and the 
ancient Buddhist p r inc ip le of "Ahimsa" ^ a s been ref lec ted in 
the Burmese foreign policy)^ Both the countr ies followed 
Nehru's p r inc ip les of "panch-sheela.'* 
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Burma -was very much sympathetic towards India in the 
hour of China's aggression and appealed to Indian and Chinese 
to d e s i s t from aggravating the armed conf l i c t and from any 
ac t ion p re jud ic ia l to one an others v i t a l i n t e r e s t s . General 
Ne win and Mrs, Indira Gandhi scanned the world scene from 
the Asian-angle. Both India and Burma remain as peaceful 
co-exis t ing neighbours with mutual good w i l l and t r u s t . 
Thus we see tha t both the countr ies have a great 
s imi l a r i t y of ideas, be l iefs and i n t e r e s t s . The aims and 
object ives of t h e i r po l i c i e s are also s imi la r . The quick 
recognit ion of Bangla Desh by India and Burma eugers well for 
the future of th i s region. 
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p a B F A c g 
The select ion of the topic "Burma's Foreign Policy 
with particular reference to India" for the purpose of 
an intensive study of the problems of her relations is 
motivated oy many considerations. The country offers a 
remarkably clear picture of a l l the major experiences common 
to traditional soc i e t i e s inevitably responding to the demands 
of the modern world. Historically the Burman monarchy was 
a well estaollshed system, Just as other monarchies of the 
contemporary era. The i n i t i a l contacts between the West 
and Burma brought into conf l ic t the Vfestem concepts of 
international relations and the ideas of a re lat ive ly isolated 
Asian society . !Die Burmese experience of colonial rule was 
also unamolguous and assumed the c lass ic form of Imperial 
domination. The British destroyed the traditional structure 
of p o l i t i c a l authority by defeating and abolishing the 
Burmese monarchy. The modern Burman state v&s thus formed 
out of the structure of administrative authority introduced 
by the Brit ish. 
P o l i t i c a l l y i t would seem that the Burman colonial 
experience represents the c lass ic response of nationalism, 
anti .colonialism, antl-westernlsm and anti-capitalism. Burma 
entered the U.N. as an independent country under the guidance 
• i l . 
of a n a t i o n a l i s t movement dedicated to s o c i a l i s t i c goals 
and the c rea t ion of a modern soc ie ty . Burma's role in the 
U.K. as an uncommitted, an t i - co lon i a l and underdeveloped 
nation^ was s imi lar to tha t of India, I t i s generally 
deserved tha t the foreign policy of a s t a t e depends l a rge ly 
on a numoer of fac tors which are the inevi table r e s u l t of 
h i s to ry , geography, in t e rna t iona l s i t ua t i on , self i n t e r e s t 
and cur rent pol ic ies —« both In te rna l and ex terna l , Burma 
is no exception. 
This study offers an analysis of the compulsions and 
the fac tors responslDie for the formulation of Burma's foreign 
policy and a lso examines the basic concepts accepted by 
Burmese leadership in t he i r I n i t i a l foimulation of a foreign 
policy for the i r new country, 
Isr viewed from tha t complex of concepts, a t t i t u d e s 
and act ions t t i s described generally as a policy of "neutra-
l i sm," By t ry ing to f ind out the ideological content of 
th i s policy as defined by the Burman leaders themselves, and 
then by analysing how these concepts of neutralism have been 
applied to important in te rna t iona l issues and of concern of 
Burma, a basis is l a i d for some evaluation of Burma's neutra-
lism from both the points of view of Burmans and of the out -
side observer. 
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G H A P T iS R I 
J M T R Q D U G T I O N 
HISTORICAL BAGKGBOUND AND GJSOGIViPHICAL SITUATION 
The a r ea which i s known as Burma l i e s w i t h i n the most 
d i s t i n c t i v e p h y s i c a l environment . Shaped l i k e an ' o y s t e r ' . 
In s i a e Burma i s the second l a r g e s t count ry of Southeas t Asia , 
w i th an a rea equal t o t h a t of Texas. (U .S .A . )* I t i s b igger 
1 
than Denmark, Ne the r l and , i ' rance , Belgium and Luxembourg. The 
t o t a l a r ea of the count ry i s j u s t over 261,000 sq . m i l e s , and 
t h e popu la t i on i s s l i g h t l y over twenty m i l l i o n about the same 
2 
as t h a t of Thai land and I r a n . The p o l i t i c a l Inf luence by 
o u t s i d e n a t i o n s on Burma has been b r i e f and t r a n s i t o r y . Conse-
quent ly Burma never proved h e r s e l f a r e a l bone of con ten t ion 
between r i v a l i m p e r i a l i s t powers. 
Burma l i e s i n the t r o p i c of Cancer and i s oddly shaped, 
the sou the rn most t i p of which almost touches the iiiquator and 
Kor thwestern f r o n t i e r s of Burma march wi th Assam, Kanipur , 
3 
t h e Lushai h i l l t r a c t s witii Upper Burma. The f r o n t i e r s of 8uxn-><t 
are touching China t o the n o r t h , I nd i a t o the west and Siam 
t o the e a s t and Ind ian ocean t o the sou th . The lower ex tens ion 
1 . V/illiara, C . Johns tone , Burma's f o r e i g n P o l i c y , Massachuse t t s : 
Havard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963, pp. 7 - 8 . 
2 . Pye.W.Lucian, P o l i t i c s , P e r s o n a l i t y and Nation Bu i ld ing , 
London^ Yale U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962, p . 6 1 , 
3 . i<'.Jesse, Tennyson, The S tory of Burma, London : ' [ acmi l l i an 
& Co. L t d . , 1946, p . 1 2 . 
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of Burma known as the tenasserim extends over four himdred 
4 
miles down along the Malay a peninsula . 
The character of the federat ion i s determined by the 
5 
physical and p o l i t i c a l geography of burma, "Burma proper, 
the area within which the organs of the union possesses fu l l 
powers, cons is t s mainly of two r i ve r ine systems. The val ley 
of Irrawaddy, r i s i ng in the mountains of Tibet and traversing 
the whole country down to the sea below Rangoon and the valley 
of the S i t t ang , running p a r a l l e l to the lower Irrawaddy on 
the ea s t . I t also comprises the estu.ary of the Salween r iver 
which for pa r t of i t s course forms the eas tern boundary of 
Burma and two coasta l s t r i p s , Arakan bordering the way of 
Bengal and tenasserim ninning down in to the Malay peninsula. 
All round the Irrawaddy and Si t tang v a l l e y s , range of h i l l s , 
off shoots of the Tibetan mountain complex, cut off Burma 
fran i t s neighbours, within these h i l l s l i e the t e r r i t o r i e s 
of the four cons t i tuent s t a t e s . Another offshoot from the 
same system penet ra t ing Burma between Arakan and the Irrawaddy 
va l ley cons t i tu t e the Chin H i l l s , a special d ivis ion of Burma 
proper which has more in conmion with the h i l l s t a t e s than vrith 
6 
the lowlands, " 
4 . V/.S,Desai, India and Burm_ai. TTew Delhi ; Indian Council of 
World a f f a i r s , 1953, p . 3 , 
6 . Dorothy, -ioodman, 'The Making: of Bur-ma, London ; The 
Cresset Press , 1962, p . l l . 
6. J .S . i ' \ ; rn iva l l ; The Severance of Modern Burma. Hew York: 
I n s t i t u t e of Pacif ic Rela t ions , 1960, p . 3 , 
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Burma is not only important to the economy of Southeast 
Asia but also to the s t ra tegy of Southeast Asia. Burma func-
7 
t lons as a l ink between two countr ies China and India , though 
i t cons t i tu t e s the weakest l i nk in the defence system of 
Southeast Asia and Singapore. I f Burma f a l l s the whole of 
Southeast Asia co l lapses , the control of the way of Bengal 
by enemy power imperi ls the secur i ty of India, Buraia has at 
times seemed to be an enigma in the modern age. I t s self-
imposed i so l a t i on and an a t t i t u d e of d i s in t e re s t ed aloofness 
from i t s neighbour reveals Inexplicable nat ional psychology 
8 
i s a puzzle for outside world. 
in the B r i t i s h per iod , the annexation of Burma pushed 
I n d i a ' s f ron t i e r s eastwards to the borders of Thailand. In 
the north and nor theas t , B r i t i s h diplomacy together with 
Chinese we&kness, ensured I n d i a ' s s ecu r i t y . Before Japanese 
invasion, India has no s t r a t e g i c probl£sm on her eastern s ide , 
but the invasion of Burma by Japanese and i t s d i r ec t t h rea t 
to India in 1942, changed th i s peaceful s i t u a t i o n . So in 
view of such a s i t u a t i o n a r i s ing now and then, i t i s quite 
9 
necessary for both the countries to have fr iendly r e l a t i o n s . 
7 . William G.Johnston, o p . c i t . , pp. 7-8 , 
8. B.S.I. .Murti , Nehru's Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Bacon 
information and publ ica t ion , 1953, pp. 147-148. 
9. Theien, That, Ton, Ind ia and Southeast Asia 1947-60. 
Geneva : L ib ra i r i e Droz, 1963, p.160, 
- 4 -
The second v^orld War has proved the s t r a t eg i c importance of 
Burma. "The blockade of the pac i f ic coast of China by the 
powerfril o'apanese Navy compelled China to discover nev/ Channels 
of in tercourse with the outerworld for mi l i t a ry suppl ies . The 
Lurma road arid use of the por t of rlangoon gave her the l i f e 
10 
blood which she needed," 
The big c i t i e s of India from the Himalayas to Gape 
Comraorin and the i n d u s t r i a l wealth of Bihar are within easy 
bombing ringe of any power which succeeds in subduing Burma. 
I t i s quite s ign i f i can t t ha t the m i l i t a r y operations for 
the l i b e r a t i o n of Burma had to be e n t i r e l y based upon India, 
TTiere is no question of doubt t h a t the defence of both the 
countr ies are interconnected, in the words of Sardar Faniltkar, 
<'•'the defence of Burma i s in fac t the defence of India , and 
i t i s I n d i a ' s primary concern no l e s s than Burma's to see 
11 
t h a t i t s f r on t i e r remain i n v i o l a t e , " 
In the event of a h o s t i l e power cont ro l l ing Burma, 
i t would threaten Ind i a ' s secur i ty from land, sea and a i r . 
India has to remain quite a l e r t towards Burma, because a power 
vmich is unfriendly to India and in control of Burma, could 
10. B.S.K.. l u r t i , Qp.ci t ,^ p . 145. 
1 1 . I b i d . , p . 148. 
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not only send i t s ground forces across the hovdex but also 
bomb the c i t i e s of eas te rn India , and i t also paralyse Indian 
shipping in the Bay of Lengal and threa ten I n d i a ' s commmiica-
t ions with the pac i f ic through the ^lalacca s t r a i t s . I t i s 
quite f r u i t f u l for Southeast Asia tha t Burma has comprehensibly 
adopted a s trongly i s o l a t i o n i s t n e u t r a l i t y which has so far 
prevented any requirement for tlie employment of foreign troops 
within her borders . Ind ia i s quite conscious t ha t Chinas 
land forces could cross her t e r r i t o r y in a matter of days i f 
she wishc-Jd and e s t ab l i sh a bridgehead on the Bay of Bengal 
for more p o t e n t i a l l y damaging to western s t ra tegy than any 
corar.iunist take over of South-Vietnam. The f i r s t and formost 
e f fo r t of Burma i s to seek a "protact ive cardon*of sympathetic 
s t a t e s around her borders . Liks t h a t ^vhich Russia has managed 
13 
to achieve in iilurope. 
S t r a t e g i c a l l y , Burma controls one oT the most important 
land routes frcsn China to Southwards, Aie s t r a t eg ic impor-
tance of this'Burma road' was such as to I n c i t e . Japan to 
exer t pressure on great Br i t a in for i t s closure in 1339. 
The closing of th i s road provoked the p r o t e s t s not only from 
12. Theien, That, Ton, Qp . c i t . , p . 151. 
13. Allen, Richard, i>, Short Introduction to the History and 
P o l i t i c s of Southeast Asia. I\lew York : Oxford University 
Press , 1970 pp. 14-15. 
- 6 -
China t u t also from the U.S.ii.. and the Soviet Government. 
Burma road has a great s ignif icance that i f Burma ^^ a^s used 
as a passage from Thailand to Ind ia , i t could also be used 
as a passage from China to India . Nagas (a t r i b e ) \i^o l i ve 
near the border area of BuiToa and India , may cause trouble 
to Indian government, so , we cc.n say tha t the neu t r a l i t y of 
the goverimant of Burma i s necessary for India . After the 
p a r t i t i o n of India and the creat ion of Pakistan in 1947, a 
t h r e a t to the secur i ty of India was posed due to the h o s t i l i t y 
of t h i s new s t a t e . I t i s believed that with the emergence of 
Bangla-Desh as a f r iendly s t a t e on the eas tern border of India, 
14 
t h i s t h rea t has been removed. 
But i t should also be borne in mind that the b i r th of 
Bangla Desh has introduced an uncer ta in e leaen t . Much would 
however, depend upon i^uigla Desh reac t ion to v/orld p o l i t i c s . 
In sp i t e of having such a s t r a t eg i c importance, so l i t t l e i s 
heard or known about Burma, not only in the world but also 
in Asia tha t i t might be " te r ra - incogni ta in the icy wastes 
of an ta rc t i ca" and not a neighbour who within a l iv ing memory 
was ruled by the Br i t i sh as a par t of the Indian empire, r'ar 
14. Theien, That, Ton, Op.ci t .^ pp. 151-152. 
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reaching changes are taking place in tihat country under the 
dynamic leadership of the Revolutionary Council and t h i s fac t 
16 
i s of great s ignif icance to India , 
If we take Burma geographically i t can be divided into 
two pa r t s , upper Burma and lower Burma, Upper Burma has a 
fearsome r i b e cage of mountains, the shape of horseshoe, the 
16 
opened facing the Bay of Bengal, Lower Burma may be divided 
into two na tu ra l d iv is ions the coas ta l region and Delta, The 
Costal region i s In te rsec ted by numerous h i l l ranges. The 
17 
Delta i s a la rge p la in with a dense populat ion. 
To the west along the border between India and Burma 
are the Naga h i l l s , to the eas t l i e s the formidable Karen! 
kange bordering on Siam, and to the north a re the Himale/a 
which r i s e beyond 20,000 fee t high. The drainage from Burma's 
mountains bols tered by spring thaa^rs in the Tibetan Himalayas 
and augnented by monsoon r a i n s , s lash across the land and 
change into huge, f a s t flowing r ive rs which empty into the Bay 
of Bengal while the r ive r Irrawaddy running through the two 
great countr ies of the eas t India and China. Because of i t s 
V 
15, Special Correspondent, ^*Co-operative Farms in Burma, 
Mainstream^ (July 13, 1963), p. 12. 
16, William, R.Peers, and Dean,Brells, Behind the Burma Road, 
Boston I L i t t l e Brown and Company Ltd. , 1963, p.46, 
17, Anil , Chandra, Banerjee, The Eastern Front ier of Br i t i sh 
India, Calcutta : Mukerjee and Co», 1943, p ,53 . 
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phys iography , Burma i s known as a "^/alley s t a t e . " The c l imate 
18 
of Burma i s g e n e r a l l y t r o p i c a l . 
Buima p a r t a k e s of the c u l t u r e and l i f e of bo th her 
more populous neighbours I n d i a and China. Burmese anc ien t 
and modern h i s t o r y i s very much in f luenced by the movement 
19 
of even t s towards or b.cross these b o r d e r s . Burma's overland 
communication with Ind i a i s d i f f i c u l t because of mountains 
and jung le -covered r i d g e s . The mountains p lay a very important 
r o l e tc^iake the boundary and to s e p a r a t e Burma fron China, 
i t a l s o makes a n a t u r a l boundary with Buima's e a s t e r n neighbour 
Tha i l cnd . The sea has proven much l e s s of a b a r r i e r . The 
heai^t of the country i s the c e n t r a l I r raweddy. The e n t i r e 
l e n g t h of the countrv se rves as a p r i n c i p l e means of conmuni-
20 
c a t i o n . 
In Burma, the Valley of i r rawaddy , r i s i n g in the moun-
t a i n s of T ibe t and t r a n s v e r s i n g the \*Lole count ry down t o the 
s e a , below Langoon, and the v a l l e y of S i t t a n g , running p a r a l l e l 
t o the lower ' I r rawaddy on the e a s t Sa l r een r i v e r forms the 
e a s t e r n boundaiy of Euiina, and two co^s-:tsl s t r i p s , -.rakan 
18 , Wil l iam, R. Peers and Dean^cre l i s , o p , c i t . , pp .44 -45 . 
19, uohn, ^e i'^ o^y. C h r i s t e n , Burma and the Japanese Invader . 
Bombay, Thacker and Company l i m i t e d , 1945, p , 7 . 
20 , Ilaung, Maung, Buima i n the ^''amilv of n a t i o n s , /onsterdan: 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l e d u c a t i o n a l p u b l i s h i n g house , 1966, p , 9 . 
_ o _ 
boder ing t h e Bay of Bengal, and tenasse r lm running dovn 
in to tile Malaya p e n i n s u l a . A l l roundthe Irrawaddy and 
S i t t a n g Va l l eys , ranges of h i l l s , o f f shoo t s of the Tibetan 
mountain complex cutoff Burma from i t s ne ighoours , "Burma 
sec luded from the o u t e r world by mountains and the sea , 
appears d e s t i n e d f o r p o l i t i c a l oni ty by n a t u r e , i lnthropolo-
g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and economic Circumstances r e i n f o r c e 
the t rend to u n i t y . " 
'Hie immense mountains mass of i n t e r i o r Asia, a f t e r 
forming the •fimalayan bulwork ac ross n o r t h e r n I n d i a , tu rns 
south along Westtrn Yunnan and forms a tumbled mass of 
p a r a l l e l ridfes and v a l l e y s running sou theas t through the 
^ 22 
g r e a t pen insu la of Indones i a . Burma occupies the most 
f e r t i l e p a r t of t h i s p e n i n s u l a . The geograph ica l i s o l a t i o n 
and h e r f r o n t i e r p r o t e c t i o n have been v i t a l f a c t o r s in he r 
h i s t o r i c a l development and remain prime c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in 
he r p o l i t i c s today. J3ie Chinese f r o n t i e r p lays a very 
23 
impor tan t ro^e to make Burma's p o l i t i c s . 
2 1 , J . S . F u r n i v a l i , The Goverance of B r i t i s h Burma^ New Yort: 
I n s t i t u t e of i^acif ic r e l a t i o n s ^ I960, p . 3 , 
22, I b i d . , p . 3 , 
2 3 , Richard , Butwell , The Changing Face of Sou theas t A^iaj 
Lexington : U n i v e r s i t y of Kentucky P r e s s , 1967, p .240 . 
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If we see the h i s t o r i c a l aspect of Burma, the Indian 
influence i s deep-rooted in Burmese cu l tu re and p o l i t i c s 
24 
because i t l i e s to the eas t of Bengal, A l t h o u ^ Burma shut-
off from the outer world by h i l l s and sea, i s f i t t e d to be 
the home of a unified people. But even now the progress of 
un i f i ca t ion , though accelera ted , i s incomplete; and when 
h i s to ry began the country was a medley of t r i b e s . So Burma 
26 
has been more than the val leys of a r i v e r syst^n. 
WDrld ^ r I I involved Burma in two devastat ing 
compaigns and three years occupation by Japanese troops, which 
destroyed two-thirds of the country 's productive capacity 
was not successful in t h e i r e f for t s to make the Burmese more 
in t e rna t iona l minded. On the contrary, i t reinforced t h e i r 
determination to r i ^ themselves of a l l foreign imperialism 
26 
and to win sovereign s t a t u s by t h e i r own e f f o r t s . 
The l a rge r Nicobar and Andaman groups lying off 
southern Burma have never been administered by Burma, although 
they have traded with Burma for cen tu r i e s . Both groups were 
27 
administered by the government of India. 
24. W,S.Desai, op.cit«« p«4» 
25, G.E.Harvey, Outline of Burmese History, (Calcutta j 1926} 
p . l . 
26. Virginia;Thompson and Richard,Adloff, The Left ¥ing in 
Southeast Asia, New York : William Sleane As so e la tes -
1960, p . 77. 
27, Christen, Leroy, John, op.c j . t . , p, i l . 
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Die geograph ica l p o s i t i o n of Burma p r o t e c t e d her 
from any p o s s i b l e a t t a c k . On t h t n o r t h e r n s i d e , she i s 
Dounded by the mountanious and undeveloped provinces of 
China. Like o t h e r c o u n t r i e s in Sou theas t Asia , Burma is 
28 
i n no poso t ion to defend h e r s e l f . 
By 1940 with the s i n g l e excep t ion of the P h i l l i p p i n e s , 
no t r o p i c a l appendage of any g r e a t pover enjoyed a l a r g e 
29 
degree of autonomy than d id Burma. 
Burma has come in to c lose c o n t a c t with Ind i a . This 
i s r e l a t i v e l y modern f e a t u r e of Burma and came in two d i s -
t i n c t s t a g e s . F i r s t l y in medieval t imes the t rade and i n t e r -
change between India and China s k i r t e d Burma to the North 
by way of T ibe t over the moutain r o u t e s and southev/ard 
round the c o a s t . Buddhism came to the Burmese a long t h i s 
s e a - r o u t e , fol lowed i n i t s time by Islam which has e s t a b -
l i s h e d l i t t l e more than a minor c u l t u r a l i n f l u e n c e . The 
Buimese t r a d i t i o n s developed in t h e i r own way and t h e i r own 
pace v/ i thin the p r o t e c t i v e i s o l a t i o n of the i n t e r i o r . The 
Bast India Comoany came to the coas twise t r ade r o u t e , through 
30 
which the B r i t i s h became a s s o c i a t e d with lower Burma. 
28 . Buss, A. Claude^ Sou theas t Asia and The l^brln Today^ 
i - r ince ton : MBL Dvan Nostrad Company, 1968, pp .38-39 . 
29. C h r i s t e n , Loroy, John, o p . c i t . , p . 4 0 . 
30 . E.H.G. Dobby, Sou theas t ±\sia^ (London : I960) , p . l S 9 , 
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If we go through the h i s t o r y of Burma, we f ind t h a t 
the e a r l y h i s t o r y i s o b s c u r e . The Burmese c h r o n i c l e s began 
with the supposed founda t ion of Tagaung in 850 B.C. But 
the s t o r i e s , they t e l l a re the copies of Indian legends 
31 
taken from S a n s k r i t o r P a l i o r i g i n a l s . The Burmese h i s t o r y 
inc ludes t h r e e d i s t i n c t e r a s in terms of t h e i r contemporary 
impact, the p r e - c o l o n i a l r u l e of the Burmese k i n g s , B r i t i s h 
Colonia l i sm, and the war time Japanese occupa t ion , l e f t 
32 
the independent Burma of UNU and General Newin, 
The scho la r s appear to agree t h a t the f i r s t migra t ion 
i n t o Burma took p lace about 500 A. D. Some of the Buimese 
33 
d y n a s t i e s were very pov/erful. 
The f i r s t major s t a t e in the Irrawaddy Valley of 
which t he re i s some r e c o r d had a c a p i t a l S r i k s h e t r a , no r th 
34 
of prome, founded around A.D. 638 by people c a l l e d Pyu, 
Ksha t r iya t r i b e s i^ gcstfjija;^  migra ted from I n d i a . The Kshatr iya 
36 
kings in t roduced the in f luence of Buddhism in Burma, The 
3 1 , D. G.E.Hal l , Burma^ London : Hutch inson ' s Un ive r s i t y 
L ibe ra ry , 1950, p . 7, 
32, Vandenbosch; Army, and Butwell , Richard, The Changing 
face of Sou theas t Asia^ Lexington : U n i v e r s i t y of 
Kentucky P r e s s , 1967, p , 241, 
3 3 , William, R.Peers and Dean ,Bre l i s , o o . c i t . j p . 4 7 . 
34, Richard, Al l en , o o . c i t . , p . 12. 
35 , S i r Aur ther , P .Phayre , H i s to ry of Burma^ (London: 
1883), p . 3 , 
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r e i g n of k ing Anavarahta (1044-77) i s a Convenient s t a r t i n g 
po in t h i s t o r y , who founded Burma's f i r s t n a t i o n a l kingdom 
of Pa^aw, The kingdom l a t e r conquered the Mon s t a t e of 
Southern Burma and put-down a l l r e s i s t a n c e and u n i f i e d the 
coun t ry . "Anawratha u n i f i e d the smal l p r i n c i p a l i t i e s t h a t 
c o n s t i t u t e d Bunna i n t o a r e l a t i v e l y United S t a t e . Burma's 
r e l a t i o n s with o t h e r powers during t h i s pe r iod were p r i -
mar i ly concerned with r e l i g i o u s r e l i c s . During, the pagan 
pe r iod , Anawarahta, one of the most popular and adventrous 
36 
of Burmese k i n g s , conqueredthe no r th of Arakan." 
At thto end of the 13 th cen tu ry the pagan kingdom was 
des t royed by Mongol-Chinese armies (KuDla Khan) and the 
next four and ha l f c e n t u r i e s vere marked by the absence of 
even the semblance of u n i t y in Burma except fo r the r e ign 
37 
of Byinmoiung (1530-1581 ) . 
The Monkingdom, which l a t e r s h i f t e d i t s c a p i t a l to 
Pegu, r ega ined i t s independence only to l o s e i t again in 
the 16th cen tu ry , v.'hen a new and powerful Burmese dynasty 
em6rg,ed. In 1740, when the Toungoo dynas ty was on d e c l i n e , 
the Ihns r e v o l t e d and r ev ived t h e i r kingdom and conquered 
38 
the -whole Burma and e s t a b l i s h e d t h e i r regime, The nex t , and 
36, Dorothy, Voodman, o o . c i t . ^ p , 15, 
37, Vandenbosch, Army and Butwell , Richard, o o . c i t . . n o . 
241-243. 
38, Al len , Richard, o p . c i t . , p . ] 3 , 
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the l a s t , great dynasty v.'as bu i l t by iUaungpa;/a (1752-bo;. 
'Ihis time the honour of uniting, the country went to Upper 
Burma, the f e r t i l e del ta of the South was overrun and in 
l7bb Alaungpaya crowned himself a king of Burma. The 
expansion of Alaungpaya's empire happened about the time 
that the Br i t i sh liast India Company was increasing i t s 
trade a c t i v i t i e s and p o l i t i c a l hold over India. After 
Alaungpaya, there were few strong kings . Vhlle the Burmese 
empire f lourished in i t s f i na l glory before the inevi table 
d i s in teg ra t ion se t in . fhe East India Company was beginning 
to take an i n t e r e s t in Burma, Br i t i sh t raders came to the 
Burmese coui't seeking concessions and t rea ty r igh ts to 
Christen missionaries came to preach and teach, >Iow Burma 
Decame aware of tht world, she sent mission to Europe to 
study and obseive, xlowever, i t was ra ther l a t e in the day 
when jurma starced to wake up and move slov/ly in the 
d i r ec t ion of mate i ia l and s c i e n t i f i c progress. In diplo-
39 
macy and foreij^n r e l a t i ons she had lagj_^ed farbehind. In 
the eie,hteenth century Burma was an uncertain fac tor and 
the centre of gravity of p o l i t i c s v;as India, where the 
Br i t i sh were gaining ground over the French, 
39. Maun^, Maung, o p . c i t . j p, 13, 
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i'ne annexation of Arakan by the king 3o da way a 
broUj^ liL the Burmese up to share a long f ron t i e r with the 
Br i t i sh in India. Victories confirmed the Burmese in 
t h e i r bel ief that the world was a t t he i r f ee t . The Br i t i sh 
were a t f i r s t somewhat conscious and made a t t e - p t s to 
e s t ao l i sh diplomatic r e l a t i ons with the i r young and exuberant 
neighbour. 'Ihe effor ts of the Br i t i sh t o t a l l y fa i l ed to 
get t r e a t i e s of f r iendship or commerce from the king or 
40 
to e s t ab l i sh permanent diplomatic missions in Rangoon. 
After the annexation of Arakan, King Bagyidaw con-
quested Assam and a f t e r the v ic tory the disputes about 
borders, ex t rad i t ion increased. Diplomacy fa i ledto es tab-
l i s h f r iendly r e l a t i o n s between the two powers. Mil i tant 
natio-ialism was a s t i r in Burma and the people were ready 
for v.'ar with the B r i t i s h , So the f i r s t nnglo-Bui'mese war 
broke out . The war was popular not only with the princes and 
the army out also with a l l c l a s ses . The Burmese defeated 
in this war and Burmese troops dispersed, broken and l o s t , 
Ihe Br i t i sh teims for peace emboldled in a draf t t rea ty 
were accepted by the generals in the f ie ld and the Burmese 
minis ters protes ted vigorously agains t the demand of Arakan 
and the indemnity, they said, "our fores t s contain fine 
^0* Ib id . , pp. 27-28. 
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n 
t r e e s , you may cu t them down, but ve do not &rov7 rupees . 
Wien the t r e a t y was no t r a t i f i e d by the k ing , the B r i t i s h 
pushed on to^cards t v a , "Once more ano the r Burmese deputa-
t i on i n c l u d i n g an A.merican B a p t i s t mi s s iona ry D r . P r i c e , 
went to n e g o t i a t e peace terms and a t "yandaoo" the terms 
4i 
ccepted u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y . " 
Diplomatic r e l a t i o n s betvjeen the c o u r t of •^ •va and 
the B r i t i s h of India were thus h a l t i n g and becoming d i f f i -
c u l t . Ava would n o t cons ide r pos t ing a permanent miss ion 
in Ind ia , and the k ing and h i s cour t only v/anted to f o r g e t 
the t r e a t y of landabo. The opening of a new regime a t Ava 
worsened of Burma-Bri t i sh r e l a t i o n s . The nev; k ing Tharawsddy 
was ambi t ious to go down in to h i s t o r y . The shame of Yandato 
must be e rased and the k ing decided t h a t the most convenient 
way to do so was to r e j e c t the t r e a t y , 
ihe Sfccond-Anglo-Burmese war came i n 1862 and in 
the aosence of d ip lomat ic r e l a t i o n s , i t was unavoidable . 
Bie chief towns in l o v e r Burma f e l l to the B r i t i s h Lmpire 
and the vhole of the g r e a t mari t ime province of Pegu was 
annexed by Lo^rd DalJ^iousie. So l o v e r Burma became a p a r t 
4 1 . Ib id . J pp. 30 -38 . 
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42 
of the B r i t i s h empire i n 1£52. 
Af ter the second Anglo-Burmese USir the r e i g n came 
in the hands of King Mindon.King Mindon was a man of peace . 
^-:is r e l a t i o n s with the B r i t i s h i n lov/er Burma v a s t l y 
improved, Mindon s e n t a goodv/ill miss ion to Ca lcu t t a e a r l y 
in 1855, and the m i s s i o n warmly r e c e i v e d by Loard Dalhousie, 
was a success Diplomat Sir Aur ther P h a y r e ' s successo r , s l so 
n e g o t i a t e d a t r e a t y , in 18b7, with the k i n g , t h i s t r e s t y , 
i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to n o t e , was merely as p o l i t i c a l as i t 
was commercial. King Mindon was So wise and s k i l l e d in 
s t a t e smansh ip t h a t he t r i e d to p r e se rve the sove re ign ty of 
the Burmese kingdom and he was shrewd enough to see t h a t 
hope must l i e not in the might of arms but i n diplomacy, 
lie worked hard to b u i l d f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s v/ith the West 
43 
and to get Zurma's s o v e r e i g n t y i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y r ecogn i sed . 
After Mindon'£ dea th , the t h i r d war between Aiglo-
Burma carab i n 1886. Burma was de f ea t ed in t h i s war. On 
1 January 1886 the independent kingdom of Ava annexed to 
B r i t i s h Burma i t s d e s p o t i c monarch Thibaw had been deposed 
and e x i l e d , and the abo rp t ion of Burma in to the B r i t i s h 
42, J e s s e , F.Tennyson, o p . c l t . j p . 29. 
43 . Maung, Maung, oa . c i t . j pp. 46-49 . 
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Indian empire. The g radua l annexa t ion of the count ry was 
the r e s u l t of th ree wars . Burma was admin i s t e red as s 
province of India u n t i l 1937, when i t became a s e p a r a t e 
45 
colony. 
The G u r r i l l a warfare was going on between B r i t i s h 
t roops and the Burmans from the beginning of 1886, "After 
the s e v e r a l years of G u r r i l l a war fa re , of dea th and d i s a s t e r , 
the ch ie f l e a d e r s of r e b e l l i o u s had f a i l e d to supress i t 
in lower Burma. The G u r r i l l a v/ar came to an end suddenly. 
Those r e b e l l i o n s which were spread i n Lower Buima} were 
40 
de fea ted by the B r i t i s h Indian t roops J' 
Af te r the annexa t ion of Burma in B r i t i s h - I n d i a n 
empire, the c i v i l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of upper Burma was d iv ided 
in to f o u r t e e n d i s t r i c t s , each under a Deputy o r A s s i s t a n t 
Commissioner with a p o l i c e a s s i s t a n t . But the l o c a l adminis-
t r a t i o n of lower Buima was based on the c i r c l e with i t s 
47 
h e r e d i t a r y headman. 
44, Tinker , Hugh, The Union of Burma^ London : Oxford 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1969, p , l , 
45 , Mende, Tibor, Sou theas t Asia between Two IferldST 
London : T u r n s t i l e P r e s s , 1955, p . l l l . 
46 , Cady, F.John, Sou theas t Asia ± i t s h i s t o r i c a l develop-
mentj New xork : Mcgraw-Hill Book Company, T964,p ,398, 
47 , ., D .G. i . i ; ' *a ix£ i t , , p . 143. 
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Some changes came in the machlnary of the cent ra l 
government a t the end of the lOth century. The government 
functioned very much l i ke tha t of any other Indian province. 
At tha t time, great changes were taking place in the out-
side vorld, the effect of these changes f e l l upon Burma, 
"k new era of economic competition had begun between the 
leading European pov/ers; the rapidly expanding industr ies 
of Europe needed more raw materials from the t rop ics , and 
in consequence Big Business was demanding the more e f f i c ien t 
explo i ta t ion of colonies.- In 1S97, some changes s t a r t ed 
taking place in Buiroa, l i ke promotion of chief commissioner 
to the rank of Leiutenant Governor, a s s i s t ed by the 
Legis la t ive Council of nine nominated members, including 
48 
five non-of f ic ia l s . " The Jud ic ia l system was also introduced 
in Burma which was oased upon the B r i t i s h pr inciple of 
the separat ion of power. "Burma cons t i tu ted a loca l admi-
n i s t r a t i v e uni t under chief commissioner, a s s i s t ed by his 
s e c r e t a r i a t , un t i l in 1S97 i t was ra i sed to the s ta tus of 
a separate province of the Indian empire with i t s own 
Lieutenant Governor and a small l e g i s l a t i v e council . The 
loca l government is capable to make lavs for Burma, but 
important matter such as finance were s t i l l reserved to 
the cen t ra l government in India on whom councils of Burma 
49 
was unrepresenta t ive ." 
isT m ^ . , p. 147. 
49. Maung, Maung, o o . c i t . , p . 78. 
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Following the example of the government of India, 
the municipal i n s t i t u t i o n s with l imi ted powers were 
gradually introduced in Burma. Nominated municipal commi-
t t ees came into existence in a few towns of 3urma in 1874. 
Eight years l a t e r the number was increased and the e lec t ive 
pr inc ip le was also Introduced in Surma. The people of 
Burmese towns welcomed t h i s op^^ortunity of having a voice 
in thL management of their,own a f f a i r s . The uroan areas 
had four separate communities with d i f fer ing in t e re s t s 
as Juimese, Indian, Chinese and European, After the turn 
of the century a department of j a i l s and hosp i t a l s , a chief 
court of judicatui-e with a j u sd i c i a l service, a commissiontr 
of land revenue, a chief conservator of fo res t , a d i rec to r 
of ag r i cu l tu r e , an exercise commissioner and a public 
hea l th dt-partment were es tao l i shed . Sta te education was 
o l 
extended a f t e r 1900. 
During th i s time the wave of nationalism spread s l l 
over Asia. :iow could Burma remain untouched by th is wave. 
T!ie events within Burma v/ere influenced by other countr ies . 
Japan's v ic tory over hussia in 1906, provided vivid evidence 
that the white man was not unconquerable. The hect ic 
oO. D, u.ii. l a l l , DO. c i t . , pp. 14&-149. 
51 , Allen, -lichard, o p . c i t . , p, 9S. 
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p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of the Indian na t iona l Ckangress led 
by Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Nehru in India, (of which Burma 
was a par t un t i l 1937}, cons t i tu ted another important 
factor for Jurmese nationalism which inevi tably took 
in sp i r a t i on from Ind ia ' s s t ruggle for freedom. Consequently 
the -Loung Man 3uddhist Association was founded in 1908. 
I t acquired p o l i t i c a l s ignif icance as a channel for the 
62 
t en ta t ive expression of n a t i o n a l i s t goals , 
"The transformation of the provincia l government, 
which began in 1897, car r ied a stage fur ther under the 
Minto-Morley reforms of 1909, when the Legislat ive Council 
of Burma was increased in s ize to a membership of t h i r t y 
witli a non-off ic ia l majority,Only one of these was electdd 
and he was chosen by the Burmese chamber of commerce an 
53 
en t i r e ly European organization^^ 
torld \^r I hastened cons t i tu t iona l progress in 
India and as a par t of i t in Burma as well . The Br i t i sh 
government had done th i s in order to appease r i s ing Indian 
nationalism and woo India ' s support in the war. Nationalism 
in Burma pecul iar ly enough, grew out of Buddhist organisat ion. 
52. Vendenbosch, Army and Butwell, Richard, o p . c i t . , 
pp, 243-244. 
53, Tinker, Hugh, o p ^ c i t . , p . 1. 
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3urma v.'ss a^-cre of ac tua l p o l i t i c a l development. I^e 
f i r s t na t iona l sentiment developed in Burma in 1916-T7, 
An announcement by the Secretary of State 14i-. Mont^ ^gue 
in 1917-1918 that Burma was incapable of exercising the 
de£,ree of self government, planned for India oecause 
Burmese lacked experience inrepresenta t ive government, 
which is necessary for the ^^'orking of 3 democratic cons t i -
tu t ion on the western model. Largely for th is reason the 
Hontagu-Chtlmsford Iieport proposed to se t aside the problem 
of her p o l i t i c a l t ve lua t l on ' f o r future cons idera t ion . ' "Ihe 
proposal evoked an immediate storm of p ro tes t in the 
country. Burmese na t iona l sentiment, long dorra'.nt, suddenly 
awoke and began to shov; i t s e l f as a force to be respected. 
The n a t i o n a l i s t General Council of Burmese Associations 
(G.C.3.A.; carr ied an intense p o l i t i c a l ag i t a t ion , organized 
55 
boycotts and demanded home r u l e . " Everyone took the strength 
of na t iona l feel ing by s u r p i i s e . i i e r e fo re , in 1921, the 
secre ta ry of State for India recommended to parliament th-it 
5D 
the 'dyarchy' ^ranted to India by the Government of India 
o4. Maunji, Maun^, o u . c i t . y pp. 79-80. 
55. D. G.E.Hall, g p . c l t . , pp. 149-150. 
ot>. (Dyarchy was the name given to the reforms of 1919-
1923. In principle, it extended a measure of home 
rule to the. province of Burma, under a British governor, 
two appointed members and two ministers, who repre-
sented and responsible to a unicameral E^g^ Jxi Legis-
lative Council). 
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Act 1919 should be extended to Burma, and the government 
of 3urma Act 1921 vas passed to bring Burma into l i ne v/ith 
the other provinces of India. Dyarchy system proved 
unsuccessful and although the G.C.3.A, condemned dyarchy 
as inadequate, Burma became a Governor's Province in 1923 
and the nev; form of government was es tabl ished, though the 
Shan S ta tes , Karennl and the Tribal Hi l l s v;ere excluded 
from i t s operat ion, The Legis la t ive Council vas increased 
to 103 members of whom 79 vere to be elected on a democratic 
f ranchise , 2 were ex-off ic io and 22 nominated. "The govern-
ment was entrusted to a Governor with an Exedutive Council 
of two members in charge of Jueserved subjects , and tvvo 
min i s te r s , responsible to the l e g i s l a t u r e , in charge of 
t ransfer subjec ts . The reserved subjects comprised defence, 
law and order, finance and revenue. The transference of the 
fo re s t department placed Burma ahead of a l l the o ther pro-
vinces of India except Bombay. The franchise was granted 
to householders without sex d i squa l i f i ca t ion and with eigh-
58 
teen years as the minimum age l i m i t . " At the very movement 
for nationalism a t the grass roots l eve l divided, in 1924 
to 1926, into tv;o p r inc ipa l f ac t ions . There was a s p l i t in 
o7. pui 'cel l , Victor, The Revolution in Southeast Asia, 
London : Thans and Hudson, 1962, p, 82. 
58. D. G.E.Hall, op.cii;;., p, 150. 
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the independent par ty . Dissidents led by U paw Tun broke 
avay to form a 'Swaraj pa r ty ' pledged to work for the 
abo l i t ion of the dyarchic system. In the e lect ions of 
192o, the Ni; t ionalist got twenty five sea t s , and the 
Swarajists nine while the independent and non-party members 
maintained the i r majori ty. Ihe majority of Indian members 
wanted to support the Burmese Nat iona l i s t groups in l e g i s -
59 
l&tion who \N'as not contrary to t h e i r communal i n t e r e s t s , 
Ihe next stage of cons t i tu t iona l progress was con-
sidered by the Br i t i sh au tho r i t i e s in 1928 the Burmese 
s t a r t e d demanding separat ion from India. Biey v^anted d i rec t 
r e l a t i ons with tht English sovereign because they feared 
Increasing Indian immigration and economic competition. 
The Burman feared " t h a t the i r country might one day become 
avassal s t a t e of an Indian commonwealth ruled by the 
Indians. This movement for separat ion was s t rongly supported 
by the Br i t i sh oecause Br i t i sh business i n t e r e s t s in 
Burma favored separation} they had no desire for re tent ion 
of the t a r i f f on s t e e l imports and many expected to wield 
more influence than they had under the Government of India 
i f a separated Bui^ ma should be placed under Colonial office 
59. David, G.Hinners, Br i t i sh Policy and the Dfivelnpment 
of Self Government in Burtnaj 1935-1948. Chicago; 
I l l i n o i s , 1951, p . 33 . 
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jurisdiction. Other businessmen wanted to lessen the 
growing Indian competition in comi'^ erce and industry and 
it was assumed that a separated Burma could impose a ban 
on further Indian immigration. Most of the British official 
favoured it due to local patriotism, as well as to their 
belief that the Burmese as a people were innately hostile 
60 
to the Indians." 
lo see these circumstances Simon Commission which 
came in 1928, r tpor t ed in favour of separat ion and soon 
a f te r the publ icat ion of i t s r e p o r t , the Hound Table Con-
ference met in London to discuss the framework of a new 
Indian cons t i tu t ion to replace the dyarchy, the delegation 
of Buima a t the f i r s t session of the confer-.nce v;ere l e s s 
f o r t h r i s h t on the suoject of separat ion, Before committing 
their country they wanted assurances that her ra te of 
cons t i tu t iona l progress one her economic re la t ions with 
India would not be prejudiced. To see the unqualified 
support given to separat ion by the European c i v i l servants 
and businessmen, suspicion among Burmese aroused. At the 
end of the conference in January 1932, the Prime Minister 
MacDonald announced that "the government would do with 
60. Ib id . , p, 41 , 
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separat ion a f te r the question has been put before the 
3urma e l e c t o r a t e , " 
j3ie Ant i -Separa t ion is t then declared the i r ob;jective 
to be "federat ion v/ith India with succession r igh ts reser -
ved," Ihfc t l ec t ions r e s u l t v.^ as in favour of an t i - separa-
t ions t . 3a Maw's party v;on the general e lec t ion held in 
November 1932. London found i t impossible to abide by 
th is decision vtoen the reforms were f i n a l l y approved in 
1936, The attempt of the a n t i - s e p a r a t i o n i s t Legislat ive 
Council to resolve the question of separat ion or federat ion 
along with a l t e rna t ive l i nes from those proposed by the 
London government quickly ran ground. This proposal ignored 
London's Sovereign Const i tu t ional au thor i ty . The authori ty 
continued to urge tht council reexamine the proposals 
o f f i c i a l l y se t oefore i t and sutxnitted a summary descr ip-
t ion of the proposed separated cons t i tu t ion as the basis 
for such ac t ion . 3ut in 1933, the au tho r i t i e s in London 
formulated the new 3ui'ma cons t i tu t ion In the absence of 
b2 
any c lea r expression of opinion from Burma, 
The government of Burma Act of 1936 a^r^arded "qualif ied 
dominion s t a tu s " to Jurma, separated from India, a s t a tus 
b l . Ib id . , p, 43, 
62. John, F.Cady, o p . c i t . j pp, 618-619, 
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A(jhich was to remain u n t i l the Japanese invasion and occupa-
t ion in 1942. The proposals of the Br i t i sh Government's 
"white paper of 1933" on which new cons t i tu t ion was based 
were included in the Government of India Act of 1936. These 
proposals passed in the c r i t i c a l "second reading" in the 
douse of commons in February 1936, by a vote of 404 to 135. 
The new Consti tution came into ef fect in 1937. This pro-
vis ion took a degree of responsible government in Burma 
63 
adtual ly ^^reater than tha t of in India. I t alloved to 
set-up tv;o chamucrs of parliament, a Senate and a House of 
Representatives, half of the members of the Senate vtre to 
be nominated by the Governor, but the lower louse V/E^ S 
en t i r e ly elected under an extended f ranchise . A.mong the 
132 members, 22 members were elected by spec ia l 'Communal 
Gonstituences' to represent the minority JEK^ peoples. There 
were also nine European members. The government of 'Burma 
proper' developed into a Cabinet led by a premier and res -
ponsible to parliament. The government control over the 
na t iona l l i f e ; excepting only defence, foreign af fa i r s -.nd 
monetary pol icy. These subjects remained the d i rec t res-
pons ib i l i t y of the governor, who was appointed by the Bri t i sh 
government. The Shan Karenni, Salween Di s t r i c t s and 
remaining h i l l areas remained under separate forms of 
$4 
adminis t r a t i o n . 
o3. David, G.IIinnei^s, Qo.c i t . ) pp. 60-61, 
o^, Hu^h, Tinker, o p . c i t . , pp. 4-6. 
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Tht f i r s t e l e c t i o n took p lace under t h i s Act vhich 
brought s e v e r a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s came in to p o l i t i c a l 
p i c t u r e . The l a r t r e s t was the United General Council of 
Burma A s s o c i a t i o n (G.CB.A. ; l ed by U.Ba r'e, but he WDS 
65 
unable to f ind s u f f i c i e n t adherence to command s ma jo r i t y . 
But the f i r s t f'rime M i n i s t e r of Burma vas Dr. Ba Haw whose 
•Sinyetha Vunthanu' P a r t y has no m a j o r i t y . In February 
1939 he was d e f t a t e d , and a new m i n i s t r y was formed ou t 
of Ja P e ' s ^roup and t h t new 'Myo c h i t ' p a r t y led by the 
ambi t ious and t h u r s t i n g U Saw. In September 1940 u.Saw 
cap tu red the u remicrsh ip , which he held u n t i l January 1942: 
l',hen he completed the v i s i t to B r i t a i n and the United 
S t s t e s to seek assurance of independence, he v/as de ta ined 
in Uganda on ^rounas of con tac t s v;ith the Japanese , In 
the absence of U.Saw, S i r Pa Tun then became the fou r th 
Prime Min i s t e r w i th in f i v e y e a r s , remaining in o f f i c e u n t i l 
o7 
the Japanese invas ion . 
Af ter Dr Ba I!aw*s downfall h i s p a r t y l i nked with 
the TLakins to form a new f r o n t c a l l e d the "Freedom b l o c . " 
6 5 . Vic to r , Pu i ' ce l l , o p . c l t . ^ p . S3 . 
ot), (Lovers of the Mat ionj , 
o? . Ilu^h, Tinker , o o . c i t . j p . 5 . 
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I t fol lowed a po l i cy of a n t i - s e p a r a t i o n from Ind ia . Mr 
3a Sein was the l e a d e r of the Thakins and he a t t ended the 
Samgarh s e s s i o n of the Indian Nat iona l Congress in 1940, 
68 
which was p r e sen t ed by Gandhi and Nehru, On August 1, 
1942 a Burma Execut ive Admin ins t r a t ion was s e t - u p with 
5a Maw a t i ts head. He withdrew from h i s own 'S inye tha 
p a r t y ' and from the Thakin l e a d e r s h i p . Now both the p a r t i e s 
were merged in •Mahbama Asiayons* (Radica l n a t i o n a l i s t ) 
Aung San who belongs to t h i s p a r t y went to Japan, as a 
l e a d e r of the ' T h i r t y Comrades. ' They r e t u r n e d to Burma 
with the invading Japanese , The o t h e r t h i r t y n a t i o n a l i s t s 
who adopted the name 'Ne Win' meaning b r i g h t sun, i s a 
m i l i t a r y f i g u r e . I t renamed in p l ace of 'Burma Independent 
Army' the 'Burmese Defence Army.' The Burmese n a t i o n a l i s t 
hoped to use the Japanese to o u s t the B r i t i s h and gain 
t h e i r independence so the 3a Maw government became mainly 
a v e h i c l e for p r o t e c t i n g the Burmese from the harshness of 
Japanese r u l e . The Ba Maw government o rgan i sed a movement 
to r i d t h e i r country from c o l o n i a i l s i t . Tnis o rgan i sed move-
69 
ment became the "Ant i F a c i s t P e o p l e ' s Freedom League." 
(A.F .P .F .L . ) . 
o8. Ib id . , p , &, 
69 . Army, Vandenbosch and Richard, Butwel l , o p . c i t . . 
p . 242. 
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We can not Ignore t ha t the p o l i t i c a l s i t ua t i on in 
Burma, vhich supported Ba Maw government in the l a t e t h i r t i e s , 
was also d i r e c t l y affected by developments in neighbouring 
India and E China. The objectives of the Indian Congress 
i->arty were confined for the most par t to the Thakins and 
to Dr. 3a Maw's following. We set tha t Mr. John F.Cady 
r i g h t l y pointed out , "Japan 's A i i t i a t i o n in 1937 of an 
ef for t to conquer alJof China found 3ur...ese opinion gene-
r a l l y pro-Chinese. Some of the Thakins echoed a n t i -
imper ia l i s t ag i t a t ion emanating from Indian Communist sources 
and began examining the general a p p l i c a b i l i t y of Marxist 
p r inc ip les to Burma's economic and p o l i t i c a l problems. In 
general but with notable exceptions, the revolutionary 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement in Burma was prepared to accept a s s i s -
tance from v i r t u a l l y any quar ter , including even the Japanese, 
70 
for the achievement of i t s p o l i t i c a l ends." 
When the Japanese at tacked Burma with the help of 
the 3 . I . n . , the weaker Br i t i sh forces , which were supported 
by the Chinese troops under General S t i lwe l l , were forced 
into a long but on the whole s k i l l f u l r e t r e a t . Here new 
All ied forces were assembled which checked and eventually 
defeated a strong Japanese th rus t in the region of Imphal 
70. John,F.Cady, o o . c i t . , pp. 525-526, 
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which was to oe the prelude to the Invasion of India. At 
th is time the Governor of Buitna with some of his collabora-
tors es tabl ished an adminis t rat ion in exi le a t the Indian 
71 
h i l l st-^tion of Simla. 
ihe effects of the Japanese occupation on the 
developiaent of the independence movement and more par t icu-
l a r l y on the a t t i t u d e s of i t s leaders have not been 
throughly studied but i t was during th i s time that most of 
the present 3urman p o l i t i c a l leaders gained thei r f i r s t 
s ign i f i can t experience in government opera t ions . \hen 
the Ilnd IwDrld War broke-out in Europe in Septemut-r, 19o9, 
the leaders of tht independence movement in Burma were 
attempting to bring together p o l i t i c a l groups of various 
i n t e r e s t s to form a kind of united front against the 
Br i t i sh , t.t the beginning of the year 1940, the newly 
enacted Defence of Burma regula t ions , giving the Governor 
au tocra t ic emergency powers, ens Died the Br i t i sh adminis-
t r a t i on to la Del the independence leaders suDversive and 
traitox-TUS to the s t a t e , .\ Burmese wr i t e r has observed 
that , The word 'independence' h i the r to unheard of in the i r 
(Burmc &) l i v e s , vhich Tokyo radio repeatedly held out to 
them, had worked l i ke magic ontheir wishful imaginations. 
71, xxichard, Allen, Qp , c i t . , p, I Q S . 
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UNU also said that the Japanese seemed to be the only 
eastern people t^ . could hold I t s own against the west, 
and we carne to look confidently to Japan for leadership. 
Some Juimese leaders v/ere conscious aoout Japanese efforts 
to woo Indian d i s s iden t s , some of wliom were working with 
the Japanese outside of India. There w .^re several groups 
of Burmans, who had gone Japan for mi l i t a ry t r a in ing . These 
groups l a t e r became known as the "'Thirty comrades".^mong 
these groups, some were prominent independence leaders , but 
others were the followers from various walks of l i f e . The 
mi l i t a ry t ra in ing was given to these men by Japanese, The 
other outside 3ui'mans were also to have the contact with 
the Japanese s ec r e t l y . Both Dr. 3a Mav,who had been the 
f i r s t Prime Minister under the 1935 cons t i tu t ion , and Dr. 
Thein 'laung, a former Minister of commerce, had pre-invasion 
r e l a t i o n s with Japanese, U Saw who followed 3a Mav as 
Prime Minister , was a r re s t ed and imprisoned by the Br i t i sh 
for having the r e l a t i ons with Japanese, The Marxist also 
joined hands with the Japanese, 
We see that Japanese had adopted a favourable a t t i t u d e 
towards the Burmese people a t the s t a r t . 'Bie bulk of Burmese 
population shov.'ed no desire to r e s i s t Japan's occupation 
and, unless they feared being charged as Br i t i sh agents, they 
did as they were told, William C, Johnstone r i gh t l y pointed 
• 33 . 
out, •*one major reason why many Burmans welcomed the Japanese 
and irfiy many of the Burma independence leaders of diverse 
views i n i t i a l l y believed the Japanese had come as liberators 
was the obvious unpreparedness of Britain to defend Burma 
adequately. The v swiftness of the Japanese invasion in 
January, 1942 was as much of a shock to the Burmans as to 
the Bri t i sh , but to the Buimans the shock had a double 
e f fec t . Ihey had given l i t t l e thought to a possible Japanese 
invasion or to any need for defense of their territory. Ibey 
looked upon the war only as an event that caused the British 
colonial government to hamper their moves for independence. 
Ihey assumed, as did the Brit ish themselves, that adequate 
provision would be made for defending Burma, !Die unexpected 
rapidity with which the Japanese routed the small British 
forces and cleared them from Burma led many Burmans f i r s t , 
to applaud the success of their Asian "brothers** and, second, 
to f e e l that they had, in fact , been l iberated from British 
72 
rule." 
Before the Japanese invasion the '•Thirty heroes** led 
by Thakin/ Aung San, were never in a position to attach any 
conditions to their assistance to the invading Japanese, 
72, William,C.Johnston, o p . c i t . , pp, 13-16. 
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They could only gambl* and hope for the best* The actual 
73 
military role had no importance for them, 
Bie British forces in Burma l e f t the t Japanese free 
to carry out their plans for the country as a part of the 
Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere* Under this plan 
the Buioiese territory vas to he used as a bait in a new 
peace approach to Chiang Kai-Shek. In this plan, the French 
were to be forced out of Ihdo-China and the province of 
Ibnking offered to CJhiang Kai-Shek, he was also to be offered 
large areas of Upper Burma. But Chiang Kai.Shek refused to 
accept the given independence. The Japanesevere careful 
a tout propaganda in Burma and other Southeast Asian terr i -
tor i e s . The Japanese Premier Tojo promised independence 
to the Burma* In organizing their Japenese dominated regime 
in Burma they needed more experienced co-operation than that 
of young Thakins, and Dr* Ba Maw became their tool . In 
1943, they set-up the ostensibly independent Kepublic of 
74 
Burma with Ba Maw as head of state with the t i t l e of 'Adipatl* 
giving him the status of a f a c i s t leader. Aung San and 
UNU became respectively Ministers for Defense and Foreign 
Affairs. The Burmese Independence Army «as dissolved and 
73. John, F.Cady, aiu£lfc.> ?• 676* 
74* "Adipadi" derived from the Pali-Sanskrit - term for 
head of State* 
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another forc« was organized imder close Japanese supervision 
76 
known as the Burma National Army* Adipadi Ba Haw made 
sustained efforts to qualify as Burma's ruler according 
to traditional syialx>ls and standards. He undertook to 
maintain the prestige of t3oth his of f ice and of h i s person 
in his strained relations with the Japanese military. 
Dr Ba Maw established friendly and fru i t fu l relations with 
premier ToJo* Adipadi Ba Maw also developed cordial and 
friendly relations with Sulshas Chandra Bose, the leader of 
the revived*Indian Independence League' and Indian National 
Army,* This led to the s h i f t by Bose of h is headquarters 
from Singapore to Rangoon in October, 1943, and also change 
76 
in the name of the organization to 'Azad Hind (Free India)* 
There were so many changes and developments has taken 
place in Burma under the Ba Maw government during the war 
under Japanese. I t was the f i r s t occasion that many of the 
Burman independence leaders had the experience of the re s . 
ponsible government. The leaders l ike General Aung San, 
Thakin NU and many other leaders, ybo led the AFPFL (Anti 
Facist People's Freedom League) after the Japanese defeat, 
gained their f i r s t p o l i t i c a l and governmental experience 
76* Richard, Allen, ojs^cit.j p« io4* 
76* John, F.Cady, ajU-filfc., pp* 676-677* 
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und«r the Japanese. It may be true as UNU described, "that 
many Buiiaans velcomed the Japanese as liberators from the 
alien rule of the British, i t was not long before the people 
f e l t the h^vy hand of the Japanese military." 
William, C.Johnston also rightly pointed out." It 
is doubtful, however, that the harsh, brutal, and arbitrary 
treatment of the Burmans by the Japanese military alone 
would have caused the Buzman leaders in the "independent" 
government to revolt against the Japanese. They could not 
be sure when the war would end It was obviously tight 
Japanese controls over a l l aspects of the economic l i f e of 
the country that opened the eyes of some of the Burmese 
leaders l ike ilung.San to the fact that this "made-in-Japan 
independence" was a shame." 
^^  The Japanese Army had a fu l l control over the economic 
l i f e of Buxma. Railway and river communications were mono-
polized by Japanese. The large quantity of rice supplied to 
Japanese military requirements. All resources to which 
Japanese could ut i l ise such as cotton, minerals, timber etc. 
were sent out of the country. "Sie 30,000 Burman labourers 
died in the construction of the infamous "railway of deatii" 
being constructed in the South between Burma and Thailand. 
After the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, Communist Parties 
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In ksi-B and else^^ere vere against the German-Japanese 
Fascism. In southeast Asia, the Communist organised aoft 
underground antl.Japanese movement. They also developed 
their relations with the Indian Communist Party (CPI). At 
that time !Qiakln NU and other Burmese leaders were acting 
under P,C.Joshl«s (General Secretary of the C.P. I , ) Ins-
77 
tructlons.'' 
On the other side y4dlled preparations for the 
counter attack from India on the Japanese position in 
Burma had begun with the establishment of a South.East Asia 
Command at the Que be Conference in August, 1943. Lord 
Louis Mountbatten was named the Supreme Commander and 
General St l lwel l of the United States was the deputy comman-
der. In view of the lack of Allied naval power in the Bay 
of Bengal and the extreme d i f f i cu l t i e s of the terrain for 
any overland Invasion, iMountbatten was much l e s s anxious to 
get on with the task than was S t l lwe l l . But the American 
Commander wanted soon recovery of Burma, because Burma was 
Important for mil itary supplies to China, ' v^ere the f inal 
struggle against the Japanese would probably be waged. 
Stl lwell* s main effort was to train a Chinese anty in north, 
eastern India with American aid which could drive the Japanese 
77. William, C. Jolpiston, QJH^SJ^,, pp. 19-20. 
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from northern Burma and thus r e s to re road Communication 
78 
with Kunming via the pre-war Burma Boad» 
OJie f i r s t aniversary of Burma's "independence" under 
the Japanese was celebrated in August 1944. The Anti Facis t 
Organization was formed s ec r e t l y by a few leaders of the 
Burma Defense ilrmy. They met witii both Communist and as 
well as S o c i a l i s t leaders to form th i s Organisation, i t 
l a t e r became the Anti Fac i s t People Freedom League (A.F.P.F.L) 
The AFPFL es tab l i shed contact with Simla (Br i t i she r s ) in 
l a t e 1943. !I!he objec t ive of the League was to a t t a i n self-
ru le to. for Burma. A se r i e s of circumstances, therefore , 
combined to place the "Thakins, the younger p o l i t i c a l 
leaders of Burma," a t the head of an ant i . Japanese movement 
%^ich cooperated with the Al l ied armies as they drove the 
Japanese out of cen t ra l Burma in the race to Rangoon. **Ih 
sh i f t i ng from an a n t i - B r i t i s h movement to tha t of an a n t i -
Japanese movement, Aung S%n and h is assoc ia tes not only 
a, 
kept pace with the fee l ings of most of the people but emerged 
a t the end of the war as na t iona l heros with an ent i iusiast ic 
popular support . The q u a l i t i e s in General Aung San tha t 
79 
helped him a t t a i n the top pos i t ion of a na t iona l l eader , " 
78, John F.Cady, fljBjiJiJ^., p . 677. 
79, William^C.Johnston, op . c i t . ^ p , £1 , 
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It was a l l due to the reason that the Japanese occupation 
of Burma wrecked the country's economic system, Burma 
suffered more from the war in comparison with any other 
Asiat ic country. Many towns of Burma were reduced to ashes 
by Japanese a ir -ra ids . All her external markets were l o s t . 
Japanese also looted the machinary, s c i e n t i f i c apparatus 
and even furniture, and stopped her rice export completely. 
Ttie destruction of Burma came heav.ily because Burma used 
to be cal led as Britain's principal shop window in the war 
against Japan' , The Burma became the main target between 
the se l f interest of Japan as v e i l as Brit ish. To the Al l ies 
i t s Importance lay in the maintenance of communication with 
China, and Japanese threat to India, which envisaged a 
possible link.up between their armies and the Germans. 
In these circumstances, when c i v i l government was 
o f f i c i a l l y restored in October 1945. The aim of Aung San 
and his party was complete independence. British policy 
at f i r s t envisaged a reconstruction period of some years 
as a preparation for the long.promised grant of "^Dominion 
status ." The organized strike of pol ice and governmental 
o f f i c i a l s in October 1946, Aung San and the other A.F.P.F.L. 
leaders won their way into the Governor's Executive Council. 
Viey also got the communist cooperation. I t was necessary 
for attaining the power that they were compelled to view 
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the problems of government from the practical angle of the 
maintenance of law and orderi the achievement of economic 
s t a b i l i t y , and the establishment of public confidence. So 
they had to break their relations with their old a l l i e s , 
80 
whose outlook and methods were quite different with them. 
To see these s i tuation, Sir Hubert R«nce, \itio was a major 
General and had served as Lord Mountbattln's Military 
Administrator in Burma, was appointed a successor in place 
of Sir Ibrman Smith. !Ilhe appointment was real ly genlous. 
Because Sir Hubert was a friend of Aung San and as a soldiers 
81 
the two could think al ike and speak the same language. Soon 
after this Aung San promised to the people ' indepoidence 
within one year* Aung San and the representatives of the 
Executive Council were invited to London to talk with 
Melem^t Att lee , (the Prime Minister of Labour government 
of London) and his cabinet. Aung San l e f t the Rangoon, 
(hoping for the best.* In London talks were frank and 
cordial. Mr. Attlee repeated his assurence to give f u l l 
independence m either within or without the British Common. 
wealth. 
Vhen Aung San came again to London to discuss matters 
with Att lee ' s Laisour Cabinet in January 1947, an agreement 
80. D.G.E.Eall, flJSUJCJLi., PP. 172-174. 
81. Se« a^i», William, C. Johnsdkon, Burma's Foreign Policy 
Massachusetts j Havard University Press, 1963, p,26. -^  
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was signed, popularly known in Burffla and elsewhere as the 
Aung-San Attlee Agreement. By the provision of this agree-
ment j his government was granted control over Burma*s 
finance and army, and the r ight to hold a general election 
for a Constituent Assembly in the following April. Ihe 
Brit ish Government bound i t se l f to accept the Verdict of 
the Burma electorate even if tiie resu l t were a vote in 
favour of complete independence. The agreement also safe-
guarded the rights of other indigenous races of Burma such 
as Karens, Shans, Kachins and Chins. Ilhe elections, on 
effect of th is agreement, were held in April, Aung San won 
an overwhelming majority a t the polls* 
!Ehe f i r s t session of the Constituent Assembly was 
held on June 9, 1947, and the Assembly also went to wo]± 
quickly*** On June 17th, the Assembly adopted a resolution 
moved by Aung San defining the basic principles ^ i c h should 
be breathed into the constitution, that Buzma should be an 
82 
'independent sovereign republic ' to be known as the "Union 
of Burma". According to th is resolution a l l powers of the 
s ta te were to be derived from the people and constitutional 
guarantee for the fundamental rights of cit izens was be given 
82. 'Union' (means Burma consist of specified autonomous 
units )• 
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interests of minorities were safeguardedfand i t vas stated 
that the sovereignity of the union shal l t>e maintained 
according to Justice and international law. The union should 
be dedicated to the id^a of peade and friendly relations 
83 
with a l l nations* 
Ihe Burma constituent Assembly passed the new constl . 
tutlon on 24th September 1947. But Ik by that time Aung San 
was no more. On July 19th 1947, he and several of his 
colleagues were assassinated at a cabinet meeting. The 
leadership of the AFPFL and of the Government passed into 
the hands of Thakin NU Who was the Deputy President of the 
League and the President of the Constituent Assembly, \i^ose 
policy was in a l l important matters the same as that of dead 
84 
leader Aung San. 
After assuming the leadership in October, Thakin NU 
went to London to sign a treaty with His Majesty's Government, 
popularly known in Burma as t^e NU.Attlee Treaty, >^lch made 
arrangements for Buzma's Independence, and also defined future 
relationship between Britain and Burma. After signing of 
this treaty Prime Minister Attlee introduced in the House of 
Commons the Burma Independence Bil l* 
83^ Maung, Maung, gjuj^lj^., pp. 107-109. 
84. D.G.B.Hall, o iUi i l i . , P. 176. 
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In accordance v l th t h i s B i l l , the Union of Burma came 
Into existence as a 'Sovereign Independence Republic' outside 
86 
the Br i t i sh Commonwealth of Nations on January 4, 1948. 
g>g gactegfowna of C^YAX >^r: 
Uii le Burma was going to achieve Independence by 
peaceful agreement, the other i n t e rna l p o l i t i c a l s truggle 
s t a r t ed between the s o c i a l i s t s and the communists for control 
of the AFPFL, which led to c i v i l war. Ihe reason of th i s 
i n t e rna l s t ruggle was tha t vtien in August, 1946, the AFO 
was reorganized as the AFPFL, a t t h a t time the leader of th i s 
organisa t ion Aung San invi ted " a l l p a t r i o t s and p a t r i o t i c 
p a r t i e s " to jo in the A.F.P.F.L. So t h i s organisa t ion became 
a popular f ron t , a coa l i t i on of various p o l i t i c a l groups. Hie 
s o c i a l i s t gave f u l l support to the AJTFL and i t s policy to 
a t t a i n independence by peaceful means. 
The great pressure on Aung-San and h i s s o c i a l i s t a l l i e s 
came from the various communist groups and the i r extreme 
l e f t i s t supporters . A So the communist refused to take orders 
from non.communist. At t h i s time the Burma Communist Party 
was also divided Into two wings. Thakin so and h i s followers 
86. Maung, Maung, ofij-fiii-i P» 110. 
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immediately organized themselves as the Communist Party of 
Burma (CPB) becoming popularly known as the "Eed Flag Ck>mmu-
nists** while Ihakin Than Tun's group became known as the 
"Uii te Flag Ck)mraunists". After few months of th i s s p l i t , 
Red Flag Communist began an underground compaign of violence 
aga ins t the Burma government, iSiakin than Tun and h i s Vbite 
Flag Communists alAed to gain control of the Burma government. 
So Aung San and h i s successor UNU gained the cooperation of 
th i s group within the AFPFL u n t i l independence. Aung San 
became Deputy Pres ident of the Governor's Council in l a t e 
September 1946, when Aung San refused Than Tun's pleas for 
g rea te r \4iite Flag representa t ion in the Council, Than he 
declared a general s t r i k e agains t the AFPFL government. 
The another reason for the general s t r i k e was tha t 
\^en the Aung San . A t t l ee agreement for Burma's independence 
was declared, the r i g ^ t e s t and l e f t i s t both opposed i t . The 
leaders l ike Ba Maw, Thakin Ba Sein and U Saw opposed i t and 
also Tc/iAc^ ' 'protest'* s t r i k e s . The underground Bsd Flag 
Communist increased t h e i r sabotage a c t i v i t i e s , l^en Aung San 
was assass ina ted and Thakin NU succeeded in place of Aung San. 
Thakin NU's f i r s t a c t was to reconcile with the Wiite Flag 
Communists. The e f fo r t s of Ihakin NU were some^at successful. 
Uien the KU-Attlee agreement was anix^unced, the Burma Communist 
. 45 . 
Party, a t f i r s t welcomed t h i s agreement, but soon BCP opposed 
t h i s agreement* William C. Johnson r i g h t l y observed, "Two 
provisions of the NU->A.ttlee agreement came under heavy f i r e 
from the Communists and the i r suppor ters . The f i r s t had 
provided for Br i t i sh ass i s tance in t r a in ing Burma's armed 
forces , sjid Burma had undertaken not to arrange for such 
ass i s t ance from any nat ion outside the Commonwealth. By 
the second provision the Burma Government had undertaken 
to pay equi table compensation for such Br i t i sh en terpr i ses 
86 
in Burma as the government might nationalize.** 
A meeting vas held in February 1947 in the Shan s t a t e s 
for the opposi t ion of the government. This meeting vas 
attended by the represen ta t ives of the Shans, Kachln and 
Chins. The Karens were aireaay s p l i t between pro-and a n t i -
government fact ions and looked to a measure of r e a l autonomy, 
because the Karens already had put the 'Home Rule* for Karen 
87 
in London. tlien the c r i t i c i sm of the AFPFL arose to take 
the provisions in the NU-Attlee agreement, Thakin NU rep l ied 
to the opponents »that the two provisions in the NU-Attlee 
agreement under a t tack by them were reasonable and normal 
86, William, C.Johnston, o p . p i t . j pp. 29-31. 
87. Richard, Allen, fla,uCll«> p. 106. 
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In in t e rna t iona l usage, tha t even the Soviet Government had 
paid compensation to pr iva te foreign i n t e r p r i s e s and tha t 
such communists countr ies as Yugoslavia had accepted th i s 
p r inc ip le .* The AFPFL government f a i l e d to achieve " l e f t i s t 
Unity", because the Burma Communist Par ty leaders es tabl ished 
d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s -with the vorld communist ntovement, serfcing 
guidance howfto overthrow the Burmese government. They also 
began to s t a r t the plan for c i v i l wars in South and Southeast 
Asia with the help of Moscow and other European Communist 
agents , they also developed r e l a t i ons with the Indian comma, 
n i s t Par ty . After the "youth" conference, Thau Iun|l and 
Qhosal at tended the second Congress of the Comaunlst Party of 
India^ There they also met with European Communist agents 
and party members. After re turn ing Ihakin Than. Tun have told 
the General Committee of the BCP in 1949, f « , . , , t h a t the 
Yugoslav Comrade \riho at tended the CPI Congress in India in 
1948 had advised him to go ahead with armed revolut ion in 
Burma, 9 
So by th i s decis ion, the BCP s t a r t e d to follow th i s 
plan and a t the end of March, 1948, " the l i i i t e Flag Coomunists'^ 
under Tha^ L Tun broke f i n a l l y with the AFPFL government and 
followed the e a r l i e r example of the "Red Flages" by going 
underground and commencing the i r armed insur rec t ion . The 
Burmese Communists became aware of developments in China and 
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they had also r ea l i s ed tha t the armed revo l t s of the Chinese 
Communists aga ins t the Kuomlntang Government were much 
more nearly p a r a l l e l to t h e i r o^ n^ des i res and ac t ions . !Che 
two communist groups stupk to the i r programitibf se iz ing of 
power by violence and began the i r underground res i s t ance , 
providing the spark for insurrec t ions tha t near ly toppled 
the AFPFL government f rpm power* Ihere has been no doubt 
tha t t h i s l a t e r development gave to the i%>re moderate AFpFL 
leaders , espec ia l ly the S o c i a l i s t s , a d i s t i n c t bias agains t 
Communist methods. I t was not good for the Burmese leaders 
tiiat they broke future r e l a t ions with the Soviet bloc nat ions, 
but i t was su f f i c i en t to make them wary of any r e l a t i o n s 
i^ich might r e s u l t in outs ide communist support for the 
Burma Communists. Ihus, ' Ihakin NU and h i s colleagues, in 
the f i r s t year of independence, had a strong predisposi t ion 
towards s t t t r ing c lear of alignment with e i t h e r the Anglo-
American group or the cojuaunist bloc, a forrunner of the i r 
policy of •neut ra l i sm," 
T3a.Q new government would welcome a l l groups \itio were 
ready to make a Burma a "Lef t i s t Country** —» Br i t i sh Indian, 
Chinese and Burmese and enabled the Burmese masses to enjoy 
a f u l l r i g h t . So the new government of Burma & had a double 
economic policy to overcome as a r e s u l t of the war. F i r s t , 
' i t had to proceed with a formidable job of economic rebabi-
l i t i o n and recons t ruc t ion . Secondly i t was committed to 
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undertake, hand-in-hand with economic reconstruct ion the 
development and execution of vdiolly new and untr ied economic 
po l i c i e s and plans cons i s ten t with i t s s o c i a l i s t goals , ' 
Die new Burmese government has decided a t the ear ly 
days of independence tha t s ince t h e i r f i r s t important tasks 
were to e s t ab l i sh the au thor i ty of t h e i r government in the 
face of r ebe l l i on and a lso firmed the economic reconstruct ion 
of t h e i r country, the leaders did every attempt to r ^ a i n 
unlnvolved in cold war p o l i t i c s . !Qius the leaders and mainly 
UNU es tabl ished "the cornerstone of a foreign policy l a t e r 
88 
l abe l l ed as neut ra l i sm." 
Soon a f t e r assuming the of f ice in 1948, UNU t r i e d tk 
best to uni te a l l the l e f t i s t forces in the country. So in 
May 1948 UNU announced a f i f t een point "Le f t i s t Unity Pro-
gramme", but the e f fec t of th i s programme was quite contrary 
as UNU thought. !niis programme was c r i t i c i s e d as having been 
influenced by Communist ideologies and apperently, UNU had 
hoped tha t the programme would be supported by th.. People's 
volunteer organisa t ion (P70) but v*ien the PVO leaders and 
several o ther Communist refused to support the ' L e f t i s t Unity 
Programme shor t ly a f t e r they went underground and launched 
a v io l en t com^aign aga ins t the government* 
88. William, C,Johnston, o p , c i t . , pp. 36-39, 
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Another reason of the v io l en t compaign and opposition 
of the UNU Government vas tha t UNU promised to make Buddhism 
the s t a t e r e l i g ion during an e lec t ion compaign so he won 
the support of the powerful «Phongiyis' and won the e lec t ion . 
But soon he found adc out t h a t the fulf i lment of the promises 
89 
viould De very d i f f i c u l t and f i na l l y leading to a c r i s i s . 
I t vas much l a t e r in 1953 UNU confessed, **I had not expected 
tha t tlje work of building up a nat ion would be so d i f f i c u l t . 
I had thought t h a t everything could be accomplished a t the 
stroke of a pen ^ e n one become the v i e lde r of p o l i t i c a l 
pover.** So the government plunged a f t e r t h e i r independence 
into the mult i fold tasks of organizing t h e i r administrat ion 
and deciding how and in ^ a t ways they should proceed to 
turn Burma into a s o c i a l i s t s t a t e . Ihe government also 
f a i l ed to prevent the \ ^ i t e Flag Communists from going 
to underground to Join t he i r Bed Flag Comrades. On many 
occasions UNU and h i s colleagues f e l t very much alone and 
wondered whether t h e i r "small , weak nat ion" would be able 
to survive* 
On the other hand, there was fea r of possible coup 
91 
become of Mujahids, and Aung San's p r iva te army, the People's 
89. B.B* Cha t te r j i and S.Krishnmurthy, Burma and Burmese 
Leadership^ ed. B.B.Chat ter j i , Meerut: Meenakshi 
Prakashan, 1966, pp. 180-181. 
90* William, C. Johns ton, OiUiuIJi*, P« 40. 
91* 'Mujahids* Muslim Marauders from Northern Arakan. 
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Volunteer Organization (PVO), Far more serious was a 
revolt of the Karens, including their regiments in the 
Burmese army. So the UNU government replaced tiie Karen 
Commander.in.Chief and appointed NeVin in place of him, 
Ilhere were disgruntled Karans who wished to take advantage 
of the Government's helplessness. A movement began in 
Papun to set.up a Karen govemment| a revolt broke out in 
karenni, led by a pretender to the throne.' Ihe Karen 
leaders Xhaton and >bulmeln were busy a t the end of Augast 
by Karen rebels, including Union Military Police mutineers, 
but a l l the Karen leaders woz^ Eed for a peaceful settlement. 
Ihe government also showed goodwill by appointing a Regional 
Autonomy Commission with the Chief Just ice, Sir Ba U, as 
Chairman. In this committee of 28 members 6 were Karens, 
so this body was the representative of the minorities. 
Ihe insurrection of Communists, PYO's and army mutineers 
were chacked by the government in th is time. The-Communists 
in Central Burma also suffered a heavy defeat* 3000's 
Communists also surrendered. A Peace mission was also 
formed, headed by Sir U Thwin, which made contact with the 
PVO and declaration was signed by the members of the mission 
and three PVO, leaders s ta t ing that understanding had been 
reached, and that the PVO would make 'unconditional surrender' 
to the Government. "This declaration was repudiated by the 
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Central Cominlttee of fighting for the more congenial pastine 
of ravanging the countryside. The old BIA . KAren conflict 
was played upon, and in many^ areas the Crovemment vas 
powerless to intervene". In the Karen's leaders meeting 
a t Bassein i t was resolved that the "UNU shal l accept r e s . 
ponsiDility for safeguarding l ives and propertty . . . . . in 
Karen majority areas.** In 1948| Karen formed the a pera. 
mil i tary organisation named Karen National Defence Organiza. 
tion (KNDO), their commander was Mahn Ba Zan.'^ Ihe extremists 
amongst the Karens now begin to force the peace. Maha Ba Zan 
92 
tr ied to persuade the Kachins to enter into an a l l i ance . " 
But in the l a s t months of 1948, a l l efforts for compromise 
failed because neither the UNU coalition nor the Karens could 
achieve a strong and unified command of the si tuation. 
a}ie Karen insurrection resulted in more intense guerri-
l l a ac t iv i ty lay the Communists and the PVO's. The outbreak 
of the Karen insurrection in early 1949 posed an even greater 
threat to existence of the AFPFL government. As Burma had 
refused to Join the Commonwealth, so there were some members 
of parliament in London and many Brit isher alarmed a t the 
poss ibi l i ty of warfare between the Burmese and Karen minorities 
92* Hugh, Tinker, OJ^A^JJI*) PP< 37-38. 
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because Br i t i sh agents were aided Karens. Although charges 
tha t the Karens were aided by B r i t i s h agents were denied by 
the B r i t i s h government, but UNU and h i s colleagues worried 
tha t the Karen i n s u r r e c t i o n i s t s might get a id from the west. 
Due to see these circumstances, UNU and h i s colleagues decided 
tha t the safes t way for Burma was to s t e e r c l ea r of alignments 
with major nat ions e i t h e r in the Communist or Anglo-American 
bloc» The pol icy of non-alignment was never designed to 
prevent Burma from receiving help from other nat ions "\idien 
offered without s t r ings a t t ached ." India invi ted the repren-
t a t i ves of Br i t a in , Pakis tan, Ceylon and Aust ra l ia to a 
conference in New Delhi to consider Karen problem. At the 
same time Burma Government sent a request to London and the 
Commonwealth countr ies for urgent f inanc ia l a id . The con-
ference a t New Delhi suggested the conc i l i a t ion of Karen 
differences through commonwealth meditat ion, through a good-
off ices committee of Commonwealth represen ta t ives in Rangoon. 
IJie proposal was opposed by UNU government as undue in t e r -
ference in i n t e rna l a f f a i r s . The AFPFL leaders could not 
accept or t o l e r a t e th i s kind of a s s i s t ance . To face these 
circumstances, add i t iona l arms were provided under the Br i t i sh 
Defense Assistance Agreement and by June the main th rea t of 
the combined communist PVO-Karen Insurrec t ion to the government 
had been considerably lessened. Ttie main reason of th is was 
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t h a t the government s t i l l control led the Capi ta l , Rangoon, 
and was s t i l l the government of Burma dealing v i th foreigp 
93 
powers. 
The Ckjmmunist a l so put t h e i r f a i t h in foreign aid to 
bring them v ic to ry . At the same time, the Chinese communists 
es tab l i shed themselves in neighbouring YUnnan l a t e r in 1949. 
iJie Chinese could a s s i s t Burmese, but the i r i s no evidence 
of any such cooperation. At the time of Chinese interven-
t ion in Korea, i t seeaed tha t the general var broke-out« !Die 
Burmese Communists wanted to l ink t h e i r forces with the 
Chinese army of i t should take the ancient Bhamo invasion 
94 
route into Burma. But there was no contact . So the 'People 's 
Army' was never able to function as a m i l i t a r y force, and 
so broke up into bands of Jungle g u e r r i l a s . 
To face th i s s i t u a t i o n , the rebe l s no longer stood 
as a l t e r n a t i v e s to the AFPFL Government; some secur i ty 
returned to Buima. The Prime Minister UNU declared tha t to 
bring the s t a b i l i t y in Burma was an extremely d i f f i c u l t task. 
But now, the government f e l t secure and summoned a mass 
meeting a t Rangoon to make the new plans for a welfare of 
s t a t e . But within two months, Burma was under tiie gravest 
93 . William,C.Johnston, o p . e l t . j pp. 60-61. 
94. P^g Na,tlQfiy 26 June, 196^ 
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t h rea t because of the menace of the Chinese Nat ional i s t s in 
Kentung S t a t e . 
After the emergence of the Chiang Kai-Shek regime in 
Yunnan tovarcls the end of 1949, a huge number of Nat iona l i s t 
troops s t raggled over into the 'va s t a t e s ' and Kengtung, d e y 
vere led by General Limi of tiie Eight Army, General Liw Kuo 
Chwan of the twenty-sixt)i Army, and Major-General Mah Chaw Yee 
of the 93rd Division. At t h i s stage the KMT behaved as an 
organized army on foreign s o i l . !I5ieir s t rength y&s about 
2,6CX), t h i s number increased up to 4,000 by April 1951, During 
1962 the KMT rec ru i t ed and t ra ined more troops and t h e i r 
number rose to 12,000 by the end of the year, TSiet KMT troops 
posed themselves as a ' l i b e r a t i o n army* on 'undemarcated 
t e r r i t o r y * . !lJhe troop a lso began to ac t as they had acquired 
some l ega l r i g h t to occupy the borderland. They also imposed 
taxes on the loca l people and to impress them into seirvice 
when requi red . Ihey were s trongly supported by the American 
Government. Towards the middle of 1952 the KMT extended the i r 
t e r r i t o r y up to west of the Salve en, Biey also contracted with 
the KNDO. To see t h i s , Wiite Flag Communist, ^ o in the wake 
of t h e i r recent defea ts , reacted aga ins t i t and launched a 
propaganda campaign fo r ' na t iona l un i ty ' agains t the KMT, They 
a lso made t h e i r assoc ia t ion with the P70 and the Bed Flags. 
So on I October a Tr ip le Alliance Pact was signed near Monjpwa 
and a lso the terms of cooperation wttre decided. 
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But KMT car r ied out a def in i te plan of a t tack towards 
the end of 1952. "On 8 February a combined KMT and KNDO 
force at tacked Loikaw, c a p i t a l of Kayah S ta t e , but f a i l ed 
to overrun the town. Three days l a t e r they captured the 
96 
c a p i t a l of Mongpan s t a t e , and then Kyukhok and Muse." Captured 
documents revealed tha t the Karen-KMT a l l i ance was gaining 
ground and they together entered in number of towns. Thus 
the pretence of '•borrowing'* Burmese t e r r i t o r y to prepare 
for LlMi»s triumphal r e tu rn to China was thrown overboard. 
The so ld ie r s of Formosa were now openly in te r fear lng in 
Burma's in t e rna l a f f a i r s in an unconcealed mi l i t a ry a l l i ance 
with an armed force challenging the e lec ted and in te rna t iona l ly 
96 
recognized government of the country. Buxmese were also 
feared to see the Communist Chinese a c t i v i t y to supress the 
KMT forces . "Burmese concerned about Chinese Nat iona l i s t 
troops in the i r country only because th i s s i t u a t i o n could 
97 
give the Peking Government a claim for in te rven t ion ." 
To see th i s s i t u a t i o n , ins tead of completing the task 
of crushing her r e b e l s , Burma had to use the major par t of 
her armed forces in dr iv ing off the invaders, Burma took 
96. Hugh, Tinker, oiUiiiiM PP. 61-63. 
96. Tibor Mende, SoV t^b Baa^ AsJ-a gfltygW tW wrIidS* 
London : Turnst i le Press , 1966, p.140. 
97. William, C.Johnston, £LIU£iJ(*» P* 22&« 
m Ob m 
98 
the matter gd; to the United Nations General Assembly forces. 
On the other hand Burma Aioy was now a much larger and more 
e f f i c i en t force and could supress the internal enemies. 
At the same time in February 19&4 the PVO and the 
Mujahids signed a 'ron-aggression pact* to respect each otheife 
territory, "even though the Muj»ljids were presecuting and 
mil i tat ing any Burman who f e l l into their hands." At the 
l a s t , in May 1954, the Triple Alliance collapsed in a "welter'^ 
of mutual recrimination and personal abuse among the rebel 
leaders. 
The Burmese Army launched a new offensive against the 
KNDO in 1955. Ihe ENDO f e l l back, deep into the jungle, 
surrendering their strongholds without contest. This brand of 
KNDO guerril la w i l l contrive to hang on for years, slipping 
over the Siam border. UNU describes his views in October 
1954 in these terms: "Uien insurrection becomes small enough, 
i t i s nothing more than dacoit>/» Certainly the c i v i l war, 
vdiich at one time seemed l i k e l y to swallow Bui^a, i s no longer 
a menace to the integrity of the s ta te . Up to the end of 
1954 the number of rebels giving themselves up to the govern. 
99 
ment forces ." 
98. D.G.E.Hall, ftfiaJiii., p. 180. 
99. Hugh, Tinker, oiUSit*! P» 58. 
- 67 -
Burma's f i r s t f ive years of Independence were a period 
of severe t r i a l s . One by one these c r i s i s were surmounted 
and by the end of 1953, the AFPFL leaders could look to the 
future with some confidence. Ihe AFPFL government had ample 
opportunity to put the basic concepts of i t s n e u t r a l i s t 
100 
policy to t e s t . Burma's Engl i sh-s ty le democracy was also 
the supporter of Burmese fo re ig i pol icy . To understand the 
Burma's foreign policy i t i s necessary to see the cons t i tu-
t iona l development of Burma during the yea r s . 
After independence of Burma i t i s in form of an 
Engl ish-s ty le democracy. The pres ident , elected by a Joint 
session of parliament, i s l i t t l e more than a cons t i tu t iona l 
figurehead. Parliament i s bicameral, I t s cabinet body and 
the Chamber of Deputies. Every c i t i z en of Burma over eighteen, 
having the r i g h t of vo te . I t i s popularly e lec ted . The 
chamber of n a t i o n a l i t i e s or Upper house is composed of elected 
represen ta t ives from the s ix s t a t e s ^ i c h make-up the union 
of Burma, The r ea l head of the Government i s the prime-
minis te r and cabinet are co l l ec t ive ly responsible to the 
Chamber of Deputies. Nominally the Union of Burma i s a Federa-
t ion but the pol icy of the Union government i s to uni te a l l 
101 
the peoples of Burma. 
100. William, C.Johnston, oiUiiiJ;.. P» 77, 
101. Lennox, A. Mi l l s , Southeast Asia^ Minneapolis: Univer-
s i t y of Minnesota Press , 1964, p . 29. 
. 68 -
After the establishment of the Bepubllc, the f i r s t 
e lec t ion took place in 1961, *ihen the government was galUr 
ing the upper hand in c i v i l war. Die AFPFL vfon three quarters 
of the seats in the l e g i s l a t u r e . 
once again the e lec t ion of 1966 appeared to he properly 
conducted, "except for the f a n t a s t i c ineff iciency with vdiich 
the e l e c t o r a l r o l l s were prepared ; of the Rangoon population 
of 737,000, only 200,000 were r eg i s t e red as e l e c t o r s . One 
p a r t i c u l a r feature of the 1956 Bangoon e lec t ion threw a ray 
of l i g h t upon the pa t t e rn of contemporary p o l i t i c s in Burma. 
3!he one poster which the AFPFL chose to paste up everywhere 
around Bangoon was a p o r t r a i t of detezmined looking young 
man in Japanese army uniform j Aung San. Out of the t h i r t y 
f ive united opposi t ion candidates, ttie only one to achieve 
e lec t ion was that man's brother, Aung Than. The legend of 
Aung San and the ' s t rugg le for independence' s t i l l looms 
la rge in Burmese poli t ics.** 
^f At the time of 1966 e lec t ion , the rul ing AFPFL coa l i -
t ion awaited with a confidence tha t was dangerously akin to 
102 
complacency.^' In the e l ec t ion AFPFL won 173 seats in 1966. 
Vhen the AFPFL s p l i t Into two f r ac t ions , one headed by UNU 
103 
and the o ther by XJBa Swe. 
102. Hugh, Tinker, aiUjalt.» PP» 88-89. 
103. Lennox, A, Mi l l s , aftjLfiii.i ?• 34, 
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on 5 June 1956 UNU announced that fhe would r e l i n -
quish the premiership for one year in order to undertake 
the reorganizat ion of the AFPFL and the elimination of 
corrupt elements. During th i s period UBa Swe became Prime 
Minister with three Deputy P r ^ i e r s : Kyaw Nyein (Minister 
for National Economy) and Thakin Tin (Minister for soc ia l 
s e rv i ce s ) - Ba Swe's r i v a l s in the leadership of the s o c i a l i s t 
par ty —-- along with Sao Hkun Hkio as Foreign Minister , 
Despite NU»s withdrawal from formal leadership , he remained 
c losely associated with government pol icy, pa r t i cua r ly in 
the realm of foreign a f f a i r s . He resumed the premiership 
in June 1 9 6 7 / 
At the end of the year the opponents within the Cabinet 
and the party became acute . Bie 'Swe-Nyein' group and NU«s 
associa tes f a i l ed to s a t i s f i e d the s o c i a l i s t Par ty , whose 
programme of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and na t iona l i za t ion had been 
p r a c t i c a l l y suspended in consequence of the continuing balance 
of payment d i f f i c u l t i e s . In th i s s i t u a t i o n , UNU followed 
the continuing re l ig ious and c u l t u r a l undertakings. 1 d i s -
turbing fac tor was the growing power of the mass p o l i t i c a l 
o rganisa t ions , Ba Swe's Trades Union congress was prooably 
the most powerful, but i t was r i v a l l e d by the All Burma 
Pesants* Organization of Thakin Tin and Thakin Kyaw Tun, as 
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well as the Federation ofTrade Organizations, But UNU's 
influence over r e l i g i o u s , c u l t u r a l , and educational tjodies 
was mov^ 
**Vith the s o c i a l i s t leaders divided and r e s t l e s s , 
UNU chose to toss an i n t e l l e c t u a l bombshell into t he i r midst. 
on 29 January 1958 the Ih i rd All-Burma Congress of the AFPFL 
was opened." He concluded tha t "Ihe AFPFL re j ec t s Marxism 
as a guiding philosophy or as the ideology of the AFPFL.** 
He also described^his own idea of welfare s t a t e and also 
appeal for higher moral standards within the par ty . His 
supporters praised the UNU*s ideas on na t iona l uni ty but the 
Swe-Nyeln group accepted i t as a d i r e c t challenge to i t s 
Marxist s o c i a l i s t Philosophy, So the r e l a t i o n s between two 
104 
group became bitter;* ' 
On the other aspect , both fac t ion clung to the AFPFL 
image. The other Swe Nyeingroup became the "Stable AFPFL" 
and UNU group cal led i t s e l f the "clean AFPFL", each f rac t ion 
organised i t s t rade unions. The c r i s i s appeared in August 
106 
vtien title budget had to be presented in parl iament. The 
s i t u a t i o n btcame worse. The d i s tu rb ing fac tor was the growing 
104, Hugh, Tinker, oiUfili . i PP. 90-91. 
106, John,H. Badgley, "Burma P o l i t i c a l C r i s i s " , Pacif ic 
AfXalia.> Vol. XXXI, No.4 (Decmeber, 1968), pp,346-346. 
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pover of the mass political Organization. Rapidly the rela-
tions between tvio AFPFL group became worse, and on 4th June 
1968 fifteen ministers and twenty two parliamentary secre-
taries resigned from the government. To solve the party 
deadloxsk and to restore law and orderi Premier UNU announced 
that parliament would be dissolved and a general election 
was fixed for November and on September 26, 1968, Premier 
UNU announced to handover power to general Ne Win. The 
selection of NeWtn was unopposed and Newin also accepted this 
offer. The New Ne win Government announced its decision to 
hold a general election but Ne Win government Included only 
106 
military men in administration. 
\*ien General Newin took office, he made seven reassur-
ing commitments:-
(1) *'Fair and free elections before April 1969, 
(2) To exclude the active leaders of the political parties 
from the Government* 
(3) 16 stop the army from interferring in political matters, 
(4) To control and punish acts of violence and lawlessness 
by military personal. 
(6) To act to supress crimes as far as possible. 
(6) To preserve the international peace. 
107 
(7) To maintain Burma's foreign policy of n e u t r a l i t y , " 
106. Butwell, Richard and Mohendden, Fredvonder, "The i960 
Elect ion in Burma", Pac i f ic Affa i rs , Vol. XXXIIII 
(June, I960), p . 144. 
107. J . S . F u m i v a l l , iScie Goverence of Burma, New York: 
. 62 -
The Newln Government quickly took onthe cha rac te r i s -
t i c of a "good government" and "reform government." But the 
e lec t ion of I960 brought overvdielmlng v ic tory for UNU and 
h i s par ty . On April 4, General Newin stepped out of off ice 
and vent back to h i s ro le as Commander-in-Chief of Burma's 
106 
defence forces . 
The pol icy and adminis t ra t ion of Burma during the 
period of February I960 to 1962, were not changed vhen UNU 
ree lec ted as a prime min i s t e r . I t i s qui te s imilar as i t 
was in 1967, The e lec t ion of I960 gave Burma a second 
chance to e s t ab l i sh democracy. But UNU -was not successful 
to pacify the opponents, on effect of t h i s , in March 1962 
General Newin again took over cont ro l , UNU was a r res ted along 
with a la rge number of o ther p o l i t i c i a n s . The l e g i s l a t u r e 
was suspended. General Newin became both Prime Minister and 
109 
Chief of S ta t e , 
The re l ig ious pol icy of UNU Government also provided 
a cause for the coup. The another reason is tha t UNU's 
effor ts to soothe i l l fee l ings could not succeeded for long 
if he governs poorly. ^However, in the pas t , h i s Impatience 
108. liliiJ.i p . 162, 
109. Lennox, i . ,Mil ls , ojUfiiJi.j PP. 38-39. 
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with the d e t a i l s of administering a government and h is readi -
ness to leave them to l e s s qual i f ied undertakings, once he 
had s e t the po l ic ies ——. were h i s grea t l im i t a t i ons as a 
leader ,^ As the English language Newspaper Nation put i t , 
with UIJU Burma has had "the world's best Prime Minister and 
worst adminis t ra tor . " To t e l l the t r u th Prime Minister UNU 
himself sa id a t News conference, ^The adminis t ra t ive machinery 
i s l i k e a broken down old jeap without a s t ee r ing v*ieel, no 
acce le ra to r , no gas tank and not even any tyres on the wbieels. 
How can you expect such a car to t r ave l a t l6o m,p,h,?f When 
one of the newsman observed and said, ' s i nce he had been tiie 
dr iver of the jeep for ten or i t s twelve years , he might 
be considered responsible for i t s condi t ion, ,* the Prime 
Minister near ly l o s t h i s temper but the point was obvious. 
The another reason of the coup tha t when UNU's Govern-
ment presented the budget for 196o-6l in parliament, the 
f i r s t instalment was of a new four year plan, the r e s t being 
expecte(|soon, the Government was cautious and conservative. 
Ihey s t a r t e d some vague ta lk about using foreign aid, but 
there was no good planning vdiich could a t t r a c t foreign fund. 
The main reason of the coup was tha t , the production 
r icd , ^ the s tap le crop, i s s t i l l lagging a t 93 per cent of 
what i t was 20 years ago. Wtiere as Burma exported 3,6 mil l ion 
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tons r i c e in 1939, i t exported only 2 mi l l ion in 1958 that 
f igure w i l l be Dut Darely loopedthls year,^ The reason is 
t h a t domestic requirements due to the population increase have 
grown grea t ly since the war, because r i c e represents about 80^ 
of Burma's exports , the country 's a b i l i t y to increase foreign 
exchange reserves and imports decreased, "The keys to even-
tua l broadering of the economy-depends upon an increase in 
r i c e production great enough to cover the growing needs of 
the country and permit an expension of exports ,^ Only the 
strong and firm leadership from the government can improve 
110 
the s i t u a t i o n . 
The UNU government sharply reduced foreign control 
of the nat ions economy through na t i ona l i za t i on and a policy 
of favouring Burmese businessmen. The government s t a r t ed to 
e s t ab l i sh new indus t r i e s , and also s t a r t e d the soc ia l welfare 
programme and also build an effect ive defence force . In 
effect of t h i s , the Burmese people can not save themselves 
to some degree of r e spons ib i l ty for the chaos and corruption 
UNU government was not so much firm to face the s i t u a t i o n . 
The war time head under the Japanese Dr Ba Maw put i t , 
^The Burmese have believed for a thousand's years or more 
tha t a government ex i s t s only to promote t h e i r r e l i g i o u s . 
110, Joseph, Lelyveld, New Claim in Burma, The Nev T.ear^ar. 
Vol. XLIII, No.38, (October 3 , 1960)p . lO , 
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e spec ia l ly by building pagodas and other r i ch and cos t ly 
ed i f i e s , f i t seems tha t the firm leadership i s necessary, 
because p o l i t i c i a n depend on public approval in democracy, 
of course, NU found i t more d i f f i c u l t to provide t h i s firm-
ness than did General Newln, On the o ther hand, Newin regime, 
for a shor t period a lso introduced so many programs for 
reforms viiich were extremely Important to the natiorts welfare 
but dangerous p o l i t i c a l l y . 
The Amy w i l l be standing by ready to move in a pros-
pect tha t i s never appealing to c i v i l i a n p o l i t i c i a n s . The 
most important f ac to r I s t h a t the Newln i s in a pos i t ion to 
turn h i s wisdom into p r a c t i c a l achievements. These clrcums-
111 
tances became the cause for a coup. 
Immediately a f t e r the coup and overthrow of the DNU 
government a Revolutionary Ck)uncil was formed on l^rch 2, 
1962, under the Chairmanship of General Newln, consis t ing 
of himself and s ix teen other members belonging to the armed 
forces . Ijie Revolutionary Council on the following day 
dissolve both the chambers of parliament, and the General 
Newin exercised f u l l l e g i s l a t i v e powers. The d i s so lu t ion 
of the union parliament produced Chain-reactlon under the 
Burmese cons t i t u t ion . The r e s u l t of t h i s was the d isso lu t ion 
111, Richard, Butwell, "UNU returns to power in Bunaa", 
The New Leadar^ Vol.XLlH, No.l3, (March 28, I960), 
p . 10. 
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of the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s a l s o , the Revolutionary Council 
a lso dissolved the s t a t e Councils of Shan, Kachin, Karen 
and Kayah and he formed f ive s t a t e Supreme Councils, consis t -
ing of i t s ovn min i s t e r s . Ful l povers of the government 
112 
came in the hands of General Newln. Not only the l e g i s l a t u r e 
but a l so the executive and the Jud ic ia l povers came in the 
hands of Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, In place of 
High Court and Supreme Court, the new s t a t e judic iary was 
es tabl ished consis t ing of a chief Judge and five other judges. 
The new s t a t e jud ic ia ry possessed a l l the powers but f u l l 
j u d i c i a l pov/ers were vested in General Newin. The Revolu-
t ionary Council founded a 'Central Securi ty Council' headed 
by a m i l i t a r y o f f i ce r . He also announced the na t iona l i za t ion 
of the export trade in r i c e and the taking over of the en t i re 
l i s 
import t r ade . 
General;^ Newln allowed only one government's party, 
•Ihe Burma Soc ia l i s t Programme P a r t y . ' But i t had not QE rea l ly 
played any s ign i f i can t ro le a t a l l s ince i t s establishment. 
The opposit ion of the Newin Government has come from a t l e a s t 
f ive Sources: 
112, Vendkatavardan. " P o l i t i c a l and Const i tu t ional Develop-
ment in Burma.'^ The Indian Year Book of Jjiternatlonal 
MISJJ:£^(Madras ; 1963) pp. 291-292. 
n s . l i i i d , , p . 294. 
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1, UJie Ctommunist 
2, Karen rebe l l ions 
3 , The Shans who re l a t ed to neighbouring Thai. 
4, Press 
6, Buddhist Clergy, 
unlike UNU, Newin was persuing a policy of maximum rapid 
114 
modernization ra ther than seeking to e f fec t , 
OJie economic aspect of the Revolutionary Council of 
Burma was to persue a pol icy aimedifeit es tab l i sh ing a Soc ia l i s t 
economy. In order to carry out s o c i a l i s t plan such v i t a l 
means of production as a g r i c u l t u r a l and i ndus t r i a l produc-
t ion , d i s t r i b u t i o n , t ransporat ion, communication, external 
trade e t c . would be na t iona l ized . "Without touching the 
question of the des t r ibu t ion of the ex i s t ing cu l t ivab le 
lands, the Revolutionary Council has embarked on a plan of 
reclaiming v i rg in l ands . They have build new v i l l ages on 
these lands and handed them over to cooperative s o c i t i e s . 
Members of the Socie t ies are landless labourers , each of 
them i s given 10 acress of land. Agr icu l tura l production 
i s l a rge ly a p r iva te enterprise.1* Some indus t r ies are s t i l l 
in the pr iva te sec to r , Biere a re of course public sector 
114. Army, Vandenbosch and Richard, Butwell, o p . c i t . . p p . 
260-261. 
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undertakings l i k e su^ar m i l l s , cement f a c t o r i e s , t e x t i l e s 
mi l l s , s a l t and t i l e f a c t o r i e s andjute manufactures. The 
Br i t i sh owned petroleum and mining indus t r ies have been 
na t iona l ized a f t e r payment of due compensation. There i s 
e f fec t ive control of the economy of the country without 
na t iona l i z ing the i n d u s t r i e s , the government can control 
them by cont ro l l ing the supply of raw mater ia ls and c red i t 
f a c i l i t i e s . "By na t iona l i z ing a l l the t rading concerns the 
government has became the sole buyer of everything which is 
produced in the country. The government also control the 
p r i c e s . Many pr ivate i n t e r p r i s e s are anxious to close down. 
But they can not do so without the government's premission. 
116 
Loss or no l o s s , the production in f ac to r i e s must continuei^ 
The Newin regime was basical ly t o t a l i t a r i a n , i n 1966, 
he a lso na t ional ized the country 's p r iva te schools . The 
P a r t y ' s secre tary General Brigadier Yu Saw r i g h t l y commented, 
"he (General Newin) wanted to switch from the cent ra l ized 
power s t ruc tu re towards democratic socia l ism. Bie cons t i tu -
t ion must include guarantees for non-exploi ta t ion of man by 
man, race by race and for f u l l human r i g h t s . He emphasised 
on framing a s o c i a l i s t cons t i tu t ion and following a neu t ra l 
116, The HlndUy (Madras j 16 September 1964;. 
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116 
policy.'* The slogan of Revolutionary Council i s that "a 
system of s o c i a l i s t democracy based on a s o c i a l i s t economy." 
So the Revolutionary Council had t r i e d to synthesize mater ia l -
i s t i c concepts and the t r a d i t i o n of Burmese socie ty and in 
doing so, has shown i t s e l f to be Burmese and n a t i o n a l i s t 
117 
a Dove a l l . 
After exi le in Bangkok, UNU became revolutionary and 
he also formed the "Liberat ion Army", He appealed to the 
Br i t i sh , the American and other countr ies for he lp . He also 
publ ic ly declared t h a t he was ready to accept help from any 
sources to overthrow General Newin's regime. I t i s uncertain 
whether he was succeeded in winning any s ign i f i can t foreign 
backing, although i t was reported tha t he attended several 
secre t discussions a t the home of General Praphas Gharusa 
118 
IJiien, !Ehailand's Vice Pres ident . The American Embassy in 
Rangoon took pains to s t r e s s tha t i t had no sympathy for UNU 
and the United Nations Liberation Front, and too, by the 
Russian Ambassador Mr. Smlrnov, who in a most unusual and 
outspoken display of Soviet diplomacy described UNU's a c t i v i -
t i e s as a <Cheap Joke.** General Newin se r ious ly alarmed th i s 
l i s 
s i t u a t i o n . 
116. ahe I^industan Times^ (New Delhi : 30 June 1971}. 
117. Dusan, Dragic,''Burma "s Second Revolution^ The EconQmic 
Weekly^ Vol,XV, No.27, (October 12, 1963)^b.io. 
118. By ed i to r . "Burma", The Economist^ Vol. 236, No,6623, 
(L0ndon; August 1, 1970), p , 27, 
119. The Assam Tribune, ((Biubati j 26 October 1971), 
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Neither UNU, vho ru led from 1948 to 1962, nor General 
Nevin, found a solut ion for the "grievances of Burma's 
m i n o r i t i e s , " d e Karens and Mons agreed to form a United 
res i s t ance under the leadership of UNU. Both groups want 
to Dreak avay from Bangoon. On the other s ide , UNU's pro-
mise of a ' f edera l solution* a t t r a c t s moderates, some ex t r e -
mists are aiming for much more near i t . 
UNU, perhaps, gets the help to e n l i s t the support of 
o ther Burmese •vho have suffered under Newln's brand of "State 
Socialism**, National is ing t rade and commerce provided no 
so lu t ion for Burma's economic problems. Since Nevin seized 
power in 1962, r i c e exports have sagged from 1,8 mi l l ion tons 
to half a mil l ion tons , Wbriters have been hu r t by s t a t i c 
v^ages, r i s ing pr ices and shortages. The people are unable 
to get the i r da i ly necessary things . On the other hand, 
army o f f i ce r s have enjoyed unprecedented ranks and p r iv i l eges . 
Newln's love of secrecy and obsessive fear of a s s l s i a t l o n 
120 
have made him is. an e r r a t i c r u l e r , morbidly inward looking. 
Under these circumstances, General Newln takes a 
s i gn i f i c an t s tep towards the r e a l i s a t i o n of the main objectives 
of the people and the par ty to make the new adminis t ra t ive 
system. In ef fect of th i s the Burmese Government appointed a 
120. By ed i to r , "Burma", o p . c l t . j p , 28. 
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97 men commission to d ra f t a new cons t i tu t ion for the country. 
The Commission is headed by the Deputy Premier Brig.San Yu 
and the new Const i tut ion was expected to ready by August 
121 
1973, according to the General Newin's promise, 13iis new 
S o c i a l i s t cons t i tu t ion w i l l be expected to be adopted by a 
People 's Assembly to be e lec ted in 1974. 
The proposed Const i tut ion under which Burma wi l l 
become the "Soc i a l i s t Republic Union of Burma" provides for 
r e l ig ious freedom fu l ly equal i ty regardless of race , r e l ig ion 
or sex, and compulsory mi l i t a ry se rv ice . I t a lso provides 
for the foimation of three new s t a t e s — Chin, Mon and 
122 
Arakan for a t o t a l of fourteen s t a t e s . 
General Newinj Chairman of the Burma Soc ia l i s t s Pro-
gramme par ty , in h i s address to the opening session of the 
F i r s t Par ty Congress, s t ressed three great tasks v*iich c a l l 
for Immediate ac t ion . These tasks are ; " to build a soUd-
iy United Party, to build the unity of the na t ional races, 
and to d ra f t the s t a t e Cons t i tu t ion . " In h i s speech. General 
Newin sa id , " I have emphasis unity of the party which plays 
121, "The Hindu", (Madras j 27 September 1971 ), 
122, The Indian Express^ (Delhi | 24 Apri l 1972). 
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the leading ro le as of importance because lack of such 
unity v i l i not only spe l l the misfortune of the party but 
of the en t i r e nat ion as wel l . For t h i s reason party must 
have a complete so l id unity and vork with a c lea r and correc t 
way of thinking. For the so l id s t rength of the par ty , the 
most important p r e - r e q u i s i t e i s inner party uni ty . Inner 
par ty democracy i s as important as par ty uni ty . In building 
inner party unity three must be freedom to express one 's 
123 
views," 
A s ix -po in t fea ture programme of the Burma S o c i a l i s t 
Programme Party also has been adopted by the F i r s t Party 
Congress. The Programme envisages; 
" (1 ) Building a s o c i a l i s t democratic s t a t e . 
(2) Developing a planned economy for a l l na t ional r aces , 
(3) Building firm and strong na t iona l s o l i d a r i t y , 
(4) Forming class and mass organizat ions within the 
s o c i a l i s t democratic s t r u c t u r e , 
(6) S t r i c t l y persuing a cor rec t and Independent foreign 
pol icy, 
124 ( 6 ; Promoting the leadership ro le of the party,»' 
123. G\j^ardiafl, (Bangoon, 26 June 1971). 
124. "iiuaj:iUsa», (Rangoon, 12 July 1971). 
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Ihe new ro le of the Lanzln Party a f t e r the » f i r s t Party 
Congress' i s undoubtedly most Important. I t i s not only 
important for the par ty as i t out a lso for the people. I t 
i s a lso as an indica t ion to the world tha t the party has been 
126 
doing what i t has s e t out to do. 
"One of the most important aspects of the new adminis-
t r a t i on system is the reorganisat ion of the Securi ty and 
yidministrative Committees (S.A.C. ) . For the new system to 
be geared towards s o c i a l i s t democratic i dea l s , i t i s essen t ia l 
to gi"ve s o c i a l i s t democratic character to the backbone of the 
adminis t ra t ive system tha t i s none o ther than the jPecurity 
and Administrative Committee.' The fundamental aim that rule 
the SAC'S are t h a t they s h a l l be responsible to the people, 
a t t end to the voice and the wi l l of the people, and adminis-
t e r public a f f a i r s , executing po l i c i e s of the Government, 
supervising and coordinating the work of various d e p a r t m e n t s -
operat ing in such a s t y l e in essence as to c lea r the way 
126 
for s o c i a l i s t cons true t ion i ' General Newin p a r t i c u l a r l y d i s -
cussed the cooperative scheme, s t r e s s ing the necess i ty to 
develop cooperative s o c i e t i e s , a t l e a s t in order to have 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of s to res done smoothy, so tha t commodities and 
126. By ed i to r , "Burma" The Guardian, Vol.XYIII No.7 
(Rangoon, July 1971), p , 6 . 
126. The Guardian^ Vol.ZIX, No.4, (Bangoon, I p r i l 1972);p.4. 
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consumer goods meant fo r the people ac tua l ly m l ^ t get into 
the hands of the people a t f a i r p r i c e s , OSiat indeed vrould 
be most welcome to the consumer publ ic . 
Now Prime Minister General Newin proposes to i n i t i a t e 
reforms tha t might eventual ly widen the otherwise narrow 
base of the power s t ruc tu re he i s not spared. In th i s they 
see the hand of conspi ra tor t ry ing to perpetuate h is strangholi 
on soc ie ty . For example, h i s recent promise to give the 
country a new cons t i tu t ion tha t would inshrine the pr inciples 
of economic equal i ty and equal i ty of the various ethnic 
minor i t ies was said to have Deen made only to fool the 
unwary, Newin's emphasis on na t iona l uni ty meant no more 
than increased oppression of Buimais ethnic minor i t ies that 
i s not a l l , "Ihe proposed cons t i tu t ion would be a gimmick; 
no more i t would put the sea l of r e spec t4b l l i t y on the 
au tho r i t a r i an regime,^ The outlook of Burma i s gloomy. How 
long the ' na t ive son' would be condemned to l i v i n g a l i f e 
of no joy and a l l f e a r s , they enquire. 
The Newin regime has had near ly a decade's run of the 
country and yet i t i s miles away from the goal i t had se t 
i t s e l f . The country 's gross na t iona l product i s one of 
As ia ' s lowest and the r i ce exports are down. 
- 75 -
one must a t the same time r e c a l l t ha t t h i s has another 
s ide too . I t would be wrong to in fe r tha t the government 
i s taking things easy assuming tha t the s i t u a t i o n must get 
worse before i t gets b e t t e r . Uie economy is a lso improving 
in Burma,self suff iciency in food isanother redeaming 
fea ture of the economy and also leaving a surplus fo r export, 
At another l e v e l , the Newin Government has every 
reason not be d i s s a t i s f i e d with i t s record. Burma's re la t ions 
127 
with the outs ide world a r e on a reasonably correc t foot ing. 
127. 'Hindustan Standard*^ (Calcutta j February 10,1972). 
C H i k P T E R I I 
gj^ltP FEATUBES OF HJBM'S FOREIGN POLICY 
Surrounded on the West, the North, and the East by 
countr ies \diich are s t ronger than herse l f , Burma i s , in the 
words of UNO, "hemmed in l i k e a tender ground among the cactus ." 
" I t i s impossidle to regard foreign a f f a i r s as something remote 
or academic, blunders in foreign policy could have d i r e c t 
repercussions a t home. In p a r t i c u l a r , Burma i s vulnerable to 
the technique of subversion by an unfriendly power amongst 
those of her communities which have not yet completely recon-
c i led to the union. The ef for t s which have been made since 
independence to maintain an independent foreign policy in this 
precarious s i t u a t i o n have been pa r t l y based upon a t r ad i t i ona l 
policy of withdrawal and i so la t ion and pa r t ly upon a new con-
1 
cept towards a l l round in te rna t iona l goodwill," 
Hence Burma's geographic cont igui ty with Communist China 
has always involved spec ia l considerat ion for Burma's policy 
makers d i f fe ren t from those which might apply to many new 
excoloniai nat ions l i k e Ghana. Burma shows an s ign i f ican t 
example of how a small nat ion can maintain i t s independence 
in a world which i s governed by two r i v a l 'power b l o c s , ' 
(now big powers). The Revolutionary Council has balanced 
1, Hugh, Tinker, !rha Union of Burmaj London j Oxford 
Universi ty Press , 1969, p . 337. 
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Eastern and Western influences in Burma while keeping Doth 
to the minimum. The reason i s tha t Burma is a Buddhist country 
and since Buddhism exhib i t s pacif ic tendencies, the question 
of i t s r e l a t ionsh ip with o ther countr ies i s a lso influenced 
by i t . Buddhist Burma may seek the way of compromise and 
peaceful solut ion of c o n f l i c t , but never a t the expense of i t s 
own surv iva l . So the foreign policy of Burma i s based upon 
2 
neutral ism, non-alignment and social ism. 
UNU has been already formulating the pr inc ip les which 
were to determine the course Burma would adopt during the 
following years . To a mass r a l l y on 11th December 1949 he 
declared. "In regard to our foreign pol icy, we are convinced 
tha t the course, we have adopted i s the best in the circumstan-
ces of oui* country and we are therefore pursuing i t s teadfas t ly 
no matter how strongly i t i s c r i t i c i z e d . Our circumstances 
demand tha t we follow an independent course and not to a l l y 
ourselves with any power bloc. Any o ther course can only lead 
the union to ruin , . The only p o l i t i c a l programme -v^ich 
we should pursue i s the one which we genuinely believe to oe 
the most su i t ab le for our union, v*iatever course the Br i t i sh , 
the Americans, the Russians and the Chinese communists might 
follow Be f r i end ly with a l l foreign countr ies . Our 
2, Bobert, A.fIolmes,^*'The P o l i t i c s of Burmlzatlonf^ Asian 
5ii£lfiX, Vol. VII, 1967, p . 196, 
~ T \ ^ 
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t iny nat ion can not have the effrontery to quarre l with any 
power. If any country comes with an offer of a mutually 
benef ic ia l Enterpr ise , welcome i t by a l l means but , , , 
in laying down p o l i t i c a l programmes, do not forget to ensure 
3 
tha t i t i s fu l ly su i ted to the requirements of the union." 
* Burma cannot be sa id to have played any independent 
pa r t in in te rna t iona l a f f a i r s from the 1880 to 1940. In 
the great p o l i t i c a l system of South Asia which the Foreign 
and Economic Department a t Simla wished to «rea te , Burma 
represented an outer Dastion. In the absence of a 'forward 
pol icy ' Burma's foreign r e l a t i o n s were l imi ted l a rge ly to the 
4 
c rea t ion of a s a t i s f ac to ry f ron t i e r with Siam and caiina. 
During the years 1948 to 1962, the foreign policy of Burma 
was dependent upon UNU, insp l t e of the caretaker government 
formed in November 1968 to I960. Since General Newin's secoild 
takeover of March 1962, some people are of the view tha t 
i3urma has become advantageously n e u t r a l i s t from the Communist 
point of view. But t h i s conception i s pa r t l y wrong. General 
Newin i s not pro-Peking nor has he sought in any known way 
to undercut American po l i c i e s in Southeast Asia. Burma never 
favours with e i t h e r the Communist or Western camps in i n t e r -
3 . Hugh, Tinker, o p . c i t . j pp. 342-343, 
4 . l t J 4 . , p, 339, 
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na t iona l a f f a i r s , general ly Nevin v i s i t e d Soviet Union in 
1966 he also v i s i t e d India, Pakistan and in I960 he t ravel led 
to U.S.Ik. "Kevin's neutral ism i s no more pro-Communist than 
vias UNU's, but Newin has diminished Western influence In 
h i s country. In some respects i t seems tha t Burmese neutr-
alism favours the communists or more spec ia l ly China than i t 
6 
does the West orthe U.S.A., For example, the Burmization 
programme has oeen one sided and has adversely affected only 
Indian and Western i n t e r e s t s . This has not been the case 
6 
for communist countr ies l i k e China, 
Burmese leaders believed tha t the world is divided 
by the contes t of the big powers in a cold war. They also 
saw a t t he i r problem of Duilding a new nation, and desired 
as l i t t l e to do with t h i s in t e rna t iona l contes t as possible . 
They knew tha t withdrawal from the world was not the answer. 
They determined to keep on f r i ^ d l y terms with a l l nations 
and to avoid involvement with the big power blocs if they 
could. By taking economic help from a va r i e ty of sources, 
foreign governments and in te rna t iona l tjodies, they r ea l i s e 
t ha t they have not prejudiced t h e i r neutral ism dn the i r 
independence of ac t ion . They might not have been a Die to 
6, Richard, Butwell and Army^  Yandenbosch^^The Chan^ing 
Face of Southeast Asiaf* Lexingtons University of Kentucky 
Press , 1967, pp. 276-277. 
6, Bobert, A.Holmes, oMsSH*} P« 192, 
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obtain a l l the economic help from outs ide tha t they van ted 
7 
but they did not have to go about begging, UNU described 
Burma's foreign policy as one of "dynamic n e u t r a l i t y " . In 
h i s National Day speech the Prime Minister UNU referred to 
Burma's foreign pol icy as follows: "Due to our neu t ra l 
pol icy, we do not a l i gn ourselves with any, power bloc. For 
t h i s non-alignment, both blocs would of course view us a 
favourable as they would the i r own close colleagues. But, 
one f a c t i s ce r ta in , both these power blocs know ful ly well 
we are not playing second f iddle to any bloc, Beca»e of 
our neu t r a l stand, we are in a pos i t ion to be on f r iendly 
terms with a l l countr ies of both blocs. I t may perhaps be 
d i f f i c u l t to understand tha t our f r iendly dealings with a l l 
countr ies are important for the s t a b i l i t y of our Independence, 
But, a perusal of the world map and the geographical posi t ion 
occupied by our country and close-study of various countries 
w i l l convince, us, beyond a shadow of a doubt, how fa r our 
f r iendly r e l a t i o n s with a l l countries based on our neu t ra l 
foreign policy have contr ibuted towards the s t a b i l i t y of our 
independence , . , * . . . we have been able to be on the fr iend-
l i e s t terms with Doth power blocs because of our correct 
8 
foreign pol icy. I have not the s l i g h t e s t doUDt about i t , " 
7, William, C.Johnstone, Buima's Foreign PolieVj Massachusettsj 
Havard University Press , 1963, pp. 287-288. 
8. Ib id . , p . 100, 
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On January 4, 1966, Ba U, the Pres ident of Burma, 
in h i s Independence Day speech, sa id , "Burma gained world-
wide recognit ion mainly due to her s teadfas t pursuance of 
the pol icy of maintaining s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y between the 
9 
two Power Blocs,*^ In t h i s month UNU resigned and U Ba Swe, 
(who had been Defence Minister}, succeeded him, s t a t i ng 
tha t Burma's Foreign Policy was, "act ive n e u t r a l i t y aimed 
a t bringing about understanding and be t t e r r e l a t ions between 
the two opposing Dlocs," Again on July 3 , 1956, U Ba Swe 
affirmed the policy of "act ive n e u t r a l i t y " and l a t e r in 
the same month he a s s e r t e d , " we wi l l accept a id from any 
country provided i t does not conf l i c t with our policy of 
10 
independent n e u t r a l i t y . " 
On July 19, 1966, UNU as a Pres ident of the AFPFL 
said in h i s speech, t ha t Burma's "neut ra l foreign policy" 
had three f e a t u r e s : " 1 , Non-alignment with any power bloc, 
2 , Friendship with a l l countr ies , and 3 . Pos i t ive end-
eavours to bridge the gulf between opposing blocs and to 
promote peace." He a lso sa id tha t , " s t r i k i n g a t the oppo-
s i t i o n p o l i t i c a l groups in Burma as stooges (a favour i te 
l e v e l ) stooge-breeding wi l l end up with the loss of inde-
pendence." To pro tec t h i s country to th i s danger UNU said 
9^  U 2 ^ . , p . 103. 
10, lMii.> p. 103. 
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tha t the AFPFL Government must "use the following weaponsj 
I , Support for the U.N.Organisation, 2. A c lear and s t r a i g h t 
forward policy of n e u t r a l i t y and 3 , Ac t iv i t i e s d i rec ted 
11 
towards conversion of the foreign stooges without our country." 
Uien the foreign a f f a i r s sec t ion s t a r t ed , the Prime 
Minister quoted from the i n t e rna t iona l r e l a t ions sect ion of 
the cons t i t u t i on and s t a t ed , "our foreign policy i s directed 
towards, securing, a world peace based on in te rna t iona l j u s t i c e 
and moral i ty , e s tab l i sh ing and maintaining f r iendly re la t ions 
with a l l o ther nat ions and cooperating with them for our 
mutual benefi t , but a t the same time avoiding entanglement 
which might e n t a i l the loss of our freedom of ac t ion in 
12 
foreign a f f a i r s , " 
I t i s said tha t Burma's foreign policy of n u e t r a l i t y 
i s the synthesis of the fear of foreign aggression or in t e r -
ference in Ik her i n t e rna l a f fa i r s and the ideal of contr ibut-
ing her b i t to world peace and harmony. Tb.e policy i s nei ther 
blind nor negat ive. I t i s to say tha t Burma's n e u t r a l i t y is 
not n e u t r a l i t y as between r i g h t and wrong, i t i s ne i ther a 
negative one nor an i s o l a t i o n i s t pol icy . On one side Ind i a ' i 
I I . Ibid.J p . 103. 
12, Ifiid.> p. 104. 
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Bri ta in , U.A..R., U.S.A., France g r e e t e d ^ e cordia l policy 
of Burma and on the o the t s ide , China, Zogoslavia, Pakistan, 
13 
Russia recognise and appreciate the po l icy . 
That i s vhy most of the Burmans in po l i t i ck are 
firm supporters of t h e i r government's neu t r a l poJicy. I t 
has given permission to them to t r ave l to I s r ae l to the 
United Arab Republic, to the U.S. and to Communist China, 
to the Soviet Utfion and to Japan and Western Europe, Since 
1964, being a member of U.N.O., Burma has na tu ra l ly Deen 
requested to send represen ta t ives to a l l U.N. conferences, 
atomic energy and the in te rna t iona l law of the Sea, and to 
host p r iva t e ly sponsored conferences. In these meetings, 
the Burman represen ta t ives are t rea ted with respect , they 
have an equal voice v i t h those of the big powers, and the i r 
fee l ings are l i s t ened by a l l t h i s means tha t the p o l i t i -
ca l ly educated Burmans r e a l l y have a determining voice in 
the p o l i t i c s of the i r country and have begun to exhib i t 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of egocentrism. Wfe can take the example of 
U Diant, the former General Secretary of Burma, played a 
important role in so many in t e rna t iona l i s sues , Burmese 
have been convinced by experience tha t the policy of t h e i r 
government has Deen workable, and has paid dividends both 
to t he i r government and to themselves as Burmans, 
13, '^'Communique No.3, dated March 2, 1962, issued by the 
Union of Revolutionary Council^ Burma Waeklv Bullatjtn^ 
Rangoon: March 8, 1962, 
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"As a r e s u l t , more and more Burmans have come to 
Deiieve tha t neutral ism permits t he i r country to be friends 
with a l l nat ions and beholden to more» This has permitted 
growth of the sentiment t h a t Burmans should run the i r own 
a f f a i r s as they please with as l i t t l e advice from outside 
14 
as pos s ib l e . " 
I t i s quite c l ea r tha t Burma and other nat ions adopted 
a non-alignment pol icy, had the l ab les n e u t r a l i s t or neutra-
lism th rus t upon them, with the implication in Western capi-
t a l s , mainly in U.S.A. tha t such a posture was not only 
'immoral' but a lso needed tha t they follow a s t r i c t course 
of i m p a r t i a l i t y . I t was rea l i sed in 1960 tha t Burma and some 
other neu t ra l nat ions were leaning toward the Ck>mmunist s ide 
r a the r than toward the West, 
UND rea l i sed the d i f f i cu l t y to accept the ' l a b e l 
n e u t r a l i s t ' as best descr ibing the i r foreign policy, tiie 
r e s u l t of t h i s might be to l i m i t severely the i r freddom of 
ac t ion and to make them so subject to pressures from each 
bloc in the cold war as v i r t u a l l y to paralyze ac t ion in the 
i n t e r e s t s of s t r i c t impar t i a l i t y . For example, the post 
Korean war usage of "the terms n e u t r a l , n e u t r a l i t y , n e u t r a l i s t 
and neutral ism,had so devantured the o lder and more precise 
14. Wiiliami C.Johnstone, op .c i t .y pp. 280-281. 
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meanings of th i s terminology as to make i t useless for t h e i r 
purposes. let UNU and leaders of the non*alignment nations 
have been so trapped by widespread usage of the terms neutra. 
lism and n e u t r a l i s t and the i r own usage of t h i s terminology 
tha t i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how they can escape from th i s 
16 
•Semantic Trap, ' " 
But Nehru, UNU and other leaders have t r i e d t h e i r 
best to escape from the *Semantio Trap* of neutralism by 
use of o ther teimstb describe t he i r foreign policy - such 
as "non-alignment", "un-committed" and by use of qualifying 
ad jec t ives such as "pos i t ive" and "dynamic". They believe 
tha t they have made impar t ia l to t h e i r ac t ions , saying that 
t he i r neutral ism combines the ideas t ha t each nat ion wi l l 
take the " r igh t " stand on any problem as i t may judge i t 
a t a given time. UNU and other neu t ra l leaders now f ee l s , 
today tha t almost t h e i r every act ion in r e l a t i o n s with 
important nat ions can be Judged as pa r t i s an . But Burma's 
foreign r e l a t i o n s shows tha t Burmese government can nei ther 
afford to be s t r i c t l y p a r t i a l in i t s foreign r e l a t i ons or 
in i t s s t a tus on a l l i n t e rna t iona l problems, nor has i t 
wished to be in the p a s t . 
The ' n e u t r a l i s t l a b e l ' has *o s t rongly been attached 
upon every nat ion following a policy of non-alignment in 
16. Ib id . , p . 284, 
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ttle cold-war tha t such nat ions can not m ignore i t . 
"The Semantic t r ap , from which the non-alig-ned 
nations have been miable to escape so fa r , is more than a 
matter of words. The implications tha t any act ion yhldti 
openly espouses a policy of non-alignment, and i s therefore, 
immediately dubled n e u t r a l i s t , must s t r i v e to follow a course 
of impar t i a l i t y isfvery c l ea r . If unwill ing to force a change 
in pol icy in a given case, such as t ha t of Burma, iDoth the 
Ctommunist bloc s t a t e s and the Vfestern a l l i e s wi l l put pressure 
on the Burma government, not to show favorit ism to the other-
s ide . Mienever Burma or any neut ra l seem to ac t paU;ial ly, 
i t is c r i t i c i z e d only by the opponents of the side i t has 
seemed to favour. Such a s i t u a t i o n has induced in the leaders 
of Burma and s imi lar n e u t r a l nat ions as constant a t t i t u d e of 
Vi&riness in t he i r f o r e i g i r e l a t i o n s . They hes—itate totake 
a needed act ion or to adopt a l og ica l posi t ion they believe 
to be " r igh t " on some in t e rna t iona l issues or the cold war, 
UNU i n s i s t s tha t Burma was following an»independent' foreign 
16 
pol icy? 
But General Newln»s policy has paid p o l i t i c a l dividends 
for Burma interms of Communist and Western fr iendship and 
economic a id , and more important because i t has enabled Burma 
16, i l j i d . , pp. 284-286. 
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to avoid the agony of Vietnam type war of 'National libera-
17 
tions,* 
Since UNU, General Newin and even other Burman leaders 
have t r i e d t h e i r Dest to give s t r e s s on ' l a b e l n e u t r a l i s t ' 
for the i r foreign policy and have attempted to present i t 
as an 'independent* pol icy, the i r lack of gain may well have 
diminished the i r a b i l i t y to make hard or couragious decisions 
on the oasis of " r i gh t " ac t ion . So Burmans and o ther leaders 
of neu t r a l nat ions are f a r from happy a tout the terminology 
of neutral ism and have sought to escape from 'semantic d i f f i -
18 
cu l t i e s with l i t t l e success so f a r , Burma has developed 
f r iendly r e l a t i ons with a l l the countr ies , adhere refusal 
of any kind of foreign aid -vAiich reduce Burma's p o l i t i c a l , 
economic and s t r a t e g i c independence and has no des i re to be 
19 
entangled in any alignment of world powers, 
OSiere are two reasons for t h i s success, The f i r s t is 
the f ac t t ha t as a small nat ion, Burma is not only under, 
populated, but also has a large r i c e surplus which i s the 
mainstay of i t s foreign exchange earnings . I t i s for tunate 
17. Richard, Butwell and Vandenbosch, Army, no. c i t . . pp. 
276-277, 
18. William, C.Johnston^, o p . c i t . , pp. 286-287. 
19. Maung, Maung,'''Burma-china iriorder disputed Asian Survey. 
Vol. I,(March 196$, p . y^o. 
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for Burma tha t the government has not been under the pre-
ssure of population growth such as India, The second reason 
i s tha t Burma's l imi ted resources have not been a t t r a c t e d 
to foreign predators through out i t s h i s t o ry . In the 19th 
century, other European powers had ne i ther the w i l l nor 
the s t rength to contes t gradual conquest of Burma by the 
B r i t i s h , In th i s centiiry, Japan has created keen i n t e r e s t 
in Soutiieast Asia, more in te res ted a t Indonesia for i t s 
resources than a t Burma and other t e r r i t o r i e s . Neither 
Russia nor communist China regarded Burma as a h igh -p r io r i t y 
t a rge t for e i the r economic or s t r a t e g i c reasons. That i s 
vihy, Burma has been in a pos i t ion to trade and get a id from 
a large number of na t i ons . "MiBBibers of both i power blocs 
as well as neu t r a l s , without seeming to prejudice to i t s 
non-alignment JQUK policy or prevent i t s maintenance of 
20 
f r iendly r e l a t ions with all.** 
Bandung Conference was beflnning of a new era In 
A.sia by the summer of 1956 and a lso opened a new chapter 
in Burma's foreign a f f a i r s . I t might not be wrong to suggest 
tha t up to 1954, Burma had establ ished r e l a t i ons with foreign 
21 
countr ies more or l e s s on empirical l i n e s . 
20. William, c, Johns tone, o p . c i t . , p . 288, 
2 1 . Hugh, Tinker, aja»^Jj;., ?• 360. 
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Hie Burmese foreign policy has been tes ted in three 
specif ic s i t ua t ions in the f a l l of 1966. The f i r s t one 
was a serious border dispute broke-out with communist CJiina, 
The o ther one was the I s r a e l i invasion of Egypt and the 
Anglo-French occupation of the Suez Canal again the th rea t 
of a general war. The th i rd one was the Soviet armed 
in tervent ion of Hungary created the problem of communist 
imperialism. The f i r s t problem was b i l a t e r a l , but the 
other two problems, although not d i r e c t l y affect ing Burma's 
secur i ty , were brought before the U,N,, %*iere Burma l i ke 
a l l o ther members had to formulate a s t a tus and take a 
22 
pos i t i on . 
The great t rouble came before Burmese government, 
and her foreign policy to the Sino-Burman border dispute 
was a r l s e d . They t r i e d to escape r e a l danger with Communist 
China by a l l possible means but not a t the pr ice of s l g n i . 
f i c an t l o s s of t e r r i t o r y or any r ea l compromise of the i r 
23 
independence. 
The war between Arab and I s r a e l and the in tervent ion 
of Anglo-French created no problems in Burma's r e l a t ions 
I 
22. Ullliam, C.Johnstone, &£*£!&• > P« 105, 
23* See, the d e t a i l of t h i s dispute ChapterfiTas pa r t a 
case study of Sino-Burmese r e l a t i o n s , pp,u^- \Z^. 
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with Ctommunist China or the Soviet Union. >Siile the Burman 
leaders f e l t the danger of th i s s i t u a t i o n , but i t did not 
come between Burman*s v i t a l i n t e r e s t s and hence the Burmpfcese 
government could ea s i l y take the stand which they considered 
"right** on t h i s x i s sue . On th i s problem Burman took Vcie 
pos i t ion which was qui te d i f ferent from India, Indonesia 
and other "neutrals,** On September 23, 1956, Prime Minister 
U Ba Swe s t a t ed tha t he believed "President Nasser had done 
r i gh t in na t iona l iz ing the Suez Canal Company, but that he 
believed tha t as an in t e rna t iona l waterway, i t should be 
24 
kept open to a l l na t i ons . " The Prime Minister also said 
tha t the Colombo powers should.be consulted about the matter 
and r ea l i s ed that they could bring about a peaceful s e t t l e -
ment. He said "Burma did not want to see any party suffer 
as a r e s u l t of the set t lement on Suez, and she did not want 
25 
to see the dispute f l a re -up into war.** 
When Anglo-French intervened, a t tha t time U Ba Swe 
was in Bombay at tending a meeting of the Asian Soc i a l i s t 
Conference, He issued an o f f i c i a l statement on th is s i t ua -
t ion on October 2, 1956 " I f e e l ra ther s trongly tha t 
in the present c r i s i s , more condeimiation of ce r t a in countries 
24. William, C.Johnstone, O P . n i t . ^ p, io7 . 
26. l i i i ^ , , pp. 107-108. 
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w i l l not help to solve the problems confronting the world 
today. Bather than condemn, I -would place a l l possible 
emphasis on construct ive and effec t ive act ion for the imme-
diate r e s to ra t ion of peace. Steps must be taken for the 
immediate cessat ion of h o s t i l i t i e s , the withdrawal of a l l 
foreign troops from Egyptian t e r r i t o r y , and the countries 
concerned must, without reserva t ion , re fe r the cases of 
dispute to the U.N,, which i t must be remembered, i s the 
only liope of mankind. In any co l l ec t ive ac t ion under the 
auspices of the U.N., Burma i s prepared to put in her share 
26 
of contr ibut ion towards for the so lu t ion of the p rob l em. , . , . " 
Burma has the hope tha t the powers in the U.N,which 
were involved in the Middle East a f fa i r s were capable to 
check the erupting c o n f l i c t . The basis for a peaceful s e t t l e -
ment has been es tabl i shed in the reso lu t ion adopted unanim-
27 
ously by the Security Council on 22nd November 1967, 
HJie Hungarian conf l i c t and i t s brutal suppression 
by the in tervent ion of the Soviet Union's armed forces 
created a d i f fe ren t type of a question for n e u t r a l i s t nations 
l i k e Burma. The c r e d i t should go to U Ba Swe and h i s 
26. Ib id . , pp. 107-108. 
27. U.N. Monthly chronic le , Vol. VI, No.9, (October 1969JL 
p . 169. 
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government which had given pos i t ive support to U.K.action 
in the c r i s i s . On t h i s 3K± i ssue , Russian forces had been 
invi ted into Hungary to "suppress a r evo l t against a l e g i -
timate government, tCaturally th i s was an in t e rna l a f f a i r . 
Burmese pos i t ion was explained in a se r i e s of s t a t e -
sments. F i r s t l y U Pe Khin, Burma's represen ta t ive a t the 
U.N. General Assembly, announced tha t Burma's abstention in 
the General Assembly reso lu t ion condemning Soviet act ion 
in Hangary was due to the f a c t the Burma delegation lacked 
i n s t r u c t i o n s . He sa id , "My delegation wi l l support any 
e f for t of the U.N, v^ich i s cons i s ten t with the char ter and 
•v^ich in the opinion of my Government does not amount to 
28 
interference by some o ther power." In a Press Conference 
in Rangoon, U Tun Shein ;i, permanent Secretary of the 
Foreign Office explained,"we worked desperately out we 
received no t ice of two resolut ion on Saturday and the vote 
was taken on Sunday n igh t . Ins t ruct ions j u s t f a i l ed to 
reach our delegate in t ime." UNU also added, "we should 
have voted. You can quote me as saying the abstent ion 
29 
was wrong." 
Burma's concept on Combodia and Laos was for some 
years doubtfulj But in 1954, these suspecisions had removed 
28. William, C.Johnstone, aiUislt . , p . 109. 
29. UzM., pp. 109-110. 
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and In August Burma gave formal recognit ion to both s t a t e s . 
During November 1964, the then king of Cambodia, Norodom 
Sihanouk, paid a s t a t e v i s i t to Burma - sharing the same 
re l ig ion and s imi la r c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s , the re la t ions 
between the tvo countr ies which were e n t i r e l y closed during 
the colonia l period, may developed a t th i s time. Both 
countr ies s t i l l follow n e u t r a l i s t foreign policy. Burma 
has es tabl i shed diplomatic r e l a t i ons with Cambodia and 
30 
Laos. Vben "Mr. Pathet Lao's m i l i t a ry , v ic tory in Laos 
r e su l t ed in the U.S. sending troops near the Burma-Thailand 
border, but the Burmese goveriment refused to allow pro tes t 
demoastratlons l e s t these be in te rpre ted as an 'unneutral* 
31 
ac t vAiich Dased on Burma's policy of non-alignment," Burma's 
main r e l a t i o n s with Laos have concerned the KMT problem; 
the two countries have a common f r o n t i e r for some 160 miles 
along the Mekong, as a r e s u l t of operat ions in January and 
March 1955 KMT troops sought refuge in the Laotian border 
land. There were so many meetings held in Kengtung and in 
Vientiane in May 1965 t>&tveen r epresen ta t ives of the two 
32 
countr ies to coordinate ac t ion aga ins t the K.M.T. Burma has 
30» Hugh, Tinker, afi*.fiii., p . 360. 
3 1 . Werner, Levi, The Challenge of l»hrld P o l i t i c s in 
South and Southeast Asia, Pren t ice Hall INC, 1968,p.78. 
A 
32, Hugh, Tinker, o p . c i t . ^ p , 360. 
Weti> Te^»*Aj , 
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developed cordia l r e l a t i o n s with Cambodia ^ e n Major General 
Lon Nbl former Minister of Finance and Chief of the Boyal 
Khmer Armed forces of Cambodia, ytio led a four men goodwill 
mission paid a v i s i t to Burma and welcomed by the people 
and armed forces of the Union of Burma. He said, "when we 
accepted h i s i nv i t a t i on to v i s i t the Union of Burma, we 
c e r t a i n l y an t ic ipa ted joys of f r iendship and of close r e l a -
t ions renewed a f t e r a oreak of almost a century due to extra-
neous circumstances. The ac tua l f ac t s experienced by us 
33 
are for beyond our dreams," 
As regards Vietnam, Burma has not developed and 
es tabl i shed diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with i t . Burma's a t t i t u d e 
has remained non-commital« Burma has not es tabl ished any 
r e l a t i o n with the Bao Dai regime, but none gave formal 
recogni t ion to e i t h e r government, although a semi-off ic ia l 
representa t ion was es tabl ished a t Bangoon from 1947 onwards. 
In 1964, UUTJ spent a day a t Honai when he was going to China, 
there he talked to Hochi Minh. Afterwards, a Jo in t communi-
que s t a t e d , ' - "the two countries would conduct the i r 
r e l a t i o n s on the basis of the Five Pr inc ip les of co-existence, 
and expressed the hope tha t r e l a t i ons between the two coun-
34 
t r i e s would De s trengthened," Phara Von Dong, the Deputy PrJme 
33, The Guardian, Bangoon : June 26, I96 l , 
34, Hugh, Tinker, o Q . c l t . , p , 361, 
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M i n i s t e r of Nortl-J Vietnam, pa id a r e t u r n v i s i t to Burma in 
A p r i l 1966, but the two c o u n t r i e s have n o t developed t h e i r 
t a l k s because UNU was wa i t ing the n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s in 
36 
Vietnam. 
Vhen Newin's Revo lu t ionary Counci l s e i z e d power in 
Burma, they proclaimed a s t a t emen t on Vietnam war and 
appealed •*to U.S.A. to r e f r a i n from e s c a l t i n g the war in 
Vietnam and search o u t ways and means of br inging about a 
p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n i n conformity with the Geneva Agreement 
of 1954 on Vietnam." The (Council a l s o lamented a t the 
r e c e n t s t epp ing up of " a i r o p e r a t i o n s in the o u t s k i r i t s of 
36 
Hanoi and Haiphong in North Vietnam," U J h a n t , former 
General S e c r e t a r y of the U.N,, addressed in London Conference 
in A t a l a n t i c City on May 24, 1966, on the s i t u a t i o n of 
Vietnam, he s a i d , " As the war worsens, i t s j u s t i f i c a -
t i o n in terms of c o n f r o n t a t i o n of i d e o l o g i e s i s becoming 
more and more m i s l e a d i n g . For democrat ic p r i n c i p l e s which 
both s i d e s cons ide r to be a t s t a k e in Vietnam, are a l r eady 
f a l l i n g a v i c t im to the war i t s e l f . Although the U,M.O. can 
n o t a c t in a c o n f l i c t which i s beyond i t s scope, m i l i t a r y 
method can not r e s t o r e peace in Vietnam. Peace can only be 
37 
r e s t o r e d by a r e t u r n to the Geneva Agreement," 
36 , U L U . , p . 3 6 1 , 
36 , The S t a t e s m ^ j CCalcut ta , Ju ly 3 , 19661 
37 , Asian Recorder, Vol .XII , No ,3 l , CJuly 30 to August 5 , 
1 9 6 ^ * 
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So, Burma greeted the current peace ta lks over 
Vietnam, and i t i s qui te hopeful tha t they wi l l lead the 
way to future of t h e i r own choosing for the Vietnamese 
people, free from a l l ex terna l hinderence or in te r ference . 
Colonel Maung Lwin, Burma's Minister for foreign ^ f a i r s 
said, " I t is immoral to c l ing to adamant posi t ions while 
innocent c i t i zens are t)eing subjected to indiscriminate 
bombing and bruta l s h e l l i n g . A good par t of the responsi-
b i l i t y l i e s with the grea t powers involved in the a f fa i r s 
38 
of these countries.*' 
During the con f l i c t of the Republic of Indonesia 
agains t Dutch au thor i ty , Burma along with other Asian 
nat ions and following the leadership of India, gave moral 
support to Indonesia. Burma gave defacto recognit ion to 
Indonesia in November 1948, and a represen ta t ive , Ihakin 
Iha Kin, was sent to e s t ab l i sh r e l a t i ons with the Indonesian 
Government. Following the Hague Agreement of December 1949, 
Burma recognized the Republic of Indonesia as dejure the 
39 
sovereign power of the archipelago on 27, December, The 
f i r s t t r ea ty of f r iendship was XQQUPI concluded between 
38. U.N.Monthly Chronicle^ Vol. VI, No.9, C0ctobeE,1969JL 
39. Hugh, Tinker, oJifcCit., p . 343, 
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Burma and Indonesia in March 1951. Trade has also expended 
between the two count r ies , some vtiat one s idedly, as 
Indonesia can not offer Burma any much-needed products in 
re turn for r i c e . 
Foreign po l i c i e s of Burma and Indonesia were decided 
by t h e i r governments as those of n e u t r a l i t y . The present 
Indonesian government l i k e s the term, "ac t ive independent 
foreign policy,*• as more accurately defining the fundamen-
t a l p r inc ip le on which i t s r e l a t ions with o ther countries 
are based. The Indonesian Parliament was especia l ly offended 
by the requirement to contr ibute to "defensive s t rength of 
40 
the free world," 
Burma's r e l a t i ons with Japan are in a c lass apart* 
The occupation of Japan on Burma was a great shock upon 
Burmans of every degree. The general reac t ion has been 
voiced by UNUj **I have been a puppet during the Japanese 
regime as a puppet minis ter and I know what i t means to 
be a puppet . . when one has to bov to the command of 
the Japanese masters and shout »Tenno Heika Banzai' (long 
l i v e the Japanese emperor) a t the bidding How we 
detes ted those days >*ien every second person you met was a 
40. ^rmy, Vandenbosch, Our Friends and Antagonosts in 
Southeast Asia^ America : The Johns Hopkins PRESS, 
1964, p . 64. 
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Japanese agent and when a r r e s t s and subsequent dlsapperances 
41 
were, tiie order of the day." 
After th i s b i t t e r experience, Burma refused to a t tend 
the general conference convened a t San Francisco in 1961 
for the signing 1 of a peace t rea ty with Japan. At f i r s t , 
there was a great difference of views between the two coun-
t r i e s , Japan offered compensation of if 100 mil l ion vftiich 
Burma put in a claim for ^ 400 mi l l ion . Kyaw Neyin, as 
Acting Foreign Minister went to Tokyo for negot ia t ions on 
August 19&4, A draf t agreement was readhed on a compromise 
bas is , giving Burma |^  200 mil l ion and Japanese loan of 
t 50 mi l l ion spread over ten years . This agreement was 
formally signed a t Eangoon on 6th November 1954, together 
with a t r ea ty of peace. 
After t h i s agreement normal diplomatic r e l a t ions 
were es tab l i shed , and the leaders of both cdtmtries convinced 
the i r des i re for future fr iendship and co-operation, Burma 
would have developed her p o l i t i c a l and economic re la t ions 
42 
v i s - a - v i s Japan. 
Burma was facing a th rea t from the Republic of China. 
A la rge number of refugees belonging to the Republic of China, 
i l l Hugh, Tinker, o i u i i i i . , p . 264l 
42. Ib td , , pp. 264-265. 
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of c e r t a i n ra^ber s t a t e s should be persued in o rde r to put 
45 
an end to t h i s s i t u a t i o n . 
Although Burma u n w i l l i n g l y accep ted^" the compromise 
r e s o l u t i d n , and en t e r ed in to weary months of n e g o t i a t i o n 
a t Bangkok with the e l u s i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of Formosa, 
t h i s f e e b l e response to a s i t u a t i o n of i n t ense urgency 
was taken as f i n a l ev idence t h a t the U.N. could not be 
46 
r e l i e d upon as a defence a g a i n s t a g g r e s s i o n . " The American 
envoy promised to Burma government t h a t h i s government 
would reduce in f luence wi th the Chinese N a t i o n a l i s t Govern-
47 48 
ment on Formosa to have the G u e r r i l l a s with drawn. 
The Burmese l e a d e r s have s a i d so many times t h a t , 
" r e l i a n c e on the U.N. fo r p r o t e c t i o n of t h e i r sove re ign ty 
and s e c u r i t y i s a dubious foundat ion and t h a t Burma does 
49 
n o t want to become ano the r Korea o r a Congo." 
IJ ia i land i s the nex t door neighbour of Burma, Thai 
i n f luence in Burma i s p a r t i c u l a r l y seen in the 'Shan S t a t e ' 
45 . (See d e t a i l in the Chapter V Burma and UNO, pp.asS--sSI . ) , 
46 . Hugh, Tinker , a a ^ i J i i . , p . 347. 
47 . (The G u e r r i l l a s f l e d in to the rugged f r o n t i e r r e g i o n of 
Burma to escape the Chinese Communist armies dur ing the 
c i v i l war in China) , 
4 8 . Ihe ?{$y XoyK linieP, (Apr i l 20, 1953) . 
49 . William, C.Johnstone, o p . c i t . , p , 233. 
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in d issuise of Kuomlntang troops, i n f i l t r a t e d into North-
eas t Burma. Burmans knew very well tha t there must be 
American backing for ttie KMT troops. So many effor ts were 
made to the American Embassy in Burma with a view to moving 
the s t a t e Department to put pressure upon Formosa to with-
draw these forces from Burma, but there was no posi t ive 
r e s u l t . On 17th March 1953, the Burman Government suddenly 
43 
announced to terminate the American a id . 
The next s tep which Burma was taken to complain 
the U.N, General Assembly accusing the Chinese Nat ional i s t 
Government of having committed aggression by denying 12,000 
Na t iona l i s t troops on Burmese t e r r i t o r y , "to submit to 
disarmament and enterment in accordance with in te rna t iona l 
44 
lav;," Wien Burmese reso lu t ion came before the Assembly, 
Mexico, as spokesman for the American bloc, put forward a 
counter reso lu t ion in much more vague and general terms. 
This did not even confirm the forces in Kengtung With the 
KMT, I t i s well known the presence of h o s t i l e a c t i v i t i e s 
and depredation of foreign forces in the t e r r i t o r y of the 
Union of Burma, The Mexican reso lu t ion vent on to recommend 
tha t the negot ia t ions now in progress through the good offices 
43, liiid., p. 246, 
44. The New York Times, (March 27, 1953;. 
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Thailand also declared a small boundary set t lement with 
Burma by \jhich both of the nations recognised the Ihalweg 
of the 'Mae Sal River' as the f r o n t i e r . Early in 1941 the 
Governor of Burma issued a statement which prohibi ted 
a l e ins from entering Burmese provinces adjacent to Thailand 
and Indo-China, because Burma suddenly guessed the danger 
of aggression from the Thai s ide . 
Vhen Burma become l ibe ra t ed , the r e l a t ions B between 
the two countries oecame f r iendly . There i s a great 
50 
s i m i l a r i t y between them in comparison to o ther count r ies . 
No spec ia l developments took place u n t i l the KMT troops 
in Kengtung created t rouble , Burmese s t a r t e d to believe 
tha t these KMT forces were receiving ass i s tance through 
Siam. Thai Government closed the f ron t i e r with Burma in 
ear ly 1963, Mien KMT troops were ready to evacute the i r 
troops in October 1953, Thai and U.S, supervised the opera-
t ion . Some tension created vhen Thai Government refused to 
permit a Burmese observat ion team to leave Bangkok to wit-
ness the working of the a i r l i f t to Formosa for themselves. 
In the course of a i r a t tacks on KMT posi t ions the B,A,F, 
(Burma Air Force) bombed Thai v i l l ages in November and 
December 1963. In h i s public speech on 9 February 1954, the 
60. John, Leroy, Chr is t ian , ^urma and Japanese Invado f^:', 
(Bombay, 1945), pp. 286-287. 
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Thai Premier, Pibul Songgram, blamed Burma of •general 
un f r i end l ine s s ' . For tunate ly , th i s tense s i t u a t i o n did not 
continue for long. Burma apologized for the unfortunate 
mistakes of her planes and announced compensation in re turn 
of t h i s , vhich was s e t t l e d a t K. 1,20,000. At th i s time 
both governments t r i e d to improve r e l a t i o n s , there was an 
exchange of mission igl a t d i f fe ren t l e v e l s . A t l a s t , a t the 
end of 1964, Thai Government re-opened the road into Kengtung, 
UNU stayed a t Bangicok on h i s way to 'liongor Conference' in 
the l a s t days of 1954. T h t ^ he apologized to the people 
51 • 
of Thailand for the pas t misdeed of Burma,'* 
When King dhumitol of Thailand and queen S i r i k i t 
reached Burma, they were greeted with warmth of fee l ing and 
fr iendship by thousands of Burmese people. The main aim of 
the i r v i s i t i s to cement fr iendship and peace. Welcoming 
the Royal couple U Win Waung said, " the union of Burma and 
the Kingdom of Thailand are close neighbours and our two 
peoples have not only a common cu l tu re and re l ig ion , but 
also a s imi l a r way of l i f e . The s p i r i t of f r iendship and 
62 
cooperation has animited our two people ." The Thai King 
said, "The Burmese and Thai peoples are bound together in 
5 1 , Hugh, Tinker,, musill>i PP. 358-359. 
62, The Guardian^ (R*ngoon : March 3, 196oj. 
- 103 -
f r iendship , through shaping the same Buddhist f a i t h , as well 
53 
as the same asp i ra t ions of peace and cooperation," 
General Newin, the Chairman of Revolutionary Council, 
paid a v i s i t to Thailand a t the i nv i t a t i on of the King of 
Thailand to s trengthening f r iendly r e l a t i ons between the two 
54 
neighbouring count r ies . I t i s f ac t t ha t , "Siam th is growing 
fr iendship towards Burma has coincided with a ful l-blooded 
acceptance of SEATO and committal to American mi l i t a ry plans 
in East Asia, t h i s apparently non-complementary policy might 
indicate tha t Siam wishes to have a f r iend a t court if i t 
were ever decided tha t SEATO should be discar ted for peaceful 
co-exis tence, or i t may simply mean tha t Siam wishes to be 
ce r t a in tha t one flank i s secure in case the other i s at tacked. 
In e i t h e r event, Burma's fr iendship i s t not unimportant 
65 
to Siam," 
Burma developed a l e s s c losely r e l a t i ons to Pakistan, 
In June 1962, a t r ea ty of fr iendship was signed between two 
count r ies . According to th i s t r ea ty , Burma and Pakistan have 
agreed to work tov«irds consol idat ion and fur ther s t rength of 
63. The Guardian, (Rangoon : MARCH 4, 196o;, 
64, The Guardianj (Rangoon : Decemoer 16, 1962;, 
66, Hugh, Tinker, op.cit., p. 360, 
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the good ne ighbour ly r e l a t i o n s betv/een the two n a t i o n s by 
i n c r e a s i n g the i n t i m a t e coopera t ion in economic, c u l t u r a l 
56 
and o t h e r f i e l d s . 
P a k i s t a n Government was sympathized v;ith the Govern-
ment of the union of Burma in r e g a r d from the presence of 
f o r e i g n t r o o p s , means IQiT t r o o p s , i n i t s t e r r i t o r y , and they 
a l so hoped t h a t these t roops w i l l soon be evacuated or g ive -
57 
up t h e i r arms. 
A g r e a t change has come r e c e n t l y in 1971. l«hen 
Bangladesh, which was a p a r t of P a k i s t a n and was known 
before as Eas t P a k i s t a n became independent in December 197] , 
has been r ecogn i sed by Burma, In o p p o s i t i o n , P a k i s t a n 
government has with dra^-n i t s ambassador from Eangoon, Burma 
a l s o g r e e t e d the r e c e n t Simla Agreement and U Lwin, Chairman 
of Burma's d e l e g a t i o n in U.N.O. s a i d , "The r e c e n t Simla 
Agreement has c o n t r i b u t e d cons ide rab ly to peace in Asia as 
58 
a whole ." 
P h i l l i p i n i s have n o t so f a r appeared over Burma's 
h o r i z e n , and the two s t a t e s have no t developed c lose r e l a t i o n s . 
5 6 . The Guardian^ (Rangoon ; January 23 , 1964), 
5 7 . U.N. General Assembly O f f i c i a l Rp.cnrd, Ninth Sess ion , 
Ad Hoc P o l i t i c a l Committee, 6 t h Meeting, Agenda item 
6 3 , ( 1 4 October, 1954^ p , i 5 . 
5 8 . U.N.Monthly Chronic les^ Vol. IX, No. 10, (November 1972)^ 
p . 8w» 
- 105 -
The most Important aspect of Burma's foreign policy 
has been the modes in which the vrarld giants have been 
approached. The Government of Union of Burma enjoys the 
fu l l support and help of the Soviet Union. In the high times 
of 1954 and 1955 UNU said , the Government of the Soviyt 
£9 
Union helped Burma and offered technical a id . 
In 1950, vhen the Korean W&r broke-out and communist 
won over China, a t tha t time U.S.policy took new shape. In 
1949 Burma took keen I n t e r e s t in some kind of Pacif ic area 
Security Pact . Burma praised the U.S. sympathy, during the 
h lght of the 'Communist insur rec t ion ' in Burma and they 
also supplied mi l i t a ry and police to Burma. But Burmese 
could not hope that U.S.A. took a r i s k to a big war for 
60 
the i r sake. 
But the r e l a t i ons between U,S.^ . and Burma became 
worse on KMT problem. A Government source in Rangoon said 
tha t , "ijurma's decision to refuse fur ther U.S. aid was a 
mark of p r o t e s t agains t the alleged complicity of the Ameri-
cans with the KMT." l\hen U.S.A.. proposed a four power 
conference to discuss means of solving the Guarri l la problem. 
59. Maung, Maung, o p . c l t . , pp, SOO-Soi. 
60. Frank, N.Trager,'^Burma and the United States^^The 
Guardian^ Vol. XIV, (Rangoon: January> 1967^ pp.46-47, 
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kt f i r s t , Burmese Government d i s ca rded the p roposa l , but 
r e a l i s i n g the U.S. s i n c e r i t y , a f t e rwards Burma agreed . 
The fou r n a t i o n U.N.Commission s t a r t e d in Bangkok on May 
22, 1963. Burmese were impressed by the s i n c e r i t y of 
American e f f o r t s to evacuate Li Mi ' s f o r c e s . The Evacuat ion 
Committee announced from Bangkok in October 29, 1953 t h a t 
61 
Burma had agreed to cease f i r e . But Burma was t i r e d by 
U.S. p o l i c y because l ack of U.S. a c t i o n . 
In r ega rd to the Asian c o n f l i c t s such as Vietnam, 
Kashmir and Malaysia , Indonesia gave Burma's l e a d e r s a 
major cha l l enge in a t t e m p t i n g to c o n t r o l f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e s . 
According to the Burmese P r e s s a peacefu l s e t t l e m e n t can 
be made on the b a s i s of the 1954 Geneva accords a s S new 
type of conference ought to be c a l i e t ^ o s e t t l e the imme-
d i a t e problems of the c o n f l i c t s . The Bui-mese P res s and 
General Newin r ev ived on Kashmir a s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y for 
the peacefu l s e t t l e m e n t and to suppor t the e f f o r t s of the 
U.N.0. General Newin s a i d , "a peacefu l s e t t l e m e n t could be 
found if the d i s p u t e v;as moved from the b a t t l e f i e l d to the 
62 
conference t a b l e . " 
6 1 , J r . C l u b b , E .O l ive r , The Ef fec t of Chinese N a t i o n a l i s t 
M i l i t a r y A c t i v i t i e s in Burma on Burmese Fore ign Pnllcv^ 
C a l i f o r n i a : The Rand Coopporation, 1969, pp .30 -33 , 
62 , Josef , Si lverstein, ' ' "Burma Newin's Revolut ion recon-
sidered,^^ isiaiL-SuoiSZ, Vol.X Vl , (Februa ry , 1 9 6 ^ p , 9 8 . 
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The most Important period of our age is the emergence 
of Asia between 1940 and 1950, At the same time two great 
povwrs emerged, one was the r i se of U.S.A. as the Vbrld's 
stix>ngest and weal th ies t nat ion which supports the democratic 
countr ies and Soviet Russia as the leader of communist 
count r ies . Asian nat ional ism gradually became a mightly 
force to reckon with in in t e rna t iona l a f f a i r s . P t . Jawaharlal 
Nehru r i g h t l y said, "Asia i s waking up and s t r e t ch ing i t s 
63 
limbs.** 
Wien the t r ea ty for the 'defence ' of Southeast *.sia 
was concluded in 1964, Burmese gttt opinion formed about 
th i s Southeast Asian Treaty Organization? (SEAIO) tha t i t 
was an anti.-4sian conspiraey of soma 'Western Powers' . Accord-
ing to Burmese Openion, "SEATO i s a sword fashioned to be 
plunged into the f lesh of f ree and democratic Asia, and the 
garnishings of co l l ec t ive Security and economic a id are 
organised on the p r inc ip le tha t i t i s goodto hide the sword 
64 
in^lowers," 
So Burma remained aloof from SEATO. Among Southeast 
Asian countr ies only Thailand, Malaya and the Ph l l l i p ine s 
63. R.K.Karanjia, SEATn Securi ty r>r Menace^ (Bombay t 1956;, 
pp. 1-3, 
64. UiidM p . 93, 
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joined the Organisation. UNU sa id that , " i t was a p o l i t i c a l 
f a c t of l i f e today that any government of Burma which al igned 
i t s e l f with a Dig power bloc would a t once l o o s e the conf i -
65 
dence and support o f the people ," 
Burma had s p o i l t i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p with U.S.A. s ince 
General Ne Win In 1962, lifeshington was hoping for better 
r e l a t i o n s h i p with Burma as a r e s u l t of diplomatic e f f o r t s . 
But i t s hope was not f u l f i l l e d . Burma be l i eves that war 
w i l l not so lve any of i t s problems and that Organisation 
66 
l i k e SEA-TO w i l l never be s u c c e s s f u l , 
Buima fol lows the ' n e u t r a l i s t po l i cy ' and does no t 
be l i eve in m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e , so has gained the world v;ide 
conf idence . But the drawback of n e u t r a l i s t po l i cy i s t h i s 
t h a t Burma i s not r e c e i v i n g the l i o n ' s share from the two 
major pov/ers U.S.A. and Russia Ins t ead they are g e t t i n g 
a s s i s t a n c e from Japan and Vest Germany. The a s s i s t a n c e , f r o m 
Tokyo and Bonn i s no t very g r e a t . I t i s however going on 
in a jjhased manner. I t i s q u i t e probable t h a t t h e r e w i l l be 
no g r e a t power to he lp Burma if a t any time i t undergoes some 
67 
h a r d s h i p . Much v l l i however depend upon the balance of fo rces 
and cons ider f i t ions in Sou theas t A l i a in the v^ake of new 
developments . 
6b , The Indonesia OoserverST ( I n d o n e s i a : March 6,1961 j , 
6 6 . The Hindua^ (Madras) September 1 1 , 196t))i 
67 . yhe New iork^Tlmes, (September 3 , 1970; . 
C H A P T E R I I I 
U^BMA — CHINA REIATIQNS 
Surma's former Prime M i n i s t e r , UNU^once descr ibed 
Burma as " t e n d e r ground among c a c t u s , " a r e f e r ence to i t s 
having common borders on the West and North with India and 
China, Burma's l e a d e r s have always been p a r t i c u l a r l y con-
cerned with the g i a n t neighbour to the Xorth and have t r i e d 
to p reven t the n a t i o n from Decoming a ba t t l eg round of g r ea t 
1 
power c o n f l i c t . In a d i s c u s s i o n of Bui-ma's p o l i c y of "neu-
t r a l i s m " a seasoned Burmese p o l i t i c i a n remarked, "j&ck of 
a l l of our p u b l i c s t a t emen t s about non-a l ignment f r i e n d s h i p 
with a l l c o u n t r i e s , p o s i t i v e n e u t r a l i s m , and the l i k e , ^s 
a c o n s t a n t awareness of o u r Dig and powerful neighbour to 
the north' , we do n o t f e a r Communism a s an ideology so much 
as we f e a r the day when China ' s masses must f i n d l i v i n g 
2 
space in our under -popula ted c o u n t r y . " An American educated 
Buimese p r o f e s s o r once remarked t h a t , "Burma's fo re ign po l i cy 
i s founded on the immutable axiom of 700 m i l l i o n Chinese to 
o 
our n o r t h , " Burma's a t t i t u d e towards China and o t h e r major 
1, Robert , A.Holmes,^*Burma's Foreign P o l i c y toward China 
s i n c e 1962>? P a c i f i c Affairs^ Vol .45, ^Summer, 1972Jp.240, 
2 , William, C.Johnstone, Burma's Fore ign Policy^ Massachu-
s e t t s J Havard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963, p . 1 5 8 . 
3 , Robert , A.Holmes, o p . c i t . j p , 240, 
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powers and the pol icy tha t has Deen designed to deal with 
the i r presence i s exemplified by a statement of a former 
Pres ident of the AFPFL Ukyaw Nien, "Small nations always 
mis t rus t bigger ones, espec ia l ly those close by. For years 
past , every Burmese mistrusted China, vhether under Mao 
or Chiang. They also mis t rus t IndiaJ for tha t matter, they 
also mis t rus t s Soviet Russia and even America. We do not 
consider China a menace, but we accept a p o s s i b i l i t y of 
China one day invading us . We are enter ing into closer 
r e l a t ions with India, Pakistan, Bidonesia, and are t rying 
to f ind a formula for peaceful co-existence in th i s par t 
of our world. We do not want to do anything that wi l l pro-
voke china but if she does invade, I am confident tha t the 
na t iona l s p i r i t of our people w i l l stand firm agains t her 
Being a small na t ion , we must find ways and means 
4 
of avoiding embroilment in power b locs , " 
Uien China under the control of n a t i o n a l i s t govern-
ment had to trade space for time v i s - a -v i s powerful Japanese 
invaders in the l a t e 1930, the building of the 'Burma Road' 
almost inevi tably led to a common defence of the t-wo neigh-
bours in l a t e r stages of the Second "Wbrld Vj&r, At the time 
of Second Warld l^r , the Nat iona l i s t Chinese troops were 
4, Ibid.T p . 240. 
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in and out of Burmese t e r r i t o r y , and Burmese freedom f ighters 
and independence leaders l ikewise used China as t he i r 
she l t e r and planning head-quarter . The Oiinese Nat iona l i s t 
Government shoved i t s promptness to exchange ambassadors 
with Burma in September 1947, when the l a t e r had hardly 
completed the formal i t ies of i t s independence pact with 
Br i t a in , But no sooner had the Burmese envoy been appointed 
to Nanking than the l a t e r hadjto face the menace of the 
Chinese communists, whose leader Mao Ise Tung, had himself 
supported Burmese independence. I'^aoist observer, Ch'en 
Yuan, declared that " in 1948-49 Burma was hardly out of 
the s t a t e of a 'miserable colony* and a na t iona l l i b e r a t i o n 
movement in Burma must therefore s t i l l 'make a hard long 
5 
s t rugg le , " 
Burma's r e l a t i ons with Communist China have been 
cons i s t en t ly cor rec t and cord ia l s ince the time of the 
founding of the Communist s t a t e in China, insp i te of the 
Communist rebe l l ion a t home which i s capable of creat ing 
mischief between the two count r ies , Vftien the Communist 
China es tabl i shed the government of the People 's Republic 
of China in Peking, Burma took the i n i t i a t i v e of recognising 
the Communist regime and to agree on an exchange of embasSie 
6^^ Shen^Yui^Dalf" PekinH and Bangoonf The China Ouarterlyj 
No.6, (January-March, 196i)^ p. i 3 l . 
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because durma r ea l i s ed tha t there could not De two china 's 
and tha t the Communist Govei'ninent represented the w i l l of 
the mass of the Chinese people on the main land. Really, 
Burma was the f i r s t non-Communist country to recognise new 
China. T/*ien the in t e rna t iona l c i r c l e of non-Communist coun-
t r i e s made mi l i t a ry moves to e s t ab l i sh basis in Asia for 
the purpose of a t tacking China, Burma reso lu te ly refused 
to take pa r t in i t and a lso took energet ic mi l i t a ry action 
in dislodging foreign forces opposed to Conmunist China 
6 
from Burmese t e r r i t o r i e s . 
-n At the Deginning of 1948, ("New Democratic Front ' 
ref lect inL Maoist mental i ty was saidco have been formed 
under the 'Waite Flag Communists in Burma, After some time 
i t was rumoured tha t Chinese and Burmese Communists had 
joined hands in a mutual a id pact and unorthodoxly the loca l 
a u t h o r i t i e s of Yunnan repor tedly undertook to attempt a 
counter measure in conjuction with the Burmdse Government. 
Wien the Communist government came in power in Peking, imme-
d ia t e ly , thousands of overseas Chinese in Burma were prompted 
in mass r a l l i e s in Rangoon to sttout t h e i r approval and support 
of Peking and over twenty Le f t i s t organisa t ions also celeber-
ated the founding of the Chinese People ' s Republic in Prome 
6. The Guardian^ (Rangoon^ 24th January, 196^ 
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(north West of Rangoon) whether the Union Government of 
7 
Burma l iked i t or not . 
T i l l 1952-63, they supported vocal ly the ef for ts of 
the Burmese Communists to seize control of the Government Dy 
force . But a t the time when i t became c lear tha t the under-
ground Comrnunists in Burma had ne i the r the strength nor 
the s k i l l a t organisat ion to accomplish th i s and when the 
ef for t s of Communist groups in the same d i rec t ion in Indonesia 
and l^laya were equally unavai l ing, , the Chinese communists 
changed the i r approach to tha t of developing "friendly r e l a -
t ions" vjith the nat ions in South and Southeast Asia. 
At the time of the Korean \\Sr in mid-1950, Peking 
gave warning to Burma tha t she would not to l e ra te any Western 
pov.'er to build a i r f i e l d s in her t e r r i t o r y . But Burma's vot-
ing v/ith the U.N. majority, and condemning Morth Korea 
the reaf te r , proved an inadvertent affront to Peking a t the 
time. Although Burma's r e l a t i ons with Chinese Nat iona l i s t 
Government were not good, a Burmese envoy had gone to Peking 
for preliminary ta lks and Amoassadors had already been 
exchanged between the two countries by September, Peking 
som'ehow s t i l l found i t necessary to accuse Burma's leader 
7. Shen, i:U-Dal, o p . c i t . , p . 132, 
8. 'rtllliarn, C.Johnstone, o p . c i t . , p. 169, 
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UNU, in the words of the tS'oo Fhan of r e t a in ing Br i t i sh 
advisers to dominate h is Government and admitting American 
G&pital to control h i s economy. This, together v i th Burma's 
\J^ vote on Korea and rumours of foreign atcempts to Duild 
a i r f i e l d s in Burma, made Burma in Peking's view "a spr ing-
board of aggression aga ins t the People 's Republic of China," 
In DecemDer 1950, ce r ta in , "major overseas Chinese 
organisat ions in Rangoon, including the China Democratic 
League and the Chinese students Association had i n i t i a t e d 
the i r own "oppose - American and aid Korea", compaign to 
9 
support the I counterpart, in the mainland of China." 
The e a r l i e s t opportunity for Burma to i n g r a t i a t e 
herself with Peking was provided by a second b.N, resolut ion 
Dranding communist China as an "aggressor" in the Kerean war, 
with an embargo as punishment which Burma chose to vote 
agains t on February 1, 1961, Burma a lso re jected an imme-
dia te peace t r ea ty with Japanjat the San Francisco Conference 
in l a t e August, in th i s conference ne i the r Peking nor Taipei 
/ i t 
was reprented. In September, a new Burmese Ambassador UITla 
Maung was sent to Peking to profess Burma's f u l l r e a l i s a t i on 
of China's importance and her po ten t i a l role in the p o l i t i c a l 
9. Shen-fU-Dai, o o . c i t . ^ p. 134. 
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obtain a l l the economic help from outs ide tha t they wanted 
7 
out they did not have to go a tout begging. UNU described 
Burma's foreign policy as one of "dynamic n e u t r a l i t y " . In 
h i s National Day speech the Prime Minister UNU referred to 
Burma's foreign pol icy as fo l lovs : "I^e to our neut ra l 
policy, we do not a l i gn ourselves with any, power bloc. For 
t h i s non-alignment, both blocs would of course view us a 
favourable as they would the i r own close colleagues. But, 
one f a c t i s ce r t a in , both these power blocs know ful ly well 
we are not playing second f iddle to any bloc. Because of 
our neu t r a l stand, we are in a pos i t ion to be on f r iendly 
terms with a l l countr ies of both blocs« I t may perhaps be 
d i f f i c u l t to understand tha t our f r iendly dealings with a l l 
countr ies are important for the s t a b i l i t y of our independence. 
But, a perusal of the world map and the geographical posi t ion 
occupied by our country and close-study of various countries 
w i l l convince, us, beyond a shadow of a doubt, how far our 
f r iendly r e l a t i o n s with a l l countries based on our neut ra l 
foreign policy have contr ibuted towards the s t a b i l i t y of our 
independence • we have been able to be on the fr iend-
l i e s t terms with both power blocs because of our correct 
8 
foreign pol icy. I have not the s l i g h t e s t douDt about i t . " 
?• William, C.Johnstone, Bui-ma's Foreign Policy, Massachusetts: 
Havard University Press , 1963, pp, 287-288. 
8. I l i i i i . , p . 100. 
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concepts and trand of events In the East , The Peking Press 
duly praised Burma's good sense, 
UNU, then Prime Minister of Burma also expressed his 
desire to ask t)oth Peking and >^scow for economic aid if 
no s t r i ngs were a t tached. In January-February 1953 he 
and h i s colleagues a t the 'iiurma sponsored Asian Soc ia l i s t 
Conference in Rangoon fur ther careful ly spared Peking while 
a t tacking t o t a l i t a r i an i sm in the Soviet Union and i t s 
s a t e l l i t e s . > 
In January 1953, Burma s ce lebra ted i t s f i r s t Burma-
China fr iendship week ca l l i ng for c u l t u r a l exchange. In 
the next month China offered to help Burma for solving 
h i s "^kuomintang troops" problem by sending in forces of i t s 
own, although th i s caused apprehension and reserve ra ther 
than gra t i tude on Burma's pa r t , A im rumour spread aoout 
the entry of Communist Chinese troops into Burma, which 
however, was promptly denied oy Peking's Embassy in Rangoon. 
Ihe Burma-China fr iendship has-- been expanded in the 
autumn of 1953. Burma-China fr iendship Association was-
symoolised the oeginning of new developments in Sino-burmese 
r e l a t i o n s . On Apri l 22, 1954, represen ta t ives of both the 
countr ies in Rangoon concluded t h e i r f i r s t ma^or BaiLter Trade 
Agreement with Burma's r i c e , minerals and rubb£j to be 
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exchanged for mainland China's coal , s i l k , farming tools and 
' 10 
l i g h t i n d u s t r i a l products during the following three years. 
Ihe Deginning of new era of c lose ly and fr iendly 
r e l a t i o n s between Burma and her big neighbours as China 
and India, symbol-zed f i r s t dy the agreement on a s e t of 
guiding "p r inc ip le s" which Burma Bienceforth accepted as a 
basis for i t s own China pol icy. Becaxjse the Chinese Premier 
Chou En Lai v i s i t e d Prime Minister Mr. Nehru in the month 
of June 1954 and they j o i n t l y announced t h e i r adherence to 
the "Five Pr inc ip les of Peaceful Co-existence". From Delhi, 
Chou came to Rangoon for h i s f i r s t meeting with Prime 
Minister UNU, and a t the end of his v i s i t , UNU, too, joined 
with Chou in declar ing adherence to the "Five P r i n c i p l e s , " 
The f r iendly v i s i t of Mr. Chou to India and aurma 
had also given r i se to the speculat ion tha t China was plann-
ing a new "peace offensive", Biis seems to be giving an 
unfortunate and unwarranted in t e rp re t a t ion to a gesture of 
goodwill from the People ' s Republic, 
Jus t before the departure, Chou En Lai and UNU Issued 
the customary j o i n t statement, affirming support for the 
"Five Principles '* they also expressed hopes for a peaceful 
10. Ijil^.i pp. 134-135, 
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solut ion of in t e rna t iona l d isputes . The most s ign i f i can t 
point in t h i s j o i n t communique was tha t , "the Prime Ministers 
affirmed tha t the people of each nat ion should have the 
r i g h t to choose the i r own s t a t e system and way of l i f e with-
out in terference from other na t ions , Eevolution cannot be 
exported, a t the same time outside interference with the 
common-will expressed oy the people of aqf any nation should 
11 
not ue permitted^-* k Burmese t rade mission was sent to Peking 
in September, where Trade Prodtocols were signed in November 
on the ac tua l exchange of commodities, specifying tha t 
Communist China would purchase 150,000 tons of r i ce from 
Burma yearly u n t i l 1967, UNU also paid a re tu rn v i s i t to 
Peking a t the end of November and issued another Jo in t 
communique declaring an accord to tackle a wider range of 
Sino-Burmese issues from consular establ ishments , t ranspor t 
and pos ta l services to economic a id and a Dorder set t lement . 
In 1964-1956 a second major cu l t u r a l delegation was 
dispatched by Peking to Buima and India, In March, more trade 
contracts were signed by which P ^ i n g began to export indus-
t r i a l i n s t a l l a t i o n s and equipement to Burma, Burma's re la t ions 
U , I\rt.lliam, C.Johnstone, o p . c i t . j pp. 166-168. 
12, Shen-YU-Dai, o p . c i t . j p. 136. 
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with China were always guided by the five pr inc ip les of 
"peaceful co-tixistence" which are intended to increase good 
r e l a t i ons oetween s t a t e s with di f fer ing p o l i t i c a l and soc ia l 
systems on the iDasis of mutual respect for each o the r ' s 
sovereigni ty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t eg r i t y , mutual non_aggression, 
non-interference in each o the r ' s i n t e rna l a f fa i r s and s e t t -
lement of disputes oetv/een nations by peaceful means. 
Scruplous oDservance of these pr inc ip les has enaoled 3ui'ma 
and China to conclude a permanent boundary set t lement and 
13 
promotion of f r iendly r e l a t i o n s . 
At the 3andung Conference Mr. Chou En Lai assured that 
Peking would never v io l a t e Burma's f r o n t i e r s since the s p i r i t 
of peaceful co-existence was to preva i l in Asia and Africa. 
Border trouble, however, f i n a l l y f lared-up in l a t e July 
1956, when a large number of Chinese Communist troops pene-
t ra ted into an extensive area inside Burma. In the duration 
of few weeks the whole world seemed to be t a lk ing aoout 
Peking's during " incurs ions" into Burmese t e r r i t o r y to 
I 
"preserve peace" in the "wa d i s t r i c t . " 
The problei-n of Sino-Burmese border set t lement had 
admitted by >• ,. a long standing and complicated one from 
13, The Guard J an. (Rangoon) 19th Fe Druary^ 1964JL 
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the time when Great B r i t a in had acquired sovereign r igh t s 
over Burma in 1886, three major agreements had been concluded 
in 1884, 1897 and 1941 af te r long-dravm out negotiat ions 
and manoeuveres. But these agreements had l e f t two of the 
four sect ions of the Sino-Buimese Dorder-line undefined, 
one being the 'wa d i s t r i c t * v,here the current dispute took 
place and the other a pa r t of the eastern f ron t i e r of the 
Kachin s t a t e , both in Upper Burma. "Kuomintang troops" in 
Burma had been a recent compiication? v i s - a -v i s the Peking 
14 
regime. 
In November 1956, the pr inc ip le issues on border 
set t lement were discussed in presence of U1*IU at Peking, A.t 
t h i s time, he was not there as prime Minister but as a 
pres ident of the AFPFL. At Peking he wasjtreated as a s t a t e 
guest, not a high government o f f i c i a l . UNU discussed the 
Sino-Burmese border problem which resu l t ed in h i s "Package 
deal" annovaiced in Burma a t a l a t e r date a f t e r h i s re turn . 
I t i s qui te c lear tha t the AFPFL leaders had become gravely 
concerned over the implicat ions of the border issue and of 
what seemed to be an increasing amount of Chinese Communist 
i n f i l t r a t i o n over the border, because of h i s non-alignment 
pos i t ion a t the time, UNU apparently f e l t tha t he could 
14> Shen-iU-Dai, o p . c i t . , p . 138, 
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lb 
speak more frankly than as a Prime Minis ter . 
During the period of the mi l i t a ry caretaker govern-
ment, between September and A.pri^ I960, Burmese Government 
continued to pursue UNU's policy of "close and fr iendly 
r e l a t i o n s " with Ck^mmunist China. The f i n a l conclusion on 
the issues of border-set t lement and fur ther development of 
economitc and c u l t u r a l r e l a t i ons took place a f te r UNU's 
re turn to power in Apri l , I960. 
In facing the problem of Communist subversion and 
i n f i l t r a t i o n , the Burma government i s not alone. I t remains 
a major unsolved problem for fliany s t a t e s of Southeast Asia 
and of r ea l concern to the United Sta tes and i t s SEATO 
16 
a l l i e s , " S t i l l another aspect of the general problem of 
subversion and i n f i l t r a t i i n has been the border crossings 
of %foole groups of t r i b a l people who apparently have been 
able to leave Zunnan as refugees and s e t t l e in with the i r 
17 
compatriots on the Burma s ide." I t i s not easy for Burma 
as well as for China to fu l ly guard a l l possible transborder 
routes along the 900 mile f ron t i e r , a t . the same time i t is 
very d i f f i c u l t to determine the numbers of persons enter ing/ 
Bui-ma o r to estimate the extent to which the Chinese Communist 
l6« William,C.Johnstone, op^c i t . , p . 173, 
16, JJoM.i p . 177, 
17, i k i d . , p. 184. 
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au tho r i t i e s have been l e n i e n t In permitt ing th i s f lov. Some 
Burmese o f f i c i a l s and mi l i t a ry personal^ have showed anxiety 
over th i s "refugee" problem as marking the oeginning of a 
l a rge r mi miration, not only of t rans border t r i b a l groups, 
out also of Chinese, which could have serious p o l i t i c a l and 
economic implications for Burma. I t is suspected that the 
Chinese communists may oe sending agents with these groups 
of refugees who wi l l e s t ab l i sh themselves on the Burma side 
and can be used l a t e r to s t i r - u p trouble and disaf fec t ion . 
During the 1967 and 1959, there were constant reports 
of border crossing by groups nianbering anywhere between 50 
to 500 and over 1000 respec t ive ly . On November, i t was 
estimated tha t there were more than 10,000 i l l e g a l immigrants 
from funnan in the area of the ""W& Sta te" and the northern 
"Shan S t a t e s , " "There numbers, mostly members of trans border 
t r i b a l groups, were reported to include many hundred^of 
persons of Chinese stock who were a l leged to have f led to 
Burma to escape the harsh r e s t r i c t i o n s of the Chinese commune 
18 
system," 
In the beginning of 1969, three events occurred which 
opened the eyes of Burmans to the ev i l s of communism as seen 
by the West, The f i r s t event was the bruta l supression of 
IS . Ibid.y p . 184, 
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the Tibetan revo l t by the Chinese Communists and the effect 
of t h i s , the f l i g h t of the Dalai Lama and thousands of 
Tibetans to India as refugees. 
The other two events took place inside Burma, "In 
April and again in June, there K vere two defections of 
o f f ice rs of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon, the f i r s t unsucc-
e s s f u l ! and the second successful . Both served to demonstrate 
the nature of communist regimes and provide evidence on the 
19 
problem of subversion." On April 28, 1969, an aff icer of the 
Soviet Embassy was brought to the Rangoon General Hospital, 
suffering from vriiat the press described as "hypnotic poi-
soning" where he voiced " invect ives" agains t the Soviet 
Union and was reported to have Jumped from the hospitaljt 
window to avoid a r r e s t . He was over powered by fellow 
of f icers of the Soviet Embassy, and according to the press 
20 
he was taken to home and was given strong seda t ives . 
These incidents involved basic Issues in Cold-Uar 
p o l i t i c s as well as providing one more instance of the essen-
t i a l s t ruggle between the two power blocs for exert ing influ-
ence over the unaligned na t ions . The border problem v;hich 
the Burma government inher i t ed from B r i t i s h rule was due 
19. I b id . , p . :S5, 
20, l i i i d . , p. 185. 
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to undefined northern f r o n t i e r by B r i t i s h r u l e r s . 
From the oeginning, the Burmese government thought 
tha t the problem of t h e i r inher i ted , undemarcated f ron t i e r 
with China was v.'holly b i l a t e r a l . I t was a problem which 
was to be s e t t l e d oetween the two pa r t i e s concerned. 'I!he 
border problem provided an example of hov; the Burma government 
applied i t s pr inc ip les of neutralism in case c l ea r ly affect -
ing i t s v i t a l i n t e r e s t s . The d isc loser 4f th i s dispute 
also provides some s ide l i g h t s on Chinese communist policy 
towards Burma and the r e s t of Asia, There are so many 
o f f i c i a l s concerned aoout the Sino-Burman f ron t i e r area. The 
problems to prevent i n f i l t r a t i o n of persons from communist 
China and to control smuggling as well as the va r i e ty of 
proDlems presented byjthe existence of transborder t r i b a l 
minority groups have been mentioned. "All Burmans in the 
government or in the Burma army who had any r e spons ib i l i t y 
for the northern border areas v/ere also aware t ha t unt i ly 
a demarcated boundary had been agreed to with the Chinese 
communist regime, the i r d i f f i c u l t i e s vould not lessen and 
21 
might, a t any time, grow worse," The r ea l problems is that 
of some Chinese troops which have entered Burmese t e r r i t o r y 
and es tabl ished outposts on the union s o i l in the ' Iv& Sta te ' 
21 . Ib id . , pp. 188^189. 
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in c l o s e proximi ty to the Burma-China border . 
UNU a l s o proclaimed t h a t t h e r e v/as s u f f i c i e n t good-
w i l l between the two c o u n t r i e s to so lve t h i s problem in 
an amicable way. He f u r t h e r s a i d , "p roper atmosphere must 
oe c r e a t e d for mutual t r u s t and goodwil l conducive to f a i r 
22 
s e t t l e m e n t of o u t s t a n d i n g i s s u e s , " 
U Ba Swe s a i d that^"Burma would never t o l e r a t e agg-
r e s s i o n on he r ' r i g h t f u l s o i l ' , but we cannot say t h a t the 
presence of Hed Chinese t roops on our s i d e of theborder 
23 
i s an a g g r e s s i o n , " 
The Burmese Government de sc r ibed a sketchy glimpse 
of the s t a t e of n e g o t i a t i o n s . U Ba Swe t o l d the p re s s t h a t 
China had agreed to wittidraw he r t roops from the 1S41 l i n e 
and had accepted the 1941 l i n e as the bas i s f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s , 
UNU p r e f e r r e d the s e t t i n g up i n t e r n a t i o n a l boundary Commi-
s s ion to s e t t l e the Sino-Burmese boundary. The l e a d e r s of 
Burma, "v/hich h a r d l y had s u f f i c i e n t armed fo rces to p r o t e c t 
even o n e - t e n t h of the t e r r i t o r y , " a r e a l s o t r y i n g t h e i r bes t 
to save the count ry with the a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s , Apart 
from r e i n f o r c i n g the border t r o o p s , the Government had p lans 
22, N.N.Ghatate , The Sino-Surmese Border Se t t l ement , Indian 
Quar ter ly^ Vol.XXIV, No .1 , (January-March;^'?^.31, 
2 3 , I b i d . J p , 3 1 . 
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f o r an e x t e n s i v e network of roads to l i n k the border lands 
more f i rmly v/ith the i n t e r i o r . 
"During the a c t i v e phase of the Sino-Burmese border 
d i s p u t e , the Burmtse government sugges ted t h a t both s i de s 
should withdraw to an agreed d i s t ance on e i t h e r s i d e of the 
I s e l i n Line , and in o r d e r to minimize the chance of m i l i t a r y 
c l a s h e s a j o i n t Doundary commission should demark the 
24 
undefined p a r t s of the Sino-Bui-mese b o r d e r . " 
Premier Chou En Lai , whi le r e p e a t i n g h i s previous 
p o s i t i o n s a i d , " t h a t h i s government could not accep t the 
I s e l i n Line, in o r d e r to c r e a t e an atmosphere f avourab le to 
peacefu l s e t t l e m e n t of the d i s p u t e , he was prepared to 
withdraw h i s t roops to h i s s ide of the I s e l i n A Line in 
• Wa S t a t e ' , provided the Burmese t roops did no t move in to 
26 
the a r e a aoandoned by the Chinese troops.** 
A fou r t een memoers de l ega t i on l e d by the General 
Ne- Win l e f t f o r Peking a t the i n v i t a t i o n of the Chinese 
Prmler Mr. Chou En Lai to th ra sh o u t o u t s t a n d i n g problems 
between the two c o u n t r i e s . 
Among the o u t s t a n d i n g border problems to be s e t t l e d 
with China were in r e s p e c t of China ' s c la im f o r the th ree 
_ _ _ _ _ _ 
26. Ibid .y p . 3 1 . 
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border v i l l ages of Phimaw, Gawlum and KangfangNortheast 
of Myitkyina and China's demand for the re turn of 80 square 
miles of oorder land eas t of Bahmo known as Namwan assigned 
t r a c t which had been leased to the then Br i t i sh government 
by China since 1897, a t a r en t of Rs. 1000 per year, China 
26 
refused to accept the ren t a f t e r the*"Second Vbrld "Ijar.-^  
men UNU ar r ived a t Peking for s e t t l i n g the Sino-
Burmese border dispute , he was given a warm welcome. In a l l 
the meetings both the leaders t r i ed to lessen t he i r differences 
kt the time of negot ia t ions between Burmese and 
Chinese governments, the Chinese government had protested 
tha t the I se l ine Line was "unfair" as China had accepted 
the Br i t i sh demands when they were under a t tack from the 
Japanese and had sorely needed Br i t i sh help . In sp i t e of 
t h i s , Chinese government agreed to accept the I se l in Line 
and also the border between Dlphuk Pass and Izurazi Pass, 
the Mac Mohan Line, provided there was an "over a l l settlement" 
of the e n t i r e Sino-Burmese border, although the Chinese in 
1914 had not r a t i f i e d the t r i p a r t i t e convention. Regarding 
the Namwan Assigned Tract, the Chinese said that , "the 
exis tence of a leased t e r r i t o r y between two severeign and 
26. The HindUj 23rd Januarv.l96nl 
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equal t nations was not f a i r and tha t the lease should be 
abrogated," Concerning the l»rder between the High Conical 
Peak and Izurazi Pass, Chou En Lai said that^"although in 
the past China had claimed the areas West of the r i ve r 
M'Mai Kha, W^ludlng the t e r r i t o r y known as the Triangle, 
he would no I. r e a s g - r t those claims and wanted th i s sect ion 
of the Doundary !:> oe del ineated in such a way tha t the 
Dorder should it^ - somewhere east of N'Mai Kha, ensuring tha t 
Hpinaw, Kangx'ang, and Gawlum f a l l on the Chinese s ide of 
27 
the borde r / ' 
l^en UNU, the former Prime Minister of Burma returned 
from Peking with the "Package Deal" proposals, he to ld the 
auroiese people tha t i t was h i s understanding tha t if Hpimaw, 
Gav/lum and Kangfang were surrendered to the Chinese, Burme 
would receive in exchange the Namwan Assigned t r a c t and a 
set t lement of the whole S boundary on tbe basis of the Br i t i sh , 
defined l i n e s . 
The Chinese were surprised to hear th i s and they 
s ta ted tha t they had never offered to exchange the Namwan 
Tract for the thre^ Kachin v i l l ages , since both, areas belonged 
to China and th i s type of exchange was impossible. They 
27. N.M.Ghatate, op. c i t . , p.32. 
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proposed tha t the Namwan Tract be exchanged for another 
area in the ' l^ fe S t a t e ' adjacent to the 1941 Line. Secondly 
they claimed that the t e r r i t o r y of three v i l l ages should be 
186 sq.miles r a the r than 56 miles . !rhird, they showed that 
t h e i r idea of the t r a d i t i o n a l customary l i n e which was 
s i gn i f i c an t l y d i f fe ren t from the Mac I-fohan Line. The Chinese 
a t f i r s t said that , "they could not accept t h i s un t i l a 
new survey had determined where the watershed lay, and l a t e r 
modified th i s to an acceptance of the '^^tershed pr inciple 
provided tha t in ce r t a in p laces . The Bui-mese continued to 
press for the watershed l i n e without reserva t ions and in 
addi t ion s ta ted tha t they could not cede any t e r r i t o r y in 
the «Wa S t a t e ' as an exchange for the Namwan Tract , The 
question of set t lement about the three v i l l s ^ e s and the 
28 
Namwan Assigned;!! t r a c t were administered loy the Kachln Sta te ." 
If any chani^es, taken place then approval^ of the union 
and the Kachin State governments would be needed. 
The Government also informed Mr.UNU tha t " i t was 
incl ined to give-up claims to Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum 
if they could r e t a i n the Namwan Assigned Tract , but they 
could not be able to convince the Kachin leaders to agree 
28. Daphne, E. Uiittam,'^'Th% Sino-3urmese Boundary Treaty/' 
pac i f ic Affairs^ Vol. JCXXIV, No. 2, (Summer 1961V 
pp. 178-179. 
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29 
to such a compromise." 
As a r e s u l t , UNU t r i e d his best to persuade the Kachin 
leaders to agree to cede the three v i l l ages but f a i l ed to 
get the i r consent. Few days l a t e r , on 4th November Chou En Lai 
placed h is nev/ proposal before the eintire Burmese mission. 
In the proposal, China i n s i s t e d on the re turn of the Hpinaw 
area, but i t accepted the Burmese proposal tha t the border 
should run along the watershed between N'Mai Kha and Salve en 
r i v e r s . UNU t r i ed her Dest to get the Kachin leaders to 
accept the Chinese proposal and toldthem inthe presence 
of Chou En Lai tha t he would persuade the Chinese to allow 
them to keep the Namwan Assigned Tract "as a gesture of 
f r i endsh ip . " 
The solut ion of the en t i r e Sino-Burmese boundary s e t t l e -
ment delayed because of the deadlock over Hpinaw area and 
although the Burmese Government was wi l l ing to cede th i s area 
to China, the puolic opinion i^ Burma, spec ia l ly In the 
So 
Kachin Sta te , was very much agains t i t . The Du ra ised 
h i s t o r i c a l fac ts and said to the Burmese Government t h a t the 
29. Sein, Win,^'Border pact with Burma^^ Far Eastern Economip 
fiasisaf, Vol. XXX, No.S,(,Hongkong, October 20, 196Q),p,io5. 
30. M , means Tribal Chiefs of th i s a rea . 
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three v i l l ages "never belonged to the Chinese in the h i s to ry . " 
In s p i t e of the such c r i t i c i sm, the Burmese leaders accepted 
the Chinese proposal because they had no a l t e rna t i ve except 
to accept the Chinese mi l i t a ry supe r io r i t y , U Kyaw Nein 
then the Deputy Prime Minister s t a t e d t h a t i t was "wise to 
give av/ay tiie Hpimaw area in order to get the en t i r e Sino-
31 
Burmese border set t lement once and f o r a l l . " 
\ihen General Ne W-n came in power as the head of the 
caretaker government in Burma, he s t a r t e d negot ia t ion with 
the Chinese government. Ihe proposal made by him in his 
l e t t e r of 4th June 1959 was the same as decided by the 
Cabinet sub-comrflittee on 14th October, 1967, except tha t 
i t offered the Chinese about s ix ty two sq,miles in the 
Panghung and Pangloo a reas . 
Ne Win also dispatched another l e t t e r s t a t i ng that 
he had considered '^the Chinese proposals of 30th July 1968, 
that he was able to make the "maximum offer" and tha t he 
had obtained the support of various p o l i t i c a l l eaders , only 
because of h is non-part isan pos i t ion ,^ He also emphasized 
that Burma had made more compromises than before and that 
3 1 . i M d . , p . 106. 
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the Chinese government, instead of suggesting "fur ther 
negot ia t ions" should take speedy s teps to eliminate minor 
d i f ferences . 
In reply of th i s l e t t e r Mr. Chou En Lai invi ted 
General Ne Win to v i s i t Peking so on 23rd January 1S60, 
General Ne Win l e f t Rangoon as the head of high powered 
d i l ega t ion . 4 f t e r f ive days serious negot ia t ions Sino-
Burmese Boundary Agreement was concluded. The Namwan 
assigned t r a c t of 70 square miles was to become a par t of 
Burma, inexchange for the t ransfer of Panghung and Pangloo 
32 
to C3aina, 
At the signing ceremony UNU said , "This boundary 
set t lement was not an easy achievement. There were many 
d i f f i c u l t i e s to be overcome on both s ides , some of them 
inftprent to the problem and others ca r r i ed over from h i s to ry . 
No progress could therefore have been made without a strong 
desire on both sides to reach a se t t lement . The f r iendship . 
understanding and s p i r i t of mutual accomroodation displayed 
33 
by both sides have contr ibuted to the present happy outcome." 
Thus on October 1, I960 the Sino-Burmese boundary 
Treaty was signed. The docunents opens with the preamble, 
32. N.M.Ghatate, QO.ci t . , pp. 42-43. 
33. Sein, Win, o p . c i t . , p . lo6. 
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"She pres ident of the union of Burma andthe government of 
ttie People 's Republic China, noting with s a t i s f a c t i o n that 
the successive governments of the Union of Burma and the 
Government of the People 's Republic of China, conducting 
friendly- consul ta t ion and showing mutual understanding and 
mutual accommodation in accordance with the Five Pr incip les 
of Peaceful Co-existence have overcome various d i f f i c u l t i e s 
and eventually achieved successfully an ove ra l l set t lement 
of the question of the boundary between the the two countries 
appoint Prime Minister UNU and Premier Chou En Lai as 
tbe i r respect ive p len ipo ten t i a r i e s to sign the Boundary 
Treaty.'' 
Thus we see tha t Burmese government as well as Chinese 
government made compromises and ooth agreed to the Burmese 
view regarding the watershed pr inc ip le in del imit ing the torder 
eas t of Izurez.ri Pass, oefore the area was sui-veyed, the 
Burmese government with -drew from t h e i r previous posi t ion 
tha t they can not offer more than 66 sq.miles in Hpimaw area, 
men the question of na t iona l i ty problem of the people 
of these ?;reas came both the countries agreed that the inha-
b i tan ts of the area should declare the choice of t he i r 
34. ib i j i . , p . 107. 
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n a t i o n a l i t y wi th in twelve months and in case they l i v e d in 
the o t h e r coun t ry , should move in to the count ry of t h e i r 
choice of n a t i o n a l i t y w i t h i n two y e a r s . 
A cen tu ry o ld d i s p u t e between China and Burma came to 
a A happ^engdj when s i g n i n g of the Sino-3urmese Boundary 
Treaty in Peking, UNU s a i d , "Ttie T rea ty which the two govern-
ments were about to conclude , would f o r the f i r s t time in 
h i s t o r y , bring i n t o e x i s t e n c e , a complfctely d e l i m i t e d and 
demarcated boundary oetwtan our two c o u n t r i e s , a boundary 
drawn-up with the agreement of bot^ s i d e s , and t h e r e f o r e a 
boundary of peace and f r i e n d s h i p . In the c i rcumstances of 
today, when d i s t a n c e and b a r r i e r s no l onge r make f o r in 
a c c e s s i b : l i t y , i t i s of utmost importance t h a t even the best 
of ne ighbours , whose r e l a t i o n s h i p i s f i rmly based on the Five 
P r i n c i p l e s of peaceful c o - e x i s t e n c e , should , know e x a c t l y x 
v:here the t e r r i t o r y of one ends and the t e r r i t o r y of the 
36 
o t h e r b e g t i n s , " 
UNUsaid, aDout the Chinese a t t i t u d e with r ega rd to the 
boundarj' d i s p u t e , "The whole h i s t o r y of the boundary ques t ion 
shows t h a t the Chinese do n o t a l low th ings to be imposed on 
37 
them." 
36 . N.M.Ghatste, o p . c i t . , pp. 42-44 . 
36 . The Link, Vo l .3 , N o . 9 , ( 0 c t o b e r 9, 196Q^ p . 2 9 . 
37 . i D i d . , p . 29 . 
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4 t the time of boundary set t lement both Premier Chou 
En Lai and Prime Minister UNU said tha t they vould review 
the r e l a t i o n s of f r iendship between the People 's Republic 
38 
of China and the Union of Burma, iVf t e r th i s agreement, the 
f ix ing of boundary p i l l a r s along the watershed betv/een the 
Salween and the N,Mai Kha was expected to give Burma the 
f i r s t f ixed boundary i t has ever had with i t s Chinese te r r i to ry 
on o f f i c i a l maps and in school books of geography. 
Both the count r ies , Burma and China, were s a t i s f i e d 
with th i s agreement because not only the boundary was fixed 
and t h e i r pres t ige enhanced, Out they also have a non-
39 
aggression pact signed. Without any doubts, the Boundary 
Treaty reprsented a forwardsMpr for Burma's secur i ty . The 
long l a s t problem of disputed border of 1,500 miles was 
peacefully demarcated and agreed » i upon, the danger to 
Burma from the north is not yet removed, "A swing in Peking's 
policy, a pretext based on the i l l e g a l immigration or on 
Burma's treatment of the non-c i t izen "overseas Chinese" or 
on some presumed v io l a t i on of the Friendship t r e a t y , c e r t a i n l y 
an i nh ib i t i ng fac tor in the free exercise of Burma's foreign 
40 
policy decision-making, might a c t i v a t e the danger? 
38. '^Sino-Burmese Boundary Agreement and Treaty of fr iendship 
and mutual non-aggressionj' Burma Weekly Bullet inj Vol. 
IX,No.l,Ulay 6, 1S6(^ p ,26. 
39. Ifoodman, Dorothy/* Burma^" The New Statesman^ Vol.LX, 
No, 1942, d o t h October,196Q, p,46o. 
40. Frank, Trager,'"Burma and ChinaJ' Journal of Southeast 
Asian His tor Vj Vol.S, No. 1, (March, 196 ;^^  p .66. 
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After th i s both the leaders agreed to expand Slno-
Burmese trade and decided to urge the vorld leaders to 
adopt a s p i r i t of compromise a t the forthcoming summit 
41 
Conference a t Par is in May. "Peking also confirmed i t s 
p o l i t i c a l r econc i l i a t ion with the Burmese through economic 
and t rade agreements designed both to provide ass i s tance 
42 
to tha t country and to spread China's influence the re . " A 
trade agreement in October i960 sanctioned tha t China vould 
purchase from Burma 3000,000 to 4000,000 tons of r i c e of the 
1961 crop for shipment in the same year and tha t Burma would 
import from China commodities vhich Burma required and China 
might be able to supply in order to balance the t rade between 
the two. The i spor t of r i c e not only a s s i s t e d Burma in d i s -
posing of her produce but was c l ea r ly u t i l i z e d to re l i eve 
China's c r i t i c a l shortage of foodgrains in i960. 
The trade agreement was soon followed Dy a bigger 
ass i s tance programme by China. \*hen Chou En Lai v i s i t e d 
Burma in January 1961, a t t h i s occasion the Agreement on 
Economic and Technical cooperation was signed with Buima by 
viilch China undertook to extend to Burma longterm (ten year) 
41 , The Guardian^ (Rangoon , April 19, 196QI 
42. Vidya, Prakash, Dutt, China's Foreign Pnl icv 1958-62, 
London ; Asian Publishing House, 1964, p. 172. 
« 136 -
loan of t h i r t y m i l l i o n pounds s t e r l i n g , "Without i n t e r e s t 
and without any p o l i t i c a l condit ion and p r i v i l e g e s attached." 
The loan vas in the shape of providing complete s e t s of 
equipment, sending t echn ica l experts and he lp ing Burma to 
t ra in t echn ica l personal . A second trade agreement vas 
signed in Peking on 13 December 1961, provided for China 
43 
purchase of 200,000 tons of r i c e i n 1962, 
Mien Chinese Premier Mr. Chou En Lai reached Burma 
a t t i iat time Premier UNU of Burma, welcoming him and s a id , 
"Ive a r e overjoyed by t h i s profound demons t ra t ion of f r i e n d -
sh ip and a f f e c t i o n of the Chinese people for the Burmese 
people , v;e v/elcome you as a g r e a t s t a t esman and wel l wisher 
of Burma whose monumental c o n t r i b u t i o n to the achievement 
of endur ing f r i e n d s h i p betvjeen our two c o u n t r i e s i s now a 
m a t t e r of h i s t o r y . The p r e s e n t v i s i t would go a long way 
towards cementing and f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n i n g the bonds of 
f r i e n d s h i p , u n d e r s t a n d i n g and coope ra t ion between the two 
44 
countr ies ,*-
Both the c o u n t r i e s d e s i r e d to ma in t a in e v e r l a s t i n g 
peace and c o r d i a l f r i e n d s h i p betvreen the two c o u n t r i e s . These 
43. Ibid.) pp. 172-174, 
44, The Hindu. (Madras^ January 3, iy6l). 
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countr ies were convinced tha t the s t rengthening of good 
neighbourly r e l a t ions and fr iendly cooperation between 
them, on account of the v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of both countries 
depends on the Five Pr inc ip les of peaceful co-existence, 
j o i n t l y i n i t i a t e d Dy the two countries and have agreed as 
f o l l o v s : -
Ar t i c l e I; 
"The contracting parties recognise and respect the 
independence, sovereign rights and territorial integrity 
of each other," 
Afticlg lit 
"•rhere sha l l be eve r l a s t ing and cord ia l friendship 
Detv/een the contract ing pa r t i e s who undertake to s e t t l e a l l 
disputes between them by means of peaceful negot ia t ion with-
out r e so r t i ng to fo rce . " 
Ar t i c le I l J t 
"Each contract ing par ty undertakes not to carry out 
acts of aggression aga ins t the o ther and not to take par t 
in any mi l i t a ry a l l i ance directed aga ins t the other contract-
ing party.*' 
Articg j y : 
"The contracting parties declare that they will 
develop and strengthen the economic and cultural h±x ties 
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between the two s t a t e s in s s p i r i t of fr iendship and co-
operat ion, in accordance with the p r inc ip les of equal i ty 
and mutual bent^fit and of mutual non-interference in each 
o t h e r ' s in te rna l a f f a i r s . " 
. ^ t i c l e V: 
^'Any difference or dispute a r i s i ng out of the in t e r -
p re ta t ion of appl ica t ion of the present t r ea ty or one or 
^more of i t s Ar t ic les sha l l be s e t t l e d by negot ia t ions through 
the ordinary diplomatic channels," 
A r t i c l e Vli 
(1) "liie present ti t-aty is subjected to r a^ t i f i c a t i o n 
and the instruments of r f - t i f i c a t i o n wi l l oe exchanged in 
Rangoon as soon as p o s s i - l e . (2) The present t r ea ty wi l l 
come into force immediately on the exchange of the ins t ru -
ments of r t -^ t i f ica t ion and wi l l remain in force for a period 
of ten yeaiL. (3) I t -Wil l remain in force without any 
specif ied time l i m i t , subject to the r igh t of e i the r of ttie 
contrac t ing par t i es to terminate i t by giving to the other 
46 
in wr i t ing a year ' s not ice of i t s in ten t ion to do so . " I t 
was in fac t a re-af f i rmat ion of Panch Sheel. 
Concerning the important a r t i c l e I I I , William C. 
Johnstone has v/rit ten, "by agreeing to th i s t r ea ty the Burma 
46. The guardian, (f(angoon,, February 1, 196QI 
- 139 -
Government has formally l imi ted i t s freedom of act ion in 
respect to i t s se l f -defence. In ef fec t , the t rea ty gives 
to the Peking regime a veto power over Burma's future 
46 
foreign r e l a t ions in respect to i t s self-defence " 
The t rea ty did not, hou^ver, r e s t r i c t Bunna's 
sovereignt:/ in the area of self-defence, in a big sense, 
China did not e s t ab l i sh a positicxn of dominance over Burma's 
foreign r e l a t i o n s . But there was a provision in th i s t r ea ty 
that Burma is r e s t r i c t e d from receiving m i l i t a r y aid from 
western na t ions , th i s did not deter the Burmese from doing 
so. 'Ihe New York Times reported in 1963 : "General Ne Win 
is buying j e t t r a n i e r s , trucks and infantry weapons 
from the U.S. on the ass i s tance of the General, the programme 
47 
is a s ec re t one to avoid provocation of Communist China." 
The same dispatch also reported tha t ^^est Germany 
was supplying weapons as well as advisers to Burma's small 
arms industry and that Burma's ^feaponary was being converted 
to the standard &a*llber of NATO weapons. China also shov/ed 
f r iendly understanding in July 196^, when Premier Chou En Lai 
v i s i t e d Bui'ma and asked Ne Win to reaffirm his understanding 
46. Kobert, A.Eomes,''''Bu2'ma's Foreign Policy Toward China 
since 1962^ ^^  pac i f ic Affairs^ Vol.46, No. 2, (Summer^ 
197^ p.241. 
47. Ib id . , p . 241. 
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of Ar t i c l e H I . Their j o i n t communique s t a t ed that the two 
nations "reaffirmed the i r understandlrig of Ar t i c l e I I I , " but 
there was no clear conception as to what the i r ideas were. 
The second major clause in the t r e a ty IV s t a t i n g 
"The contract ing p a r t i e s declare , they w i l l develop and 
s t rengthen the economic and cu l t u r a l t i e s between the two 
s t a t e s in a s p i r i t of fr iendship and cooperation in accor-
dance with the pr inc ip les of equal i ty and mutual benefit 
and of rautual non-interference in each o t h e r ' s in te rna l 
a f f a i r s . " After signing th is t r ea ty China granted a | 84 
mil l ion loan to Burma, the valu^mcof trade between the two 
countr ies expanded and there was an increase in contacts 
between Burma and China a t the government and People 's dip-
lomacy l e v e l s . Concerning the Ar t i c l e IV for th i s Treaty 
Johnstone wrote, "when tvra countries expand the i r o f f i c i a l 
and t rade r e l a t ions across a common border, there is always 
a ne t residue of grea ter understanding and accommodation 
tov/ard each other . Mien one country is a big power and i t s 
neighbour' i s smalJjand weak, however, the ne t r e s u l t is to 
49 
increase a s soc i a t e , " 
on January 4, 1961, the l3th anniversary of her inde-
pendence, Burma received a formal guarantee of her t e r r i t o r i a l 
48, Ibid.T pp. 241-242. 
49. Ib id . j pp. 241-242. 
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i n t e g r i t y from her powerful neighbour, the People 's Bepublic 
50 
of China. After tiiis ceremony, Burmese Government w i l l 
confer top l eve l honours'',to 19 Chinese o f f i c i a l s including 
Premier Chou En Lai, Chbu En Lai was decorated with the 
order of'Agga Maha Matta» « 2 i i r i Dara' , which had been 
created spec ia l ly for him. I t i s the h ighes t award of i t s 
61 
kind ever conferred on any foreign leader . 
Prime Minister UNU said in October I960 tha t , "Tb 
build f r iendship , the Burmese people should v i s i t the 
Chinese People ' s Republic and the Chinese people should 
v i s i t Burma, Ih i s exchange of v i s i t s should be done frequ^ 
en t ly , not only between leaders of our two count r ies , but 
also between l i t e r a r y , finance and t rade workers, between 
m i l i t a r y of f icers of d i f f e r en t ranks, and between the mass 
of the people of various s t r a t a . Only in th i s way we fur ther 
52 
consolidate our f r i endsh ip . " 
%|ien ^ 6 General Ne Win took over power in Burma 
a f te r h i s coup d ' e t a t ^ Qn March 2, 1962, China recognized 
the new regime two days l a t e r but the re were no important 
s t a t e - l e v e l v i s i t s u n t i l Apr i l 1963, On th i s occasion 
60» Daphne, E. Vhittam, op. c i t . , p , 174, 
51 , Ohe Guardl^ff, (Rangoon , December 29, 196^ 
62. Robert, A,Holmes, aiUAAiM pp. 241-242, 
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Chairman Liu Shao Chi and Foreign Minister Ch*en Yi v i s i t e d 
Burma. Vice. Premier Marshal Ho Lung went to Rangoon and 
had discussions with General Ne Win in NovemiDer 1963. In 
the same month, Chou En Lai and Ch'en Yi stayed br ie f ly 
in Rangoon en-route to Africa and also on the i r r e tu rn from 
tha t cont inent . 
The Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister again 
v i s i t e d Burma in Feoruary 1964, The Nev York Times reported 
tha t , "the purpose of th i s t r i p vas to seek Ne Win's support 
and endorsement of China' c a l l for convening another Afro-
Asian Conference to d iscuss , axDong o ther th ings , the Slno« 
53 
Indian border dispute,** Before a veek, vhen Chou v i s i t e d 
Rangoon, Ne Win had v i s i t e d New Delhi where Mr, Nehru 
wanted h i s support to Ind ia ' s c a l l fo r a conference of non-
aligned nations in Cairo, excluding China^ But Ne Win 
refused to support e i t t ier the Chinese or Indian proposals , 
Ne Win urged the two nat ions to accept the Colombo powers 
recommendations as a basis for se t t lement of t he i r boundary 
pos i t ion . In July Chou En Lai and Ch«en Yie paid a surpr ise 
v i s i t to Burma, 
In Apri l 1966, Mr. Ch«en, Yi and Chou En Lai passed 
three days in Burma when they returned to a t tend the ten th 
53, JUJjl,, p, 244, 
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anniversary ce lebra t ion of the Bandung Conference in Djakarta, 
p«eng Cheu, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
National People 's Congress, headed a delegation or a brief 
v i s i t to Burma in June 1965, Mr. Ne Win went to China in 
July and talked v i t h Chou En Lai and issued a j o i n t communi-
que s t a t i n g ; *'The two s ides were of the opinion tha t imperia. 
lisffl and colonialism cons t i t u t e obstacles to na t iona l inde. 
pendence and world peace and tha t these obstacles must be 
completely eradicated in the I n t e r e s t of mankind. Ihey 
reaffirmed the i r support for a l l people in t he i r s t ruggle 
aga ins t imperialism and colonialism to win a safeguard 
na t iona l independence, to defend world peace and to promote 
viorld progress . !Ihey esipressed t h e i r conviction tha t t h i s 
s t ruggle would f i n a l l y emerge<jf v i c to r ious ly despi te attempts 
by Imper i a l i s t and co lonia l powers to preserve t h e i r colonial 
i n t e r e s t s oy p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y and economic means, llhey 
deplored and opposed f l ag r an t outs ide in te rvent ion in the 
in t e rna l a f f a i r s of newly independent, developing s t a t e s on 
one pre text or the o ther because such in tervent ion v io la tes 
the sovereignty ofthese countr ies and t h e i r r i g h t to self-
54 
determinat ion," 
Mr. Chou En Lai with Liu Shao Chi again v i s i t e d 
Burma in Apri l 1966, 3h h i s speech a t various banquets and 
64, Ibid.J pp. 244-245. 
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receptions Liu emphasized a n t i imperialism and a n t i -
AmericaniSB concerning x Vietnam and sa id , "ve ifro-Asian 
countries must heighten our v ig i lance , uni te even more 
c lose ly , and preserver in the s t rugg le , " !Ehis speech 
c l e a r l y showed exhor t i a t ion to Burma to demonstrate greater 
" a n t i - I m p e r i a l i s t z ea l , " by condemning the U.S. policy in 
Vietnam, ijie communique -was published a f t e r the two days 
of t a lks between Liu and Ne Win v*iich avoided the questi<m 
of Vietnam. China was f rus t r a t ed over i t s f a i l u re to get 
Burma's help and support to Chinese foreign pol icy, the 
major cause of Chinese f r u s t r a t i o n was the c u l t u r a l Revo-
55 
l u t i o n . 
In 1966, the Revolutionary council suspended the 
publ icat ion of a l l p r iva te owned foreign language news, 
papers vdiich had the l a r g e s t circujjation in Buima. !rhis 
na t i ona l i z a t i on policy affected Chinese influence. Ihe 
Burmese Government na t iona l ized so many foreign banks, among 
them she na t iona l ized the tvo branches of the Chinese.s ta te 
owned Bank of China. This meant t h a t pro-Peking Chinese in 
Burma could no longer depend on loans from these banks. 
Before tha t these loans had been channeled so as to expand 
China's Influence among the overseas Chinese community and 
56. U i i ^ . , pp. 244-246. 
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in the Burmese economy. This new government in Burma also 
control led the Chinese run schools and stopped the course 
in Marxism and Lenninism and the teaching of Ma© Tse Tung. 
All p r iva t e schools were taken over by Burmese education 
56 
Departments in 1966. 
Mien the Chinese Embassy personnel were re turning 
from consul ta t ions in Peking in May 1967, they encouraged 
the overseas Chinese community to p a r t i c i p a t e in cu l t u r a l 
Revolution type a c t i v i t i e s in Burma. The Chinese Embassy 
also d i s t r i b u t e d Maoist propaganda to encourage Chinese s tudent 
to form groups and wanted to defy the government ban on the 
wearing of p o l i t i c a l insignia i s tha t the "Mao Badges" to 
Red guards. On effect of t h i s , the bloody clashes spread 
between Burmese and Chinese s tuden ts . After tha t the bloody 
clashes spread throughout Rangoon and destroyed Chinese owned 
shops and homes as well as at tacked E Chinese Embassy. A 
Government Radio broadcast said, "The people should avoid 
ac ts Trfiich w i l l harm fr iendship between the countr ies and 
c rea te hat red between one people and o the r . Even v^en anjl 
unavoidaole issue a r i s e s , use of force and taking the law 
into one 's own hands should be avoided . . . . . thegovemment 
s h a l l s top the bullying the minority by the majority , . , , The 
66, i i i i d . , p . 248. 
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57 
people . , • « . and asked to s top t h e i r demonstratl(^s«** 
!I!he Government was t rying her best for the people to 
remain calm. In sp i t e of government*s e f fo r t s , the violence 
occured, one of which involved the stabbing of two members, 
one of them the Chinese Embassy s t a f f . B i t t e r r a c i a l clashes 
issued v*iich r e su l t ed in ttie death of dozens of overseas 
Chinese. 
Uiese events were followed by an abrupt s h i f t in 
Chinese policy toward the Ne Win Regime as Peking unleashed 
a verbal a t tack on the goveiriment and openly entered Burma's 
c i v i l war by endorsing the communist par ty of Burma's aimed 
s t ruggle to overthrow the Rangoon government, Bie Chinese 
Government News Agency (NCNA) accused Ne Win of i n s t iga t ing 
68 
and organizing the Rangoon r i o t s . 
At th i s time, the Sino-Burmese r e l a t i ons sank to 
the lowest point a t the middle of l a s t year over the r iotous 
behaviour of the core of pro-Peking Chinese l iv ing in Buima 
and the s t e rn measures v^ich the Burmese Government took to 
deal with the s i t u a t i o n . For some months a f t e r t ha t , 
r e l a t i o n s between the two coimtr ies , "continued a t a very 
57. Robert, A.Ploftmes,'^^China-Burma r e l a t i o n s since the r l f t^ ' 
Asian QMTVBVJ Vol. XII, No.8,CAugust,197^ p, 686. 
58 . Ib id . , p . 686, 
- 147 -
59 
low at)> •" "-^ r i f t in Burma-China r e l a t i ons p rec ip i t a t ed 
by the Cninese in 1967 was perhaps a manifestation of Peking's 
f r u s t r a t i o n over f a i l i n g to become p o l i t i c a l l y or economi-
60 
ca l ly dominant in Burma," Burmese government signed the 
Test Ban Treaty of 1963, Peking opposed i t , Burma has recog-
nized as Indian t e r r i t o r y land claimed by C3aina in the Sino-
Indian border dispute Burma vas in favour of the formation 
of ]b&laysia ^ i l e China at tacked i t as a neo -co lon ia l i s t 
p lo t and a lso favoured Indonesia 's "confrontation pol icy ," 
In Vietnam "War, Burma was neu t ra l , v^ere China vas a n t i . 
U.S, and Pro-NLF and North Vietnam, Rangoon maintains cordia l 
r e l a t i ons with Mascow with vdiich Peking is engaged in a 
b i t t e r Ideological d i spu te , a t l a s t , Burma has maintained 
n e u t r a l i t y on the Laotian issue, while China supported the 
61 
Pa the t l ao . 
Before Chinese c u l t u r a l Revolution, her foreign policy 
had s t ressed the preservat ion of normal r e l a t i ons with the 
Burmese Government. But, a f t e r emergence of cu l tu ra l Revo-
lu t ion Diplomacy in 1967, **Sino-Burmese government to 
69. Ohe HindUj (Madras , Apri l 17, 196^ 
60, Robert, A.Holmes, oiUiLyi*) P« 249, 
6 1 . J i i i . , p, 249, 
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government r e l a t i ons d l s i n t i g r a t e d the armed s t ruggle of 
the CPB and the d i s s iden t m i n o r i t i e s , " 
I t i s qui te d i f f i c u l t to explain Peking's aim to 
s t a r t c u l t u r a l Bevolution a c t i v i t i e s in Burma. " I t s "Red 
Guard" diplomacy may have been an unintended aspect of 
63 
i t s own chaotic i n t e rna l revolut ionary s i t u a t i o n , " But, 
i t seems, Peking wanted to force Ne Win to accept communist 
pa r t i c ipa t i on in a United Front Government, I t may be the 
reason ( t h a t ) China th inks , tha t Burma was so weakened eco-
nomically and divided p o l i t i c a l l y t ha t tiie government could 
64 
eas i ly be toppled. 
Speaking a t the Peasant ' s Seminar in 1968, General 
a. 
Ne ¥Ln reported large sc^li^e figjiting along the China border 
and sa id tha t , "many g u e r r i l l a s had crossed into Burma, 
Chinese ass i s tance to the rebels had been widely suspected 
before tha t time, but was the most f o r t h r i ^ t o f f i c i a l s t a t e . 
65 
ment l ink ing insurgent a c t i v i t y with ex terna l support ," 
62. Daniel, Tretiak, "^ ^Changes in Chinese a t t r i t i o n to 
Southeast Asia 1967-1968;^ Current SKMM fi&fiaia, Vol.VII: 
•^o-21^(November 1, 1969), p . 5 . 
63. Bobert, A.Holmes, aJEL»iliJt.> P. 251, 
64. Ualfi,, p. 251. 
66 . i l i i d . , P« 680. 
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A London source reported in 1969 tha t FLA forces had 
es tabl i shed a major m i l i t a r y base in Burma's f r o n t i e r region 
near the t r i^horder junct ion of CSiina, Burma and India . 
General Ne Win told in the f i r s t annual conference of the 
Burma S o c i a l i s t Program Par ty , concerning these developments< 
"The most ser ious s i t u a t i o n has been the f igh t ing in the 
f r o n t i e r areasviiere we share borders with C3iina, I t has 
been the heavies t , we have experienced. From 1 January 1969 
to the end of August, there were e ight major engagements and 
ten minor ones. life have never suffered so many casu l t i e s 
before. »* 
'' Ne Win also warned against a r e p e t i t i o n of the 1967 
anti-C3iina demonstrations and appealed to the Burmese people 
to r e s t r a i n themselves: Ihe people who are against us have 
openly declared they are ge t t ing ex terna l a id . Vfe on our 
pa r t do not wish to enrage o the r s . I ask the people not be 
provoked to anger to use harsh words, or to take act ions 
66 
because of the clashes in f r o n t i e r a r ea , " 
When General Newin paid a v i s i t to India and had 
ta lks with the Prime Minister Mrs. Indra Gandhi, i t was 
charac ter i sed by China as "ea r r ing out conspiratory a c t i v i t i e s 
66. l i i i f l . , p . 689. 
. 150 -
and p l o t t i n g with the Indian Premier for a j o i n t Anti-China 
compaign and for j o i n t supression of the armed s t ruggle of 
the minority n a t i o n a l i t i e s along the Indian - Burmese border 
67 
(means the Naga-Mizo underground ac t iv i t i e s ) .** !lSie r e l a t -
ions taetveen China and Burma became worsed in 1967 over the 
r io tous behaviour of Pro-Peking Chinese l i v i n g in Burma 
and the s t e rn measures vhich the Burmese Government took 
to deal with the s i t u a t i o n . But a t the end of 1967, i t 
seemed tha t the Chinese Foreing Ministry, had gained control 
66 
over i t s own a f fa i r s and to normalize r e l a t i ons with Burma, 
There are four major factors which are responsible 
to change th4« a t t i t u d e o#-^a9tina- towards Burma. F i r s t the 
/' 
Communist Pa r ty of Burma has been severely weakened by 
purges and dissension within i t s ranks . The o ther reason 
69 
Is that the "Peking re turnees" gained control of the party 
apparatus . !I5iey a lso s t a r t e d a r e c t i f i c a t i o n compaign and 
in 1967 launched a purge of the old time leadersh ip , Ihree 
out of the e igh t members of the Pol i tburo (Yeban Htay, Than 
Wyaing and Ba Tin-a l ias Goshal) were executed af te r being 
67. Asian Recorder^ (Quarter ly) , NEW BELHI, Vol.XY,No.l7, 
Col. 6336, U p r i l 23-29, 196^ 
68. Il24ii., c o l . , 6336, 
69. (Leaders ^ o returned from Peking for amnesty ta lks 
in 1963, Including, Bo Thein Tin, Aung Gyi, Zeya, 
Xebaw tun Sein, Aung Nyein and Tin Pe) . 
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accused of "revisionism", a fourth pol i tburo member Z Bozeya, 
the ranking CPB m i l i t a r y commander, was k i l l e d by Government 
troops in 1968, and !]Jiakin Than Tun, the leader of the "'White 
Flag" vas assass inated in September 1968 by a fo l lover . A 
Central Committee member Aye San, vas stabbed to death by one 
of h i s ovai t roops. In 1969, Thakin Zin, who succeeded than 
Tun as Chairman of the CPB, executed another Central Committee, 
Other member of cen t r a l committee. Than Aung, vas k i l l e d by 
70 
government forces . 
Secondly, the Cdmmunist Pgrty of Burma CPB vas unable 
to uni te the major ethnic rebel forces under i t s leadership 
se r ious ly veakned prospects for over thro ving the Revolutionary 
Council. The effor ts of Communists f a i l e d to organize and 
dominate an a l l i ance with Karen_^; Mons, Chins and Kayaks. 
Thirdly, the Burmese government vas successful in 
showing the communists as "puppets" of an outs ide power. The 
Off ic ia l government publ ica t ion such as Botatung'and The 
•Nev Light of Buiaa* have frequently re fe r red to the guer r i l l as 
as i iat lonal t r a i t o r s whose a l leg iance i s to fore igners . 
70. ^^Tun's assass in in P lo ts and Purges Smash Wiite Flag 
Communist SummitJ^ Forward^ VII, 6 (October 16, 1968), 
pp. 12-17. 
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Fourth, the Burmese Communists made the t a c t i c a l e r ror 
of unleashing a *reign of t e r ro r " upon v i l l ages in cen t ra l 
and Southern Buima and i n s t i t u t e d a policy of "Red Authority" 
as pa r t of a 1967 plan for the estaoiishment o f Red Power" 
in two ye»rs, "The insurgents desecrated Buddhist shr ines , 
maltreated monks, to r tu red and murdered BSPP Cadres, members 
of v i l l age land committees and cooperatives as well as 
ordinary farmers and peasants . !I3iese a t r o c i t i e s aroused 
the people viao feimed v i l l a g e m i l i t i a and ass i s t ed axmy 
agains t the Communists. The r e s u l t v/as tha t government 
forces staged numerous surpr ise a t t acks on CPB bases and 
forced the insurgents to make a "Long March" to northern 
71 
Burma," 
The most s i g n i f i c a n t aspect of the Buxmese s i t ua t i on 
was tha t Rangoon showed no inc l ina t ion to a l t e r i t s policy 
of " r i g i d neutral ism" and " isola t ionism" in in te rna t iona l 
a f f a i r s . I t i s said about the Burmese n e u t r a l i t y , " i t has 
no close fr iends and wants none." Burma's leaders pr ide 
themselves on the f a c t tha t Burma does not Delong to any 
group of socai led non-aligned s t a t e s , but makes up i t s ovn 
mind on spec i f i c issues in world a f f a i r s . One aspect of 
71 . 'saw, Shwe, Boh, People 's \*Lr,'^  Eai2iaEa,v*.VII. IN».3^  
(September lo , l968Ji pp. 11-17. 
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Burma's policy Is tha t i t respect China's s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s 
but not permitt ing any use of Burmese Terr i tory tha t could 
be conceived of as a th rea t to China, 
i^bout the government's e f fo r t s aga ins t the CPB 
insurgency, General Ne Win c l ea r ly sa id tha t Burma was not 
going to abandon i t s n e u t r a l i t y by seeking massive American 
or Soviet m i l i t a r y a s s i s t ance . Burma's search for neutra-
l i t y tha t would save i t from China with©at embracing China 
too c losely , caused i t to adjure anjabassive Soviet or 
American economic or m i l i t a r y a id . May be i t was an attempt 
to show China tha t i t was not going to '*tilt** in the d i r ec -
t ion of the U.S. , even in the face of the Chlna-CPB threa t , 
Burma terminated the American m i l i t a r y a id programme tha t 
has been in operat ion s ince 1958. This ^ 88 mi l l ion p ro . 
gramme went unpublicized l a rge ly because of Ne u ln ' s des i re 
to avoid provocation &S China. This program, known as the 
"multi year token-pay c r e d i t scales program" in U.S. o f f i c i a l 
A 
communications, was believed to have been the only one of i t s 
kind. " I t was run by a so-ca l led m i l i t a r y equipment delivery 
team ii^ich operated ou t of an unmarked v i l l a on the ou t sk i r t s 
of Eangoon. The a id mostly j e t Tra iners , s he l icop te rs , 
t rucks, an Infantry weapons we At del ivered in s i i instalments 
and repayment was made in l oca l non-controver t ib le currency 
(the Kyat), under t h i s s e c r e t programme, VJBst Germany was 
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also supplying weapons as well as advisers to Burma's small 
arms industry and Burmese weaponry ^ i c h indicated Buima 
72 
apparently planned to continue receiving Western arms,** 
The U.S.J*, sent in subs t an t i a l quan t i t i e s of arms and equip-
ment under a new agreement t ha t replaced the ten year 
agreement between the two na t ions . General Ne Win turned 
down a U.S. offer to s e l l surplus m i l i t a r y equipment recent ly. 
The Burmese leader thought tha t more American aid were 
73 
undesirable , perhaps in order not to provoke Peking, 
Early in 1968, Chinese policy toward Burma differed 
someviiat from tiiat before and during 1967. The re la t ions 
between Bui*ma and China did not r e a l l y improve, but the 
degree of h o s t i l i t y toward the Rangoon government appreciably 
declined and public support for the people 's war never 
again reached the high l eve l as tha t for those in Vietnam, 
Thailand, Laos and Malaysia. In January 1969, Ne Win flew 
to Pakistan reportedly to discuss the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for 
improving r e l a t i ons between the two s t a t e s with Chinese 
o f f i c i a l s in Rawalpindi, Then in Novemoer the Burmese 
leader asser ted , " I wish to s t r e s s t h a t we want f r iendly 
r e l a t i o n s with our neighbour, , with regard to China, 
72. Robert, A..Holmes, oEUufiii., pp. 691-692. 
73. ikJj i . j pp. 691-692, 
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we vould l i k e to r e s to r e the cordial and f r iendly re la t ions 
that previously ex is ted . This w i l l require e f for t s by both 
s ides . For our pa r t , we only wish to heal the wound of the 
1967 inc iden t s . Despite the clashes a t the oorders and the 
present s i t ua t ion , ve s h a l l do whatever we can on our par t 
to res tore the old f r iendship and keep the s i tua t ion from 
ge t t ing worse , ' 
After 1967, the r e l a t i o n s between the two countries 
s t a r t to normalcy, Burmese Premier General Ne Win paid a 
v i s i t to China from 6 - 1 2 August 1971, a t the inv i t a t ion 
of Chou En Lai, At Peking, he was welcomed by Chairman 
Mao and was given a l l the cour tes ies normal to a Head of 
State including being accompanied on a v i s i t to e*Ut/Lon by 
Chou En Lai, The trade r e l a t i o n s between Burma and China 
also improved to help Burma's trouoied economy, Ne Win 
accepted a id for unfinished p ro jec t s , Chou En Lai said, ' 
"overseas Chinese should befeither c i t i z e n s of China o r the i r 
country of domicile, not botii, and t h a t mixed and pure 
Chinese of the second generation should be offered Burmese 
74 
c i t i zensh ip , Diis was agreed," So i t is more s ign i f i can t 
and has enabled Burma to avoid the agony of a Vietnam type 
74. Chlnfi Quarterly^ No.48,( October-December 19711 pp. 
803-804. 
7H. IbUy bk).8o3-SoAj. 
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"war of na t iona l l iberation.** Ihere has also oeen a phenomen-
a l Increase in contacts oetween China and Buima a t the 
po l i t i ca l -d ip loma t i c as well as the "people 's diplomacy" 
75 
l e v e l s . Both the countr ies had agreed in 1970 to return 
t h e i r amljassadors t o t h e i r pos ts . Burma had sent U Thein 
Maung as her ambassador to Peking in November 1S70. He met 
with premier Chou and Tung p i WU (act ing Cihief of S ta te ) 
within three weeks of his a r r i v a l on the 23rd anniversary 
of Burma's independence (January 4, 1971), Ambassador 
Maung gave a recept ion to him. The Chinese ambassador 
Chen Chao Yuan joined h i s new post in Rangoon in March 1971, 
Burma has a great desire to improve i t s trade and 
f inanc ia l s i t ua t i on by acquiring abandent supplies of cheap 
Chinese goods. Premier Chou En Lai said a t a reception 
in honour of h i s Burmese guest tha t he looked forward to 
increase Sino.Burmese t r ade . A-t the meeting of the General 
Committee of the Burma S o c i a l i s t Programnifarty on September 
24, 1971, Ne Win said Peking had agreed to resume economic 
ass i s tance to Burma under the 1961 accord. Colonel Maung 
Lwin the Burmese Minister of t rade, l ed a purchase mission 
u 76. Bobert, A.Bolmes. Burmese Domestic Policy, The Po l i t i c s 
of Burmizationf i s i a n Survey^ Vol. YII, No.3, (March 
1967^ pp. 196-197. 
76, Robert, A.Holmes, op^clt .^ p . 696. 
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to a t t end the •Carlton Trade Fair* and to discuss the expan-
sion of Burma-CJhina t rade , Burma was authorised to u t i l i z e 
u n t i l September 30, 1975 the oalance of the mil l ion i n t e r e s t 
77 
r r ee loan. Better t rade r e l a t i ons with China would help 
to solve the Burmese economy's major problem - a shortage 
of consumer goods. The Burmese chief of s t a t e ' s «±i t r i p 
was followed by a strengthening of economic r e l a t i ons between 
the two S ta t e s , On September 24, 1971, Ne Win made a repor t 
of h is August v i s i t to China to the Central Executive Commi-
t t ee of the BSPP, He said , "Premier Chou had assured him 
tha t China wished to provide more aid'to Burma. Die Burmese 
leader asked the Chinese Premier how Burma should make comp-
ensation for losses suffered by the loca l Chinese during the 
r i o t s , " Chou rep l ied tha t "Burma i s a sovereign s t a t e and 
78 
can deal with the matter in any way i t deemed f i t , " An 
agreement was signed in Bangoon by Colonel Maung Lwin, Deputy 
Minis ter fo r National Planning and Ambassador Cheu Chao Yuan 
79 
on October 7, 1971. 
Bui'ma has no des i re in re turn of th i s agreement to gain 
any spec ia l favour but i t wants cord ia l r e l a t i o n and no 
in ter ference in i t s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s and wants to maintain 
77. Robert, A.Holmes, flLSLufiii.j PP. 252-263. 
78. Robert, A.Holmes, o p . c i t . , p . 697. 
79. ILLi . , p. 697, 
- 158 -
peaceful common f r o n t i e r by normalizing re la t ions with China 
SO 
through promotion of t r ade . 
Since the Burmese Government aimed to reconcile ' 
with Peking i t proved receptive to the Chinese "peace offen-
s ive" , Burma was one of the 76 memoer majority it In the 
General Assembly that on October 25, 1971 voted in favour 
of PRC (People's Republic China) in and voted Taiwan out 
of the U.N.O. Ihe working People 's Daily also c r i t i c i z e d 
the American a t t i t u d e towards the admission of China to 
the U.K. I t expressed the view tha t China "wi l l behave 
respons ib le , " and tha t China's presence wi l l "lead to the 
81 
strengthening and betterment of the organization,** To reveal 
i t s new f r iendly a t t i t u d e towards Burma, delegation of 
fo r ty memoer, headed i>y v ice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hio 
stayed in Rangoon on way to New York, 
Relations oetween Burma and China have been improving 
since 1972. Vice Premier Li Asian Nien attended a reception 
in Peking in January hosted ay Ambassador Maung on the 24th 
82 
anniversary of Buima's independence. Premier Chou En Lai 
sen t Ne Win a congratulatory message on the twenty fourth 
80, g^e N^1?lQaal IJeraia, (Delhl^ November 11, 197^ 
81 , Robert, A.Holmes, op . c i t . ^ y, 698, 
82, Ibid.J p. 698, 
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anniversary of Burma's independence which said in pa r t . 
•*May the f r iendly r e l a t i ons and cooperation betveen China 
83 
and Burma develop continuously." 
Rangoon pol icy makers cherish two notions in t he i r 
minds, f i r s t , to avoid unpleasant r e l a t i ons to China and 
second i t s determination to pro tec t i t s p o l i t i c a l , cu l tu ra l 
84 
and economic independence. 
The Burmese delegation led by U Lwin Minister for 
Planning and Finance and Ucheln Hai, Director of the Minis t ry 's 
Foreign Economic Relations Department, paid a v i s i t to China 
in May and they also at tended the fianton a i rpo r t s as they 
were greeted oy Fang, Minister for Economic Relations with 
Foreign countr ies . Burma and China's f l^g hois ted side by 
side d t the a i r p o r t , the crowd hai led the fr iendship as they 
shoutd^, "long l i ve the fr iendship between the Chinese and 
Burmese people.** 
In January the New China News Agency broadcast a 
message of condolence from the cen t r a l committee on the death 
of Che& i i . In Apri l another message of condolence was 
puDliclzed a f t e r the death of Hsieh Fl-Chin (a member of the 
83. Robert, A.. Holmes, ajsuuSlify P. 253, 
84. l i i i a . , p . 253. 
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powerful standing committee of the Pol i tburo , Minister of 
public Securi ty, Vice Premier of the Sta te Council, Chair-
man of the Peking Revolutionary Committee, and a member 
of the National Defence Council and the Mil i tary Commission). 
Nov, Peking follows i t s present policy of friendship 
with Burma, but i t appears doubtful tha t Burma and China can 
re turn to the "v*iole hear ted and t r u s t i n g fr iendship of 
the p a s t . " Burma also follows neu t r a l foreign policy and 
maintains excel lent r e l a t i o n s with such nat ions as Japan, 
India, tile Soviet Union, East Germany, and numerous other 
nat ions in the lifest*m. Communist and th i rd world of neu-
t r a l na t ions . Under a 1967 border agreement with India, 
Burma has prevented the Peking backed Naga t r i be men from 
crossing into China v ia Burma to secure Chinese weapons, 
t r a in ing and supplies the Burmese secur i ty forces claim 
to have k i l l e d about 200 Nagas since the Burma.India border 
demarcation in November 1968. Regarding the c i v i l war In 
Pakistan, Burma recognized Bangla Desh as an Independent 
s t a t e on January 13, 1972 and saying; "The Government of 
Burma does not accept as p r inc ip le , the solut ion of a 
country 's i n t e rna l problems by d i r e c t help and intervention 
of a foreign country 's armed organizat ion. However, due to 
the exis tence of questions requir ing Immediate communications 
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and ac t ions , and also due to desire to l i v e f r a t e rna l ly as 
neighbours, the Govermient of Burma has recognized the s t a t e 
86 
of Bangla Desh and i t s government," 
China Deing the r i g h t hand of Pakistan in the c i v i l 
war, condemned movement as an ev i l device, taken up by 
Indian r ec t iona r i e s and Soviet r e v i s i o n i s t s , A,s i t refused 
to recognise Bangla Desh, 
f^ 
Since CJhina's foreign policy i s not cons is ten t . I t 
makes the predict ion of Sino-Burmese developments ra ther 
r i sky . I t shows t h a t the process of normalizing re la t ions 
between the two nat ions i s l i k e l y to s t r e t c h as long as 
Premier Chou En Lai remains China's chief foreign policy 
maker/ and Genersl Newin supervises the re ins of Burmese 
86 
government* 
!Qie Burmese government has been successful in reducing 
Chinese and other foreign influences in Burma and Burma has 
been handling s k i l l f u l l y i t s r e l a t i ons with China but whether 
87 
i t w i l l continue to be so remains, the matter of doubt, Tiie 
86, Eobert, 4.Holmes, QO.cit.^ pp. 698-6S9. 
86, John, J,Taylor,^''The iSma. Malost Revolutionary Model In 
Asia/ ' current Scefip IX : 3 (March 7, 1971), p, 17. 
87, Robert, A,Holmes, aftjuflit,, p, 254, 
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ideological basis of China's foreign policyj i t s expan-
s i o n i s t aims, i t s s e n s i t i v i t y to the developments in this 
pa r t of hemisphere, and Burmas m i l i t a r y vu lnerab i l i ty 
continue to introduce so many unpredictable factors tha t 
nothing can oe forecas t for future nature of r e l a t i o n 
between these tvio coun t r i es , Bie atmosphere i s a t the 
moment placid and calm. The trade agreements are manifes-
t ing s t a b i l i t y and there are no pin pricks from e i the r 
s ide . As the present prime minis ters of these two countries 
are the r e a l a r c h i t e c t s of Burma China concord, i t remains 
to be seen if tha t r e l a t i onsh ip continues even a f t e r t he i r 
absence from the scene. 
C H A P T E R IV 
INTD -> BURMA BEIATIONS 
IBie r e l a t i ons oetween India and Burma have a l l along 
been f r i end ly , Mrs. Indra Gandhi iias r i ^ t l y observed tha t , 
"we are neighbours who have had close r e l a t i o n s for a very 
1 
long time and vAio have been fr iends for a long t ime." Really, 
Burma i s the next door neighbour of India in Southeast Asia. 
Buima i s the f i r s t country among Southeast Asian countries 
which has cu l tu ra l and geo-po l i t i ca l t i e s with India. Indian 
c i v i l i z a t i o n has influenced the Burmese l i f e t o t a l l y and 
has a lso received the impact of Indian idea l s . Burma was 
under the Br i t i sh Indian Empire t i l l 1937. The role of 
India in the controversies in Burma was determined f i r s t l y 
2 
by geography and secondly by the element of timing. 
Burma has close t i e s with India since ancient times 
extending to a period of 2000 years.Burma is often cal led 
••Brthmadesha" in India and often re fe r red to as the "Swama 
chumi** or "Sona Pranta" in ancient t imes. Indian influence 
may be seen in Buzmese r e l i g ion , philosophy, l i t e r a t u r e and 
1, Selected Speeches of Indra Gandhi. January 1966-August 
J^fc9, New Delbi j Puollctation Division.Ministry of 
Efformation and Broadcasting, 1970, p .391 , 
2 . Theien, That, Ton, Indie and Southeast Asia 1947-1960, 
Geneva s Librar ie Droz, 1963, p.lSQ, 
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language. But in s p i t e of t h i s , i t stands as a separate 
3 
and d i s t i n c t p o l i t l t a l e n t i t y . 
Nature decreed t h a t the peoples of India and Burma 
should be neigjibours by providing them with a common f ron t i e r . 
But t h i s 800 miles f r o n t i e r , of vrfiich more wi l l be sa id 
shor t ly , i s v i r t u a l l y a wall of Jungle-clad mountains s t i l i 
l imi t ing contacts by land between the two countr ies . Xs in 
centuries pas t , the sea routes across the Bay of Bengal serve 
as the chief l inks between India and Burma, not withstanding 
the importance of a i r t ranspor t in fur ther ing these and other 
Inter-Asian contacts in recent years . 
Both India and Burma l i e north of the equator and 
the t ropic of Cancer passes through them but each is 
regarded as e s s e n t i a l l y a t rop ica l country. They have 
a/M«t 
s imi la r general climate^are bas ica l ly a g r i c u l t u r a l countr ies . 
The Buimese r e l a t i o n s with India during th i s Important 
overseas movement can only oe dated accura te ly from the 
5th century A, D. Based on fragments found a t Prome contain-
ing insc r ip t ions in P a l l , the c l a s s i c a l fK Indian language 
in which the sacred Buddhist Texts were often t ransmit ted. 
3 , India and Southeast Asia, Delhi : The publ icat ion Divl-
s ion, Minis t ry of information and Broacasting, January 
1963, p . 9, * 
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Burmese Buddhist legends, claim th.at in the 3rd century B.C. 
the famous Mauryan Bnperor Asoka sent the Buddhist mission-
4 
a r i e s Sona and Uttara to »Suvambhum' (Burma). 
The medieval h i s t o r y of the fragmentary r e l a t ions 
between the peoples of India and Burma as v e i l as the 
ear ly i n t e r r e l a t i o n s between other Southeast Asian peoples, 
ended with the close of the 16th century and the appearance 
of the Europeans in the waters of the Indian ocean, India 
and Burma were na tu ra l ly involved in the ear ly years of 
6 
European expansion, India more than Burma, 
The i i r i t i she r s expanded t h e i r Indian empire t h r o u ^ 
conquest in the Anglo-Burmese wars of 1824-1826 and 1862, 
Burma remained a province of B r i t i s h - Indian empire u n t i l 
1937, By a piocla^mation of 1st January 1886, Lord Dufferin, 
the then Governor General of India incorporated Burma into 
6 
the r e s t of Br i t i sh India , Ihe Indian National Congress was 
formed in India in 1886 which reg i s t e red the b i r th of modern 
Indian colonia l nat ional ism. The f i r s t branch of Congress 
4 . Richard, J.Kozicki, India and Burma 1937-1957.(A Study of 
In te rna t iona l Rela t ions) , Pennsylvania : Faculty of the 
graduate school of Arts <k science of the Universi ty, 
1959, pp. 1-7. 
6 . Ibid.^p./o 
6, V.S. Desai, India and Burma^ (Bombay : 1954;, p . i 7 . 
- 166 -
vas formed in Burma under the name of " the Burma Provincial 
Congress Committee," in 1908. So we see tha t Congress 
Drought about a p o l i t i c a l l ink of Burma with India . The 
Congress Committee, in her f i r s t sess ion, passed a resolu-
t ion p ro tes t ing aga ins t the annexation of Upper iurma in the 
7 
f i r s t place and i t s incorporat ion into India in the second. 
The Indian National Congress had s t a r t e d the na t iona l move-
ment in India, which was car r ied across into Burma through 
the Burmese Provincia l Congress Committee, although, the 
Indian puolic know very l i t t l e about Burma and cared evea 
l e s s , "The Indians were acustomed to v i sua l i ze Burma, not 
as a separate nat ion but as^ a province of India and a par t 
and parcel of her e n t i t y . The Indian Government introduced 
the Muniiiipal I n s t i t u t i ons into Burma, The rur&l areas 
d i s t r i c t councils were establishedji a t the instance of the 
government of India. The B r i t i s h parliament accepted the 
p r inc ip les of responsible self-government as the ult imate 
aia for India in 1917« 
The Government of India Act of 1919 which came into 
force in 1920 had provided tha t the 'dyarchy* which was 
7. Usha, Mahajan, The Bole of Indian Minori t ies in BUMH^ 
ant^ Malaya^ (BomDay s I960), p .33 , 
8. D,G,E, jJTail, £u£ia, London : Hutchinson's University 
Library Press , I960, p,149. 
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granted to India t>y the Br i t i sh- Ind ian government, should 
be extended to Burma, "The Government of Burma ^ c t of 
1921 was passed to bring i t into l i n e with the other province 
of India.*^ On account of the n a t i o n a l i s t pressure in India, 
the parliament appointed a Satutary Commission instead of 
1927 in 1930 under the supervision of S i r John Simon, The 
Statutory Commission v i s i t e d Buima during 1929-30 and received 
a memorandum from the government of Burma asking for the 
10 
separa t ion of Burma from India but not a dominion s t a t u s . 
The an t i . I nd i an fee l ing began to mou^'^nding inthe demand 
for separat ion in represen ta t ion . All the Indians represent-
ing d i f fe ren t i n t e r e s t s , such as p o l i t i c a l , soc ia l and 
economic f e l t the need to exer t pressure for safeguarding 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . A labour member of the Legis la t ive Council, 
E , P . P i l l a i , demanded a separate Indian delegation to r ep re . 
sent Indians l i v i n g in Burma a t the ' Indian Bound Table 
11 
Confe rence ' in London. 
At i t s 1927 Madras Session, the Congress disapproved 
of " a l l attempts to separate Burma from India", and condemned 
the idea of creat ing the North-Eastern Front ie r Province, 
9* Hal^'i p . 149. 
10» Usha, Mahajani, o p . c i t . j p , 66, 
11. U J ^ M p. 67, 
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Bae Congress also appealed to the Indians and Burmans in 
t h e i r mutual i n t e r e s t s to promote Indo-Burmese entente 
in a l l possible vays. In h i s speech Maiang Maung charged 
tha t the Br i t i sh Government wanted to separate Burma so tha t 
i t vjould be a " s o l i t a r y province in the hands of the Br i t i sh 
capi ta l i s ts .** He concluded tha t India and Burma ,"hand in 
hand wi l l be more powerful than as separate uni ts and in 
course of time we may be in a pos i t ion to e f fec t ive ly f igh t 
our own b a t t l e s , r e a l i s e our own asp i ra t ions and declare 
our own independence." Vottama sa id t ha t , " t he separat ion of 
Burma from India was completely agains t the w i l l of the 
Burmans. If Burma i s separated from India, India wi l l lose 
nothing, but in tha t s i t u a t i o n the protec t ion of Burma wi l l 
be rendered more d i f f i c u l t , India i s our fatKer, mother, 
brother and s i s t e r , Vfs en t r ea t you to t r y to keep Burma 
13 
with India ." 
Vhen the Simon Commission came to India and Burma, i t 
enjoyed a s i g n i f i c a n t l y contras t ing reception in the two 
count r ies . In India, the proposed commission was boycotted, 
' ' a t every stage and in every form* and the congress s t a r t e d 
12, Richard, J .Kozicki, o p . c i t . j p . 88, 
13. Ikid*» PP« 88-89, 
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a non-cooperatJonmovement. In Burma, on the o ther s ide , a 
large sec t ion of n a t i o n a l i s t opinion ac t ive ly cooperated 
with the Simon Commission. Ihe Burmese Legis la t ive Council 
se t -up a committee of seven non-off ic ia l members to confer 
14 
with Simon Commission, 
The recommendation was given by the Simon Commission 
in i t s r epor t t h a t Burma be separated from India,"Immediately 
and tha t a decision to tha t effect be made as soon as 
poss ib l e . " wehru observed tha t attempts were being made to 
separate Burma from India p o l i t i c a l l y , "so tha t in the event 
of India gaining freedom, Burma might continue to be exploited 
16 
by B r i t i s h imperial ism," There are some reasons which the 
Commission gave for t h i s recommendation:-
1« "Burma was not in India ," 
2» **A purposed decision for separat ions between the 
Government of Burma and the Burmese n a t i o n a l s , " 
3 . "Burma could hardly enjoy s a t i s f ac to ry separat ion in 
any cent ra l ized Indian Government," 
4» "The agenda of the Indian Central Legis la ture was of 
remote i n t e r e s t to Burma," 
14, Ib id . , p . 91 . 
16. l i i i d , , p, 94. 
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5 , "There v»as a r e a l divergence in economic in t e r e s t s 
as seen in Ind ia ' s protec t ion t a r i f f s . " 
6, "Buitna derived questionable benefits from Iks her 
cont r ibut ion to Indian cent ra l revenues," 
16 
7, "Burmese sentiment favoured separa t ion . " 
B r i t i sh governed Burma as a pa r t of India t i l l 1937, 
So as an Indian province, i t pa r t i c ipa ted in a l l the reforms 
tha t were enjoyed by India . Although the Burmese p o l i t i c a l 
movement was influenced by ' Indian National Movement', but 
there was a great difference of technique. The methods of 
non-violence vhlch were adopted by Mahatma Gandhi for the 
17 
l i b e r a t i o n movement, were not to be followed by Burma. 
After the separa t ion of Burma from India in 1937, 
the ^Jtg government of India s t a t ioned an agent in.:,Burma to 
look a f t e r the i n t e r e s t s of Indians in tha t country, because 
18 
Burma was not governed from Delhi. Under the cons t i tu t ion 
of 1937, the f i r s t Prime Minister of Burma was ix Dr.Ba Maw, 
the leader of the "Sinyetha Party", who was forced to resign 
16, HsM't pp. 94-96. 
17, India and Southeast Asia^ p p . c i t . , p . 14« 
18, W.S. Desai, QjOxSiiii^i p . 88, 
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In 1939 due to ttie s tudent s t r ikes and la Dour t roubles . The 
r e l a t i ons Detween Dr 3a Maw and Subhash Chandra Bose ware 
cordia l and amicable. Mr Bose nas s t a t e d tha t , "Indians 
and Buitoans were l i k e two children of the same parents and 
19 
formed a happy family under Japan as the guardian," Mien 
the second world war broke-out, Netaji Bose a r r ived in 
Bangoon on 29th July 1943, and was welcomed a t the a i r p o r t 
20 
by high Japanese o f f i c i a l s , 
Die Japanese occupation of Burma openec^ new chapter 
in the h i s to ry of Indian res idents in Buraia, The a t t i t u d e 
of Japanese towards Indians was very f r iendly , because 
Japanese wanted India ' s help in the war so the Indian fr iend-
21 
ship was very necessary for them. 
I t is remarkable to note the character of Indo-Burma 
r e l a t i o n s during the years of war. On the one s ide , IHdia 
and Indian army asfconnected with the a l l i e s , desired not only 
to l i b e r a t e Burma from Japanese cont ro l but also wanted to 
p ro tec t India from the imperialism of Br i t i sh r u l e . On the 
o ther s ide , the government of independent Buima under Adipati 
19, l i i i d . , p . 8 1 . 
20. iiiid»> p . 8 1 . 
21 . l i i i d . , p . 71 . 
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Ba Maw had taken oath to help Japan and Bose's government 
In order to destroy the Br i t i sh control over India and 
l lDera te the Indians. As a r e s u l t of t h i s , there vas great 
co rd i a l i t y between Burmans and Indians during the war. " I t 
the same time, in India there were f r iendly r e l a t ions between 
Indians and the evacuee Buwians, as well as between Indian 
government and the refugees government of Burma with i t s 
22 
head quar ters in Simla, 
For a long time, the f ron t i e r r e l a t ions between India 
and Burma have oeen uneventful, Ihe f r o n t i e r between the 
two count r ies , has been deiuarcated, except for the occasional 
disturDances by the troublesome tribesmen of the upper 
f r o n t i e r , the peace has not been dis turbed. India proved 
herself as Burma's best customer of r i c e and the t rue i n t e r e s t 
of Doth the countr ies requires that r a c i a l , commercial 
23 
and c u l t u r a l harmony i s es tab l i shed and maintained, 
Indo-Burmese Boundary Commission had been se t -up in 
terms of boundary agreement which India and Burma reached in 
March 1967, I t has been busy in demarcating the in terna t ional 
22, I M ^ , , p, 74. 
23, Hugh, Tinker, The P o l i t i c s of Buripaj London : Oxford 
Universi ty Press , 1963, p, 108. 
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24 
border since over the pas t four years , 13ie Minister of 
Sta tes in the Ministry of External Affa i rs , Sr i B.R.Bhagat 
said in the Lok SaDha Debate, "-i Jo in t boundary commission 
has been se t up« The Commission i s charged with the res -
ponsiDi l l ty for planning and carrying out the demarcation 
of the boundary between the two count r ies , with the prepa-
r a t i on of boundary maps and witii the draf t ing of the bound-
25 
ary t r e a t y . " Shrljnati Indira Gandhi sa id in the Lok Sabha, 
••2he Burmese delegation to the Joint Indo-Burma Boundary 
Commission held t a lks with the Indian delegation from the 
6th to the lo th A.pril 1968, A preliminary agreement on the 
cartographic del ineat ion and eventual physical demarcation 
26 
of the Indo-Burmese rioundary was ar r ived at,** 
A Joint Indo-Burma Boundary Commission met In 
New Delhi to review the peaceful means of boundary demaractior 
between the two coun t r i e s . The Burmese team, headed by 
Col. Kyi Maung and the Indian team led by Mr, Baleshwar 
Prasad (Former Indian Ambassador in Eangoon) expressed the i r 
27 
general s a t i s f a c t i o n with the progress made so f a r . 
24, John,Leroy,Christen, Burma and the Japanese Invader^ 
Bombay: Thacker and Company Limited, 1945, p,268. 
26. Lok sabha Debate^ Ser ies , I I I , VolXVl,CApril.4, 
1968J^  Col, 1869, 
26, Lok Sabha Debate, Series I I I , Vol,No,XVI, (April 4, 
196$, (;ol.2704, 
27, The Statesman^ (Delhi : 8th June 1971). 
To insu re t h a t the t a l k s con t inued , i n r e c e n t yea r s 
a l s o , both d e l e g a t i o n s agreed t h a t the p rogress r e p o r t s 
submit ted by the D i r e c t o r s General of Survey of the two 
c o u n t r i e s were s a t i s f a c t o r y . The Commission a l s o agreed 
t o demarcate 105 mi l e s of the Indo-Bunna border which had 
not t e e n demarcated. 
The Indo-Burma border demarcation was s t a r t e d on 
ilarch 10, 1967, and 245,52 mi l e s of t h e border were demarcated 
i n 1968-G9, 254,48 mi l e s i n the fo l lowing year and 225 mi l e s 
28 
i n 1S70-1971. 
The Ind ian immigrat ion i n t o Burma s t a r t e d i n 1852, 
But the p o l i t i c a l consequences of Ind ian immigrat ion did 
not appear t i l l about 1920, when the Kontagu-Ghelmsford 
neforms were in t roduced i n Ind ia under the Government of 
29 
I n d i a Act of 1919. On t h e 1s t . i p r i l 1937, Burma ceased t o 
be p a r t of the Indian Empire, in a c t u a l i t y Ind ian immigra-
t i o n was not of such a volume as to swamp the coun t ry , 
"immigration had c o n s i s t e n t l y adapted i t s e l f t o the concmic 
cond i t i on of Burma, and t h a t the number of Ind ians in Burma 
30 
was even tending t o d e c l i n e in the 1930*s . " 
28 . "Indo-£5urma Boundary Commission", £orwa£d, Vol, IX,Ko,23, 
iiangoon, 15 Ju ly 1971, p . 3 , 
29 . J e s s e , x'\Tennyson, The Indian i n Burma. j3ngland : Le Play 
House Press i^edbury H e r e f o r d s h i r e , 1946, p , 2 1 . 
30 . I b i d . ^ p . 26 . 
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The Bctxter Commission had given repor t on the volume 
and character of Indian l aa ig ra t ion into Burma, the occupat-
ional d i s t r i bu t i on of Indians there , to v^at extent , they 
had displaced Burmans, and "whether in the l i g h t of the 
s t a t i s t i c s obtained and o ther re levant fac tors any system 
of equating the supply of Indian unsk i l l ed labour to Burman 
31 
requirements i s needed." 
d e BdXter Commission concluded tha t there was^no 
evidence of any kind to suggest tha t Indians have displaced 
Burmans from employment. The Commission recommended that 
a system of r e g i s t r a t i o n be introduced for Indian Nationals 
entering Burma, viiether for purpose of t r ave l , residence 
and employment, vould De required to obtain v isa , In the 
a 
form of/work or employment permit va l id under the Govern-
ment of Burma, on condit ion tha t the holders of the permits 
S2 
undertake to leave Burma on the i r exp i ra t ion , " The Baxter 
Commission a lso recommended the r e g i s t r a t i o n of Indians 
already in Burma and Burma also entered into negotiat ions 
with India for the conclusion of an immigration agreement. 
31 , Richard, J.Kozicki, o p . c i t . ^ p . i 3 3 , 
32. l i i i i i . , pp, 133-134, 
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In a policy statement in September 1940, the Burmese 
Premier, U Saw cal led the important question of Indian Immi-
grat ion, vtoich he sa id , "his government was attempting to 
solve adequately and f a i r l y with the l e a s t possiole delay." 
He continued tha t , " the Baxter Commission Report was in the 
Press and h i s government would not shiric i t s r e spons ib i l i t y 
in the matter and would pursue such measures of control and 
r e s t r i c t i o n , as may be found necessary on thefacts reported 
1^ the Commission and both the Governments had agreed to 
discuss t h i s problem without l ink ing i t to the i r trade ta lks 
and t h a t a f t e r the r e s u l t s of those ta lks were known, h is 
Government intended to inv i t e the Government of India to 
send a delegation to Bangoon for a discussion of the immigra-
t ion question with a view to securing a, mutually s * t i s -
33 
factory agreement." 
Negotiations were begun in 1941, vihen S i r Girja Shanker 
Bajpai, Member of the Governor General 's Council for Overseas 
Indian Affai rs , was summoned to Ifengoon for the purpose. The 
agreement v*iich was passed by them, became known as the 1941 
Draft Indo-Burma Immigration Agreement and Saw-Bajpai Agreement. 
The p r inc ipa l provisions of the agreement so made were as 
33. iiatld., pp. 133-135. 
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fo l lows : -
( 1 ; "In future Indians other than casual v i s i t o r s 
and students should secure Immigration permits from the 
Government of Burma, These permits were to De of two k i n d s j -
(A) permits intended apparently for the c l e r i c a l and 
professional c lasses , vould allow the holder to remain in 
Burma indef in i t e ly and acquire Burma domicile if desired, and 
(B) permits intended fM presumably for unskil led and 
semi-ski l led labourers , vxjuld specify a period of residence 
which in no caseshouxd De extended K beyond nine years . " 
(2) "The number of 'B ' permits woUid be deteimined by the 
advice of an Immigration Board." 
(3) "A l i t e r a c y t e s t might be imposed on appl icants 
for 'A* permits, provided such t e s t should not be made in 
Burman or anyother indigenous language of Burma,*^ 
(4) "Marriage or cohabitat ion with a Burmese woman would 
be grounds for cance l la t ion of an '4* permit, but marriage 
might be permitted by Government if adequate provisions for 
the maintenance of the women were made," 
(S ; "Indians born and brought up in Burma vrould be 
regarded as of Burma domlcle, an Indian v/ho had l ived for a 
t o t a l of seven years in Burma betv/een 1932 and 1941 vould oe 
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e n t i t l e d to unlimited fur tner residence in Buima provided 
t ^ t he i&d a t no time spent more than one year out of the 
country; any other Indian res ident in Burma in 1941 could 
remain, but if he were to leave Burma h is re turn would be 
regulated by the conditions lald-down for new en t ran t s , 
except tha t he would be regarded as having a prefenent la l 
34 
claim to 'A' *B' permit over other new en t r an t s , " 
"Wien th i s agreement was passed by the two Governments, 
and was published, i t provoked a storm of anger in India, 
The Indian Legis la t ive Assembly resolved. "That th is Assembly 
being of the opinion tha t the provisions of the Indo-Burma 
Immigration Agreement are v io l a t ion of the assurances given 
in parl iament with regard to the s t a tus of Indians in Burma 
and the i r r igh t of entry into Burma a f t e r i t s separat ion from 
India in as much as they render nugatory to the protect ion 
which parliament undoubtedly undertook to give in these 
matters in pa r t Vth of the Government of Burma Act and the 
Instruments of Ins t ruct ions to the Governor of Burma, recomm-
ends to the Governor General in Council to request the 
Secretary of State not to implement the Agreement by order in 
Council unless and u n t i l s a t i s f ac to ry modifications are 
34, Ib id . , pp. 136-137. 
(See a l s o ) W.S.Desai, o p . c i t . , pp. 67-68. (See Also) 
'^It.^f.S^'y^'^Scry^-j Qp. c l t . , pp. 29-30. 
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secured which wi l l carryout , to the f u l l , the parliamentry 
assurances and remove such provisions as are discriminatory 
36 
and humil iat ing to the people of India ." 
The inmigration agreement, viiich was negot ia ted 
only a f t e r the trade pact was signed, was a corol lary to 
i t and affected an even wider range of Indian in t e r e s t s in 
Burma. Wien h is - agreement came into power in Septemoer 
1940, Premier U Saw announced tha t h i s government intended 
to end unres t r i c t ed immigration into Burma from India and 
China. Generally, t h i s agreement res ted on two main pr inc i -
ples the r i g h t of Burma to determine the composition of her 
own population, and tha t of Indians who had indent i f ied 
themselves with the i n t e r e s t s of Burma to en^oy the same 
p r iv i l eges as the permanent population. The Government of 
Burma declared tha t i t would soon i n s t i t u t e a system for 
r eg i s t e r i ng Indians domiciled in the country. Gandhiji 
himself s t rongly discarded the agreement, "as an undeserved 
s lu r on Doth Bunna and India , and could not oelieve t h a t 
i t had b«en made in response to a v i t a l cry from the great 
36 
Burmese na t ion , " 
35^ ijaifi., p . "3oI 
36, Virginia , Thompson and Richard. Adloff, Minority 
Problems In Southeast Aala, California : Stanfiford 
Universi ty Press Standford, 1966, pp, 72-73, 
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Mahatma Gandhi proclaimed a s t rong statement of 
p ro tes t from his headquarters of Vferdha, In h i s statement 
he described the Indo-Burma Immigration Agreement as an, 
**unhappy agreement panicky and i 'enal . . . . sprung upon 
an unsuspecting puDlic, The v*iole thing appears s t i l l more 
hideous vjhen we r e c a l l t ha t only a few years ago, Burma 
was an i n t eg ra l par t of India, life can never be in Burma, or 
the Burmans in India, foreigners in the same sense as people 
from the Vfest I must meet t ha t Indians have been 
par tners with the \festerners in the Exploi ta t ion of Burma, 
Dut with t h i s fundamental difference tha t the Westerner 
went to Burma with h i s gun vdiile tne Indian went on suffer-
ance I vjould plead with the Burmese minis ters and the 
Burmese people tha t they should wait for the regulat ion of 
immigration t i l l both of us are f ree and independent for 
such regula t ion Biis Agreement must be undone in 
as much as i t breaks every canon of the in te rna t iona l pro-
p r i e t y . I t becomes l e s s defensible in that an Indian, 
instead of an English man, was sent to negot ia te the 
Agreement is an i n s u l t to the vAiole nat ion, not merely to 
the pa r t i cu l a r Individuals whose mater ia l i n t e r e s t s l i e in 
37 
Burma. *' 
37, Richard, J.Kozlcki, o p . c i t . , p. 140. 
- 181 -
Seeing the opposit ion to th i s agreement, the Indian 
Government prepared to make some e f i o r t to"wards persuading 
the Government of Burma to accept some changes in the 
agreement. 
At the time of Second \t>xld WXy the Indian in Burma 
was thus already made to regard himself as an a l i en . The 
Indians in Burma were t r ea ted badly by the disorder ly e le -
ments who followed the Japanese Flag under the name of the 
•*Burma Independence Army,** But when Japanese came to power, 
these disorders were a t once stopped, During the Japanese 
occupation in Burma, the Indians in Burma enjoyed a bet ter 
s t a tus and they also joined the "Indian Independence League" 
the c i v i l counterpart of Netaji Bose's "Indian National 
Army." 
In 1943 the Pres ident of the Burma-Indian chamber 
of Commerce and the Member of the Governor General 's Council 
for communication r e l a t i ons Dr. N,B.Khare said in regard 
to immigration, "The Indo-Bxormese Agreement of 1941 is 
as dead as a doormat. No labour would be allowed to go to 
Burma before a s a t i s f a c t o r y agreement securing the r ights 
of Indians had been a r r ived a t , I am second to none in my 
anxiety for res to r ing a l l tha t belongs to Indians in Burma 
such as c i t i zensh ip r i g h t s , r igh t s of property, commerce and 
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t rade and every other i n t e r e s t . I give you a ca tegor ica l 
assurance tha t no evacuee vrftio wants to go Dack to Burma wi l l 
38 
De res t ra ined , none what so ever.** 
The general opinion in India to take th i s question 
that any Indian \itio l i ved in Buima before the evacuation in 
1942, should be permitted to re turn , whether he wishes to 
make Burma h i s permanent home or not , that whatever may be 
decided aoout unskil led and semi-ski l led labour, other 
Indians should not be denied from enter ing and working in 
Burma, and that there should be no discriminatory l e g i s l a t i o n 
' 39 
of adminis t ra t ive act ion against Indians in Burmb., 
But Burma did not give any a t t e n t i o n to t h i s , under 
the immigration policy of Burma, "thousands of Indians have 
been forced out of business and so out of the country. At 
the time of departure to India, they have been denied the 
r i g h t to take some of t h e i r most personal possessions with 
40 
them even the i r ch i ld ren ' s toys . " 
The Burmese Government passed an Emergency Immigration 
Act in June 1947, according to th i s agreement a l l persons who 
3 8 . .. R^4&. , P.Twa'Vi^ayv- , OD. c J t . , p p . 3 3 - 3 4 , 
39. Ib id . , pp. 34-36, 
40. Vendenbouch, Army and Butwell, Richard, The Change in g 
Face of Southeast Asia^ Lexingtonj University of Kentucky 
Press , 1967, p. 27. 
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wanted to enter injBurma,possess a properly visa passport 
or permit issued by the con t ro l l e r of imraigtation. The 
Government firmly claiming tha t the new law was not d i s -
criminatory in tha t i t applied equally to a l l foreigna^ 
and tha t i t was only designed to meet an emergency. Really, 
ne i the r Burma nor India wanted a resumption of the fotxmxxx 
prewar flow of Indians into Burma, 
The Burmese Indians who had enjoyed a pr iv i lege s ta tus 
in Burma under the B r i t i s h ru le , theBurman government imposed 
the na t iona l i za t i on laws. These Indians were the successful 
Dusinessmen and dominated a xarge sec tor of Burmese Dusiness 
and a g r i c u l t u r e . But these Indians were responsible for 
i t because they a l l eged ly charged the i n t e r e s t ra tes on 
loans to Burmese, This increased enmity between the Indians 
and Burmese. On account of t h i s , Indian businessmen in 
Burma have been ruined by the na t iona l i za t i on of pr ivate 
ovnned wholesale and ZKX r e t a i l shops, import-export t rade, 
41 
ware houses and s t o r e s . 
On January 3 , 1948, the day before Burma oecame 
independent, the t rans fe r of Immovable Property Res t r ic t ion 
41 , Robert, A.Holmes. Burmese tjuaxxxX domestic policy, the 
p o l i t i c s of Burmizatlony^^Asian Survey^ Vol. VII, 
(California : March 1967), p. 191. 
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Act was promulgated. The Land Alienation Act of 1948, aimed 
to prevent the sale of land to persons other than Burmese 
na t ions . Burma government also declared tha t these laws 
were not disc—riminatory in tha t they applied equally to 
42 
a l l fo re igners . 
In June i960, a conference was held a t Rangoon to 
take the question of compensation for nat ional ized land) 
represen ta t ives from India attending as oDservers. They visan-
ted to know i f the Burma government would pay cash for a por-
t ion of the i r holdings, compensating them for the remainder 
in i n t e r e s t bearing non. t ransferable bonds. 
A small unoff ic ia l delegation came to Ban^on for 
the purpose of persuading the Burma government to pay more 
compensation for Indian landholdings in Burma than was pro-
vided under the terms of the land Nat ional izat ion Act in 
December 1953. But the Burmese Government would not agree. 
Early in Karch 1964, a deputation of Indian Landowners in 
Burma explained to the Deputy Minister atf for External Affairs , 
of India tha t the Land Nat ional izat ion B i l l of 1964, soon 
to be discussed in the Burmese parliament, was ac tua l ly if 
42. Virginia, Thompson and Richard,Adioff, op .c i t . ^ p.84. 
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no t l e g a l l y , d i sc r lxn ina td ry . The Burmese landowners were 
u s u a l l y smal l h o l d e r s i n comparison to Indian landowners. 
Under the l a n d ' s p r o v i s i o n s , they claimed 12000 Indian 
landowners would r e c e i v e compensation amounting to only 
one c ro re of rupees fo r t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s cover ing 3 m i l l i o n 
ac r e s which they valued a t between 90 and 100 c ro res of 
43 
rupees . 
When i n 1947, t h e Burmese dec la red t h e i r i n t e n t i o n 
of reducing the number of n o n - n a t i o n a l s employed in the 
c i v i l s e r v i c e , I n d i a n s ho ld ing such pos t s numbered n e a r l y 
4000| faced with the a l t e r n a t i v e of l o s i n g t h e i r jobs o r 
of assuming Burman c i t i z e n s h i p and l e a r n i n g the Burmese 
language , about 1000 Indians had r e t u r n e d to India by 
44 
February 1949. 
k l a r g e number of Ind ians r e t u r n e d to Ind ia , when 
t h e c i v i l war broke-out i n Burma, the Burmese Government 
a l s o d i s c h a r g i n g Indian n a t i o n a l s front p u b l i c s e r v i c e on 
45 
ground of n a t i o n a l i t y . Under the Burmizat ion proaramme 
of the Revolut ionary Counc i l , "an e f f o r t has been made to p lace 
a l l p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e s i n the hands of Burmese c i t i z e n s 
4 3 . I b i j j . , p . 86 . 
4 4 . I b i d . , p . 88 . 
4 5 . G.D.Binani and T.V.Rama,Rao, India a t a Glance, 
C a l c u t t a : Or ien t Longmans L td . , 1954, pp. 371-372, 
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46 
and to eliminate foreign economic con t ro l . " Even foreign 
physicians, mostly Indians, cannot p rac t ice in Burma. Aliens 
s t a r t ed to evacuate Burma, Axjcording to the repor t s , a f t e r 
a year 26000 foreigners evacuated, but a l l were Indians. 
Special Indian ships began to a r r i ve a t Rangoon to a id in 
the r epa t r i a t i on of Indian na t i ona l s . Many Indians on 
Burmese bordejrs were fed and clothed by Indian Government, 
Those Indians vAio remained in Burma, had been the primary 
t a r g e t of the government's Burmization programme. The 
na t iona l i za t ion programme was imposed on Indians both in 
47 
terms of in t e rna t iona l and domestic l i f e . 
Thousands of Indians l e f t Burma, on the dai ly f l i gh t s 
from Rangoon to Calcut ta , For instance, in July 1964, to 
save the 2500 Indians, who had been displaced by the nationa. 
l i z a t i o n of various t rades in Burma, the government of India 
sent the three sh ips . After returning from Burma, several 
t raders and businessmen to ld tha t , "They had been once 
prosperous businessmen but had been put-out of work by the 
46, The HindUj (Madras ; February 2, 1964), 
47, The HindUj (Madras : February 2, 1964). 
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na t i ona l i z a t i on of t h e i r trades and shops. They were also 
forced to leave the bank-accounts, f^lnnlly jewellery and 
even the i r wives sa r ies and cooking iB±XBaxi u t e n s i l s . By 
Septemoer 1964 about 100,000 d e s t i t u t e Indians na t iona ls , 
48 
had l e f t Burma for«veri* 
During the sh i f t i ng jks of those Indian nat ionals 
from Burma to India permanently, there arose the problem 
of custody of the property because the Burmese government 
did ro t cooperate with these Indians and also tiie Indian 
government. But the Indian leaders welcomedliie Burman 
decis ion, for re turning the Indian na t iona l s ttsx from Burma, 
because ne i ther Burma nor India stands to gain from l^ss 
of mutual friendship^ But i t i s c e r t a in ly the loss of 
minority community of the Indians who l i v e there , who become 
the victims of unfavouraole circumstances. "The represen-
t a t i ve s of both the countr ies kept cool heads^ exercised 
good sense and showed a s p i r i t of negot ia t ion to s e t t l e 
49 
th is problem." 
Sardar Swaran Singh, then^-India's foreign minis ter , 
a r r ived a t Rangoon to solve th i s problem on September 1, 
48. Bobert, A.Holme-s, o p . c i t . ^ p.192, 
49. The Guardian^ (..angoon : May 28, 1964). 
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1964. After ta lks with Burman chairman of Revolutionary-
Co unc i l . General Newln, a Jo in t Ckjmmunique vas issued in 
•v^ich, " i t was agreed to exchange views and coordinate 
t h e i r e f for t s in the cause of peace and to adhere to the , " 
"five pr inc ip les of peaceful co-ex is tence ." General Newin 
explained that his government was pursuing "domestic goals 
based on a socialism tha t was not only agains t Indians but 
60 
also applied equally to a l l fo re igners , " On the question 
of Burmese na t iona l i za t i on measures, thecommunique s ta ted , 
"The various measujces . . . . . . . towards achieving a socijkllst 
soc ie ty are not discr iminatory aga ins t foreigners as such 
and equally apply to Burmese na t iona ls and foreigners e l l ke . 
On the Burman side i t was affirmed tha t these measures were 
not Intended to force res iden t foreigners belonging to the 
working c lass out of Burma and tha t I t i s the Intention 
of the govexiiDient. • • • • • of Burma to give sympathetic 
considerat ion to the case of these persons of foreign 
ex t rac t ion • • • • . . • who s incere ly des i re to continue to s tay 
in Burma in accordance with the po l i c i e s I n i t i a t e d by the 
government of Burma and to merge themselves with the common 
people, p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the building up of a s o c i a l i s t 
soc ie ty . The minis ter of External Affairs of India and 
60. The Sunday Standard^ (Delhi j February 1, 1966), 
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the Bui'mese leaders a lso studied the various problems vfcich 
have a r i s en in connection with the departure of a large 
numoer of persons of India o r ig in from Burma and exchanged 
51 
views on ways of s e t t l i n g these problems." 
I t is c lear from the a Dove tha t the v i s i t of Swaran 
Singh did not, however, h a l t the exodus of Indian nat ionals 
from Burma J indeed, the quanti ty of x exodus were greater 
in the month a f t e r h i s v i s i t there than in any previous 
month. But Mr, Singh s t a ted that , " there was no discrimina-
t ion against Indians, the Burman na t i ona l i za t i on measures 3D 
being applicable to a l l Burman Indians, Pakis tanis and 
Chinese a l ike who had such types of establishment there , the 
na t iona l i za t ion pol icy no doubt affected the pos i t ion of 
the seven lakh belonging to Indians community but the govern-
52 
ment of Burma has been very sympathetic towards Indians ." 
General Newin and h i s colleagues explained to Mr. Shas t r i , 
then Prime Minister of India, tha t the Burmese na t iona l iza-
t ion policy was not discriminatory agains t Indians but i t 
applied to a l l fo re igners , "When Foreign Minister of India, 
61 . G.D.Binani and I.V.Rama/Eao, op . c i t . ^ p, 392, 
52. Ib id . , p . 392. 
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Mr. Singh was asked during a parliamentary debate, "why 
the exodus of Chinese had not reached to the same propor-
tion as tha t of Indians if Burmese policy was non-discrimi-
natory?" He answered tha t , " t h i s was because most of the 
Chinese in Burma refused to be r e p a r t r i a t e d to communist 
China but were prepared to go to Na t iona l i s t China, so the 
Burman government was una Die to arrange t h i s , because i t 
had no diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with the Na t iona l i s t Chinese 
regime, and General Chang Kai Siek, the Fre i iden t of Nationa-
l s 
l i s t China^ refused to take these Chinese traders,*' 
Although, the Indian government made many pro tes ts 
and represen ta t ions , these were without e f fec t , yet i t did 
not press the matter too s t rongly , Mr. Raja Gopalachari 
former Governor General of India, sa id , "Although the a t t i -
tude of the government of Burma had given r i se to d i s s a t i s -
fac t ion among Indians holding property in Burma, we must 
recognise tha t the government of Burma is facing a d i f f i c u l t 
s i t ua t i on in t h e i r country. They are committed to cer ta in 
po l ic ies and they can not weaken t h e i r pos i t ion with the 
54 
general publ ic , by not purwting them," 
63, Ihe Sunday Standard^ (Delhi : February 7, 1966). 
64. Thein, That, Ton, India and Southeast Asia 1947-1960, 
Geneva ; L iber t l e Droz, 1963, p . 166, 
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Thus we conclude tha t the Burmization programme had 
been one sided and has adversely affected only Indian and 
Western I n t e r e s t s , This has not been the case for communist 
66 
countr ies l i k e China, 
BudUhism, which i s declining in the land of i t s b i r th 
India, out growing into a l i v ing force in modem Burma is 
the f i r s t ancient contact between India and Burma, So Indians 
are proud of r eca l l i ng t h i s peaceful regard to the land of 
Buddha's b i r th and teachings. Dr, Rajendra Prasad once 
wrote about Burma, "India es tab l i shed a Kozagc moral, s p i r i t u a l 
and r e l i g ious domination, there and elswwhere, not by the 
sword but through affect ion and general brother ly dea l ings ," 
adding fur ther tha t t h i s , "domination off the s p i r i t s t i l l 
continues, and the people of Burma even today look upon 
those places in India, which are associa ted with the l i f e 
66 
of Buddha, as places of pi lgr image," 
Dr, Rajendra Prasad, then Pres ident of Indian cons t i -
tuent A-ssembly, was Ind ia ' s representa t ive a t Burma's inde-
pendence ce lebra t ion on January 4, 1948 and also car r ied with 
66, Robert, A.Holmes, ofij j t i t . , P. 192* 
66, Richard, J.Kozicki, o p . c l t . j p, 242. 
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him as a gift , of the Government of India, several sacred 
ssj^lings from the t ree a t Gaya, where Buddha a t t a ined 
enlightenment. 
Various unsolved problems between the two countries 
were nearer so lu t ion than before when they had not f i n a l l y 
achieved independence. After Independence of the two coun-
t r i e s , the o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s between India and Burma have 
been most co rd ia l . I t i s the def in i t e policy of both the 
countr ies to maintain mutual f r iendship and render mutual 
58 
he lp . After independence Doth the countr ies followed the 
policy of n e u t r a l i t y p a r t i c u l a r l y among the new na t ions . 
Both the leaders , UNU and Nehru r ea l i s ed from the beginning 
tha t , " the kind of foreign policy they wished the i r govern-
ment to pu&sue was non-alignment with power blocs antago-
n i s t i c to each other , f r i endly r e l a t i ons with a l l na t ions , 
and acceptance of economic a id from any nat ion as long as 
69 
i t did not infringe t h e i r sovereignty," 
I t i s qui te fami l ia r that Mr. Nehru and Mr, UNU were 
p r inc ipa l a r ch i t ec t s of non-alignment po l ic ies for new 
57, U i id . , p , 243. 
68. V.S.Desai, QjusUi'i p.103, 
69. William, C.Johnstone, o p . c i t . , p . 282. 
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na t ions . Both the leaders always desired the i r governments 
to pursue an "independent foreign policy" taking action as 
they believed r igh t in each case for a nat ion, tha t can 
decide to make whatever alignments seem desireaole in i t s 
na t iona l i n t e r e s t s and i t i s not required to jus t i fy them 
by proving that i t i s not ' lea-J i ing to one s i d e . ' A nation 
pursuing an ' independent foreign policy can take sides 
on in te rna t iona l issues or can refuse to take sides without 
having to show that i t s act ion in e i t h e r case is bringing 
60 
i t nearer to the communist bloc or western bloc. 
Premier MU said tha t , "India and Burma were Indeed 
conferred as two sovereign independent s t a t e s , to regulate 
our future r e l a t ions by agreement in the manner best su i ted 
to our mutual i n t e r e s t s . " He also said tha t Burma sought 
the fr iendship of India in the, "new era tha t wi l l De Burma's 
in a few weeks. We know that we s h a l l not De disappointed 
and we offer our f r iendship in r e tu rn . May the future bind 
61 
our two countries in c loser Donds of f r iendsh ip ." A Burmese 
edi tor also wrote t h a t , " the re is be t t e r understanding of 
60. Ibin.^ p. 299. 
61 , Richard, J.Kozicki, op .c i t . , , p . 261, 
r 
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Burma, her s t rength and weakness, in India than in anyother 
* 62 
country. Mr, Nehru's sympathy towards Burma was unconcealed." 
Mr. Nehru had the great understanding to bring about 
the happy and close r e l a t i o n s oetween India and Burma. The 
idea of policy of non-alignment was adopted oy Burma from 
India Decause Nehru was the propagator of th i s policy and 
63 
the hero of the young i n t e l l e c t u a l s . The former Prime 
Minister of Burma UNU gave a radio oroadcast ce lebra t ing 
Prime Minister Nehru's birthday and wished him well . He 
expressed nice sentiments for him and h is country. He 
s incere ly hoped tha t "His wise pol icy of non-alignment witti 
any of the two power blocs has also come in for a good deal of 
misunderstanding and c r i t i c i sm , we have heard of the fan tas -
t i c a l l ega t ion from one side tha t S r i Nehru is gradually 
becoming Anglo-Americans, and there is an equally fan tas t i c 
a l l ega t ion from the other side that he is ttaX) becoming pro-
64 
Communist, Neither of mese a l l ega t ions of course, is t rue , " 
Nehru also s t a r t e d the idea of pos i t ive neutral ism, which 
62, IHid. , p . 261. 
63, Vendenbosch, Axmy, Our Friends and Antagonists in 
Southeast ASJ^^T America j The Johns Hopkins Press , 1954, 
p . 55, 
64, ¥ i l l iam, C.Johnstone, aB*itii. i p. 354, 
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inspired the Burman leaders in formulating foreign policy-
even though they did not always follow India on pa r t i cu la r 
occasions and i s sues . There are so many occasions between 
1950 and 1963, when Mr. Nehru said t ha t India ' s foreign 
policy had l inked p r inc ip les s imi lar to those of the Burma 
66 
government to the idea of pos i t ive n e u t r a l i t y . 
The Indian delegate Mr, P . P i l l a i greeted Burma in 
the U.N.O. and said to quote his Premier 's remark tha t , 
•'the people of India zaat would stand shoulder to shoulder 
with the people of Burm^ and -vAiether we have to share 
66 
good fortune or i l l fortune we sha l l share i t together ," 
In an e d i t o r i a l marking the event, the New Times of Burma 
took spec ia l note of the Indian de lega te ' s spedch of wel-
come, "which wi l l f ind a warm response in Burman h e a r t s , " 
and added; " Ind ia ' s l i n e in in te rna t iona l p o l i t i c s under 
the guidance of pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has been to stand 
Somewhat outside in t e rna t iona l blocs and groups and to 
champion the cause of nat ions s t r i c k i n g to free Burma as 
a small nat ion would do well , while cooperating with a l l 
o ther nat ions in the task of maintaining world peace, to 
66, Ij j i j i . , p . 96, 
66, Richard, J.Kozicki, Q B . c i t . ^ p, 280. 
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s t ea r c lear of in t e rna t iona l entanglements which might a t 
some time or other compel her to take par t in a war which 
i s not her pa r t i cu l a r concern. Likewise, i t i s the duty 
of newly emancipated Burma to champion the cause of less 
for tunate countries vtiich a t e s t i l l under imper ia l i s t s 
67 
domination." 
Burmese leaders always admire Indian leadership and 
India as the hope of present day Asia, Speaking on the 
second anniversary of Indian independence UNU declared, 
"though I have met the Mahatma (Gandhlji) only once, I have 
always regarded him as my 'Guru ' , I can not adequately 
described the great personal q u a l i t i e s of Pandit Nehru, He ~ 
has adversely earned the respect and admiration of the whole 
68 
world." So we see tha t Burman has been s t rongly impressed 
by the influence of India , Nothing t h i s , a student of Burman 
a f fa i r s concluded tha t , "Burma's foreign policy is a carbon 
69 
copy of Ind ia ' s foreign po l i cy . " But th i s i s not wholly correct , 
because Burma does not follow India in a l l respect such as the 
membership of the Commonwealth e t c . 
After p ra i s ing Premier UNU's leadership Nehru s ta ted , 
"ul t imately i t is the task of the Burmese themselves to solve 
67. U i i ^ . , p . 280. 
68 . Robert, A.Holmes, o p . c l t . , p . 364, 
69. Richard, J.Kozicki, o p . c i t . , p. 442, 
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t he i r pro Diem and i t is always a de l ica te matter for any 
country, however, f r i endly , to intervene. Ind ia ' s i n t e r e s t 
in Burma was tha t country ' s freedom, the general peace and 
70 
order in Southeast Asia ," 
In 1961, the s t ruggle between fear and need reached 
at i t s h ighest peak, a t tha t time Burma followed India ' s 
lead in f a i l i n g to p a r t i c i p a t e in the Japanese Peace Treaty 
Conference held a t San Franciso in September of that year. 
Premier UNU consulted with Indian prime Minister Mr, Nehru 
and told the repor ters that the quest ion of Japanese Treaty, 
(ne i ther Burma nor India signed the t rea ty^ would be among 
those discussed, so ne i t he r Burma nor India signed the 
71 
Treaty a t San Franciso, Burma also refused to renew an 
a l l 
agreement for economic a id from the U.S, u n t i l xlxot the 
s t r ings providing m i l i t a r y ass is tance were detc^ched. The 
Burmese people and opposit ion pa r t i e s s t rongly opposed 
Premier to take these i s sues . 
In May 1950, while in - route to London Premier UNU 
said that the in t e rna l s i t ua t ion in Buima was fiitnly in hand 
70. l l i i d . , p . 303. 
71 , The New York Times^ (New Yoik s October 22, 1951; . 
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and also said tha t Premier Nehru would pay a v i s i t to 
Burma in June, k few days l a t e r Premier Nehru confirmed 
his planned v i s i t to Burma and said , "Burma i s India ' s s i s t e r 
72 
nat ion in the deepest sense of the world." Ihe Burman 
Foreign Minister has v i s i t e d India from time to time for 
strong f r iendly consu l t a t ions . In June i960, Premier 
Nehru had spent f euA'days in Burma for the purpose of devel-
oping strong f r iendly t i e s . He was accorded a c iv ic 
reception a t c i ty Hai l , He was enter ta ined by the Government 
as well as the c i t i z e n s of E&ngoon. The Burman Premier 
also spent few days in Neiv Delhi in October 1961 and was 
honourably en te r ta ined . 
An Indian Trade Delegation went to Rangoon and held 
conversation wit3i the Burman Minister of Commerce and 
supply in OctoDer 1960. In May 1951, th i s delegation 
again went to Rangoon, headed by Mr. K.M.Munshi, the then 
Indian Minister for food. After discussion, an Indo-Burmese 
Trade Agreement was signed between the two governments on 
29th September 1961. Burma agreed to supply 240,000 tons 
of r i c e to India hy 31st D«3cember T»rfiile India prepared to 
supply Burma by the same date 26000 tons of gunny bags, 
72, Richard, J .Kozicki, op . c i t . ^ p, 92. 
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10,000 tons of ground-nut o i l , 800,000 lt>s of cotton yam 
and 3,000 tons of galvanised sheets of i ron. During the 
next four years from 1st January 1962 to 3 l s t December 
1965, Burma agreed to export to India 350,000 tons of r i c e 
each year, of which 230,000 tons is to be on a government 
to government das i s , vhich India i s to export each year to 
Burma, during the same period, 16000 tons of gunny bags, 
8000 tons of ground nut o i l 800,000 lbs of cotton yarn 
73 
and 400 tons of iron and s t e e l products. 
To maintain f r iendly r e l a t i ons between the two 
count r ies , a f ive year t r e a ty of Indo-Burman Friendship was 
74 
signed on 7th July 1961, Burma Treaty of Friendship con-
s i s t s of a preamble and e igh t a r t i c l e s j -
Ar t i c l e I, " i s a mutual recognit ion of the independence 
and r i ^ t s of each o the r , " 
Ar t i c l e I I , " s t a t e s tha t there s h a l l be ever las t ing peace 
and unal te rable fr iendship between the tvo s t a t e s , " 
Ar t i c l e I I I , "deals with diplomatic pr iv i leges and 
immunities,** 
Ar t i c l e IV, provides tha t , " t he i r representa t ives sha l l 
meet from time to time and as often as occasion requires to 
73, W,S. Desai, aiU-^li . , pp. 104-105, 
74. Foreign Policy of India texts of documents 1947-1964, 
Delhi : Lok Saoha Sec re t r l a t e , 1^6fc, p , 9 . 
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discuss matters of common i n t e r e s t and to consider ways 
of mutual cooperation. The complexities of Indo-Burma 
r e l a t i o n s as well as the s t i l l pending solut ion of the 
severa l matters involved a re indicated Dy Ar t ic le VII ." 
Ar t i c l e s VI, VII and VlII deal "with the in t e rp re t a t ion , 
76 
r a j s i f i c a t i o n and cont inuat ion of the t r ea ty r e spec t ive ly . " 
The Foreign Minis ter of Burma said , "The t r ea ty i s 
a manifestat ion of the ever increasing goodwill and 
76 
understanding oetween our two coun t r i e s , " The Burmese 
Press welcomed the t r e a t y . IJie New Times of Burma wrote 
tha t , "another b r i l l i a n t chapter has been added to the 
annals of Burmese h i s to ry" and tha t the t r ea ty , " r e f l ec t s 
the long cherished sentiments and ambitions of both Indian 
and Burman peoples ," The Burman observed tha t the sign-
ing of the t r ea ty marked the commencement of a "new chapter 
in the h i s to ry of Indo-Burmese fr iendship and goodwill and 
tha t i t was the symbol and log ica l outcome of a process 
77 
that has endured the passage of t ime." Press reac t ion in 
76, Richard, isMso. J ,Kozicki , o p . c i t . , p . S29. 
76. Foreign Policy of India t ex t s of documents 1947-64, 
OJEU^M P* 9\ 
77, W.S. Desai, op. c i t . , pp. 107-108. 
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India was more r e s t r a i n e d . For example, 'The Hindu* d i s -
cussed the t r e a t y in the con tex t of s i m i l a r f r i e n d s h i p 
t r e a t i e s with o t h e r c o u n t r i e s r e c e n t l y emerged from c o l o n i a l 
s t a t u s , p a r t i c u l a r l y Indonesia and wrote t h a t i t vas , 
"perhaps mutual t h a t I nd i a , Burma and Indones ia , a i l of 
v.4iom hold key p o s i t i o n s in Southeas t Asia , should s t r e n g -
then f r i e n d s h i p with each o t h e r r a t h e r than with European 
78 
s t a t e s , thousands of mi l e s away," 
Af te r s i g n i n g of the t r e a t y , t he Indian Ambassador 
made an appeal t h a t a f t e r the Second "librld War "which caused 
so much miss ing and l o s t , to see t h a t Burma and India achived 
Independence i s an epoch of the g r e a t e s t s i g n i f i c a n c e fo r 
us . There was a genuine f e e l i n g of a sympathy and a f f e c t i o n 
between the peoples of India and Surma, Ufe both i n s p i t e 
to "the maintenance of peace, n o t only fo r our own country 
but a l s o fo r the vdiole world and we Doth have to b e t t e r 
79 
our economic c o n d i t i o n s , " 
The Burmese Fore ign Min i s t e r s a i d in r e p l y , " I agree 
with you t h a t even wi thou t t h i s t r e a t y , the f r i e n d s h i p 
between our two c o u n t r i e s , born of long s t a n d i n g c o r d i a l 
78 . Richard, J . K o z i c k l , o p . c i t . j p , 330. 
79 . W.S.Desai, QJBULSLH'•, P. 107. 
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r e l a t i o n s , has been growing from s t rength to stren^jth. 
The t r ea ty of fr iendship which we have j u s t signed, is a 
manifestat ion of the ever increasing goodwill and under-
80 
standing between our two peoples.»* 
I t is concluded tha t th i s t r ea ty was a firm and 
l a s t i ng foundation for brotherly f r iendship between India 
and Burma v*iich was already laid-down nearly twenty-five 
81 
centuries ago when Buddhism oegan to spread. 
kt the diplomatic and p o l i t i c a l l eve l , the Indian 
Government maintained informal r e l a t i o n s . The Burmese Govern-
ment i s always with India, vtienever needed, India occa-
s iona l ly gives advice to the Burman leaders whenever they 
want i t . The formal diplomatic r e l a t i ons between India and 
Burma were establ ished in June 1947. Mr. Nehru laid-down 
emphasis on the informal and intimate character of Indo-
Burmese r e l a t i o n s . He sa id , a t a Press Conference in Delhi, 
"we are in frequent touch with the government of Burma on 
many mat te r s . We are not only f r iendly in the normal sense 
82 
out if I may so, some what more f r i end ly . " India in the 
80. Ibid. T p. 108. 
81 . Ibid.T p. 108. 
82. Thein, That, Ton, QP.c l t . y p. 174. 
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sphere of diplomacy, o f f e r s p o s s i b i l i t i e s of c o n s u l t a t i o n s 
and d i s c u s s i o n s and d i s c u s s e r ujifi*Burma and gives India a 
sever touch i n h e r d ip lomat ic moves. I n d i a ' s v i s i t by 
Burmese l e a d e r s a re common place so they f r e q u e n t l y v i s i t e d 
83 
India i n comparison to most of the l e a d i n g c o u n t r i e s . In 
p r o t e s t i n g to the U.N, a g a i n s t the Formosa r eg ime ' s r e f u s a l 
to evacua te i t s t roops from the Shan S t a t e s , Burma s t r o n g l y 
suppor ted I n d i a ' s d e l e g a t i o n and r e c e i v e d t h e whole-hear ted 
84 
sympathy of the Indian P r e s s , Ind ia was no t d i r e c t l y 
en tang led in the KMT i s s u e , but Ind ian pub l i c and o f f i c i a l 
op in ion f u l l y suppor ted Burma. Mr. Nehru s a i d t h a t , " the 
KMT Troops had a b s o l u t e l y no business to be on Burmese 
s o i l » " At the U.N. meet ing , I n d i a ' s V.K.Krishna Menon 
expressed h i s d e l e g a t i o n ' s , "ddep concern in the m a t t e r , 
oecause i t f e l t t h a t any v i o l a t i o n of the honour of Burma 
o r any wrong done to t h a t count ry was a s i n s i g n i f i c a n t to 
86 
i t as a wrong done to I n d i a , " 
8 3 . Hugh, Tinker , o p , c i t . y pp, 364-355, 
8 4 . V i r g i n i a , Thompson and R i c h a r d , M l o f f , o p . c i t . y p . 9 2 , 
8 5 . J r . O l ive r E.Clubb, The Ef fec t of Chinese N a t i o n a l i s t 
M i l i t a r y A c t i v i t i e s in Burma over Burmese Fore ign Policy^ 
C a l i f o r n i a : The Rand Coorpora t ion , January 20, 1969, 
p . 4 4 , 
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In December 1949, India and Burma were the f i r s t 
non-communist count r ies , which recognised the Communist 
86 
Chinese Regime headed by Mao Tse Tung. 
On November I960, a month a f t e r communist Chinese 
forces entered TiDetj Communist Chinese volunteers entered 
the Korean ;*&r and Tibet p r a c t i c a l l y became a forget ten 
issue . Both India and Burma had supported in June 1950, 
a t the Q.N., the charge of aggression against North Korea, 
l^ien the American sponsored resolut ion branding Communist 
China as an aggressor in Korea was approved by the U.N. 
General Assembly on February 1, 1951, India and Burma were 
the only two non-communist countr ies to vote agains t i t . 
India and Burma both supported the May i s reso lu t ion , 
ca l l i ng U.N, members to embargo s t r a t e g i c items to communist 
China and North Korea. Both always urge tha t the admission 
of Communist China into the United Nations, should be t ru ly 
S7 
open to universal membership. Burma and India were among 
the 76 member majority in tiie General Assembly tha t on 
October 25, 1971 voted the Peoples Republic China in and 
86, fiichard, J.Kozicki, op.ci t .T p. 4 i2 . 
87, i i i i d . , pp. 414-415. 
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Taivan o u t of the U.N, and both expressed the des i r e t h a t 
China ' s presence v i l l " l ead to the s t r e n g t h e n i n g and b e t t e r -
88 
ment of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . " 
Both the c o u n t r i e s have the op in ion , no t to suppor t 
c o l l e c t i v e defence arrangements such as SE^ XTO, which only 
i nc reased t ens ion in Asia and des t royed the g loba l peace 
in the world. Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru made, s p e c i a l note to 
Burma's adherence to the f i v e p r i n c i p l e s of peacefu l co-
e x i s t e n c e and desc r ibed t h a t count ry a s "our n e a r e s t 
89 
neighbour." 
In l a t e December, sandwiched between the two v i s i t s 
of Ti to to India and Burma, Premiers Nehru and NU jo ined th( 
Premiers of the o t h e r t h r e e "Colombo powers" Ceylon, 
Indonesia and P a k i s t a n , a t Bogor, Indones ia . At t h i s time, 
i t was agreed to h o l d in Indones ia , the Asian Afr ican Con-
fe rence v^ich met a t Bandung in l a t e A p r i l 1, 1955, 
After Bandung Conference, both premiers Nehru and 
NU went on s e p a r a t e ove r seas t o u r s , i nc lud ing v i s i t s to the 
Sovlfct Union in June and November 1955, where the Five 
88 . Robert , A.Holmes,'''China-Burma r e l a t i o n s s ince the r i f t f 
Asian Survey J Vol. XII , No.8, CAugust ,1974 p .698 . 
89 . P a r l i a m e n t a r y DebatesTfLok Sabhal p a r t I I , Vol.VI, 
C1954> Col-. 230. 
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P r i n c i p l e s v/ere propogated by the two l e a d e r s . As has been 
observed elsev/here, the g r e a t e s t s i n g l e suppor t to the 
90 
po l i cy of "Panch Shee l" came from Bwssia. I t can be s a i d , 
"Burma i s the key to I n d i a ' s n e u t r a l i t y j u s t as P e a r l Harbor 
vas the key to America ' s i n t e r v e n t i o n in I t ) r id l^sr I I 
91 
Burma un l ike Tibe t , i s on the Indian s i d e of the Himalaya," 
To take the problem of Hungary, vjhere India and Burma 
have d i sag reed a t the U.N.O. Burma s tood most c l o s e l y with 
India in vot ing on a v a r i e t y of i s s u e s a t the world o rgan iza -
t i o n , India and Burma both r ega rd the U.K. as o f f e r i n g 
92 
p o t e n t i a l l y the bes t s e c u r i t y a g a i n s t a g g r e s s i o n . 
The founda t ion of the s t a t e of I s r a e l , has been 
regarded d i f f e r e n t l y by India and Burma f o r some y e a r s . 
Although both c o u n t r i e s de j u r e r ecogn i sed I s r a e l by the 
f a l l of 1950 (Burma in December 1949 and India in September 
1960). S t i l l , India has n o t s e n t a d ip lomat i c r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
to I s r a e l , The p r e s e n t r e l a t i o n s of India and I s r a e l remain 
conspicuous by t h e i r absence , India has age o ld sympathy 
with the Arabs , There a r e a number of f a c t o r s r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r t h i s sympathy P r i n c i p l e s of Ind ias f o r e i g n p o l i c y , i t s 
90» Robert , J ,Koz i ck i , o p . c i t . ^ pp. 423-426. 
9 1 . Ibid.J p . 429. 
92 . I b i d . , p . 4 2 1 . 
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n a t i o n a l s e l f I n t e r e s t , IJie Kashmir i s s u e , sen t iments of isA 
Indian Muslims P a k i s t a n - p h o b i a e t c . have in f luenced the 
of 
c o n t i n u a t i o n I n d i a ' s a loof somewhat u n n e u t r a l a t t i t u d e towards 
A 
I s r ae l ,Burma , On the o t h e r s i d e , s i n c e mid 1962 has deve-
loped most c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s with I s r a e l . In March 1966, 
Burma-Is rae l s igned an economic coope ra t ion agreement and 
in DecemDer 1967, the two c o u n t r i e s r a i s e d t h e i r d ip lomat ic 
93 
miss ions to the ambassador ia l l e v e l . 
Like o the r c i v i l i z e d c o u n t r i e s , India and Burma 
s i n c e r e l y d e s i r e to avoid war, a d e s i r e i s emphasized by a 
p r e s s u r e to complete the economic p rog re s s as wel l as the 
dreaflful exper iences of t h e t h i r d Vforld V&.r, Speaking about 
the f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s of Burma and Ind ia , one can conclude 
t h a t they a re c l o s e l y i d e n t i f i e d wi th the no t ion of n e u t r a -
94 
l i sm or non-a l ignment . 
In 1962, t h e r e were no s t r a i n e d r e l a t i o n s between 
Ind ia and Burma, when the nev;s of m i l i t a r y coup in Burma 
96 
came as a g r e a t shock and complete s u r p r i s e to Ind ia . The 
Government of India has g ree t ed the proc lamat ion by the 
93 . IjDM'i p . 432. 
94. I M d . , pp. 439-440. 
96. The Hindu, (Madras, March 3 , 1962 ; . 
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Revolu t ionary Council and t h e new government of Burma t h a t 
they vould fol low the p o l i c y of p o s i t i v e n e u t r a l i t y and 
wished to cont inue the e x i s t i n g c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with 
a l l c o u n t r i e s , 
India acqu i red a minor d ip lomat ic gain by being the 
f i r s t country to r ecogn i se Burma's Newin regime. India has 
a l so g ree ted the p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i t y which was adopted by 
the new army regime, Non-alignment, however, has many shades 
to the world of today and a f a v o u r i t e of d ip lomat ic c i r c l e s 
i n Rangoon i s to s p e c u l a t e on how l e f t t h e Newin government 's 
n e u t r a l i t y i s l i k e l y to De. TheA e^ a r e no pe r sona l r e l a t i o n s 
87 
between the tvio c o u n t r i e s a f t e r IIU and Nehru, 
India has a l s o welcomed the d e c l a r a t i o n of the po l icy 
of ' P o s i t i v e n e u t r a l i t y ' and t h e i r d e s i r e to m a i n t a i n and 
98 
s t r e n g t h e n f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with a l l c o u n t r i e s . Because 
Burma i s between two g r e a t powers, Ind ia and China, so i t 
i s q u i t e n a t u r a l t h a t Burma i s a f r a i d of the p o s s i b i l i t y 
t h a t B r i t i s h imper ia l i sm may De s u b s t i t u t e d e i t h e r by an 
99 
Indian or by a Chinese imper ia l i sm, 
W, The Statesman^ (Delhi j March 7^ 1962^1. 
97. The Statesman^ (Delh i , Apr i l 4 , 1962) . 
98. ^ A message from the Embassy of India i n r^ngpon^'^ Burma 
Weakly Bul le t in^ Vol. DC, Rangoon : March 6 , l 9 6 2 , p . 3 3 9 . 
99 . Thein, That, Ton, o p . c i t M ?• 1^4, 
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The danger 1« from China i s now hover ing over t h i s 
c o u n t r y ' s n o r t h e r n f r o n t i e r which has become a t h r e a t to 
India and Burma. Because China has r e fused to recognise 
Maclimohan l i n e , Chinese a t t a c k in NEFA s p e c i a l l y Long-u a r ea , 
makes the t h r e a t more obv ious , Chinese fo rces remained 
in Burmese t e r r i t o r y u n t i l t a l k s between Mr. CIiou En Lai 
100 
and UNU l e d to a " f a i r l y s a t i s f a c t o r y s e t t l e m e n t . " Burma 
has a common border wi th china twice as t h a t of Ind ia , I t 
i s n a t u r a l l y keen to adop t an i s o l a t e d p o l i c y with Ind i a , 
The exchange of views between General Newin and Mr. S h a s t r i 
woiiild enable the government to a s s e s s Chinese p o l i c i e s in 
101 
a new p e r s p e c t i v e . 
China ' s a g g r e s s i v e a c t s a r e un fo r tuna t e happenings . 
At the end of the "Hind i -Chin i and Burmese Chini Bhai Bhai 
e r a " , the pub l i c dp in ion in Asia has awakened to the 
" c r e e p i n g yel low p e r i l " . But Burma fol lowed s u c c e s s f u l l y 
the p o l i c y of non-al ignment to pac i fy the problem concerning 
102 
China, 
Bur has remained n e u t r a l in the d i s p u t e s t a r t e d by 
P a k i s t a n and China with Ind ia , Because Burma has a keen 
100. " I n d i a and Burma',' I h a a s k i j New D e l h i : (^ 3 0 Oc to be r , 
1 9 6 ^ p . 3 , 
101 . The Sunday Standard^ (New Delhi : February 7 ,1966; . 
102. " Ind ia and Burma,*^ The Eas t e rn Economist^ New Delhi , 
(October l b , 1 9 6 ^ p . 13 . 
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d e s i r e to e s t a b l i s h peace in Asia i t cannot want t h a t Asia 
i s a f f e c t e d t3Y c o n f l i c t s and d i s o r d e r . Burma and India 
fo l low the same i d e a l s and a l s o ach ieve a new unders tand ing 
of the need f o r peace v*iich could h e l p to d iscourage agg_ 
103 
r e s s i v e tendenc ies in ne ighbour ing n a t i o n s . 
Burma has adopted the non-commit ta l a t t i t u d e towards 
the S^no-Indian border d i s p u t e s and has l i t t l e sympathy 
104 
with I n d i a . General Newin has agreed to t ake p a r t in a 
conference of "Heads of Six non -a l i gned c o u n t r i e s to cons ider 
j o i n t a c t i o n on the S ino - Ind ian border d i spu te proposed by 
105 
Ceylon ' s Prime M i n i s t e r Mrs, S.BandarnaijIak. In the d i scuss ion 
with the Burmese l e a d e r s " t h e s u b j e c t of S ino- Ind ian border 
d i spu te came up t h a t Burma was sympathe t ic to the Indian 
p o i n t of view." And Revolut ionary Council appealed to " the 
Indian and Chinese in Burma to s top from any a c t i o n in the 
p r e s e n t f i g h t i n g between Ind ia and China l i k e l y to cause 
106 
p u b l i c d i s o r d e r . " 
Indo-Burmese r e l a t i o n s are t a k i n g a new shape g radua l ly . 
Ihere was no par t i c a l a r d i spu te to be s e t t l e d . But the 
103. The P a t r i o t ^ (Delhi ; December 2 1 , 1965) . 
104. The Times of India^ (Delhi : February 10 ,1964) . 
105. The Guardian^ (Rangoon : 24 November 1962) . 
106. The Guardian, (Rangoon, 24 MaxwDO October, 1962), 
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107 
'Nagas' have been a source of trouble to the Indian and 
Burman Government, because they create trouble In the North-
Eastern par t of India, the border areajjf of India and Burma. 
"For the suppression of Naga rebe ls , the cooperation or a t 
l e a s t the n e u t r a l i t y of the government of Burmaj is nece-
108 
ssary . The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of 
External Affairs sa id in the Lok Sabha, "the presence of 
the Naga-hosteles on Burmese t e r r i t o r y was brought to the 
not ice of the government of Burma on the I6th May l96 i , 
the Burmese Government issued a communique s t a t i n g tha t 
they were taking immediate steps to confirm th is information, 
tha t they took the most serious view of any par t of the 
Burmese t e r r i t o r y being used as a base for carrying out 
operat ions agains t f r iendly neighbouring country and that 
they would take every measure open to them to deal with 
109 
bands of armed men in the i r t e r r i t o r y . " 
The Burmese Government has done i t s best to check 
these Naga r ebe l s . The Government has given ins t ruc t ions 
to the commissioners to make necessary enquiry and condemned 
107. Naga - h i l l t r i b e s of Assam, 
108. The Hindustan Times^ (New Delhi ; February 4,1964}. 
109. Lok Sat^^ Debate^ Series I I , Vol.LVl, No.4,(August 
10, 1961) Col. 1165. 
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t h a t Nagas r ece ived a s s i s t a n c e . The Deputy M i n i s t e r in 
the M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l Affa i rs S h r i Surendra Pa l Singh 
s a i d in Lok Sabha, "According to the informat ion a v a i l a b l e to 
the Government of Ind ia the underground Nagas have rece ived 
some a s s i s t a n c e from the Tangra Nagas and Kachins r e s i d i n g 
in Burma. S u i t a b l e measures have been taken to p reven t 
i l l e g a l c r o s s i n g of our iwrder, Government of Burma a re 
110 
aware of these c o n t a c t s . " From the h e l p of Kachins, some 
e x t r e m i s t elements among underground Nagas have e s t a b l i s h e d 
c o n t a c t with China and they have gone to China t h o u g h 
Burmese t e r r i t o r y . They a re a l so he lped \)y the underground 
Nagas of India because they have a common d e s i r e of having 
111 
a g r e a t e r independent Nagaland. 
The emergence of Bangla Desh as a f r e e , democratic 
and s e c u l a r r e p u b l i c which was a p a r t of P a k i s t a n and was 
knoyn as Eas t P a k i s t a n and became independent in December 
1971, with tile e f f o r t s of Ind ia , i s f r i e n d l y both to India 
112 
and 3ui-ma. Mr. Singh s a i d , "Burma was one of the coun t r i e s 
viiich r ecogn i sed Bangla Desh soon a f t e r i t s emergence as an 
110. Lok, Sabha^ Debate, Vol.XVlI^May 1968j; Col .980. 
1^1. I b i d . , Col. 986. 
112. United Nations C h r o n i c l e s , Vol. IX, No. lo , CNovember 
1972^ p . 93 . 
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independent country. Any step taken for neu t r a l i s a t i on of 
Southeast Asia area would have the support of both Burma and 
113 
India ," In p ro tes t , the Pakistan Government has v/ithdra\-7n 
i t s ambassador from itangoon. To take the problems which 
a r i s e with the emergence of 3angla Desh, a meeting was held 
in Simla between the top leaders of India and Pakistan. 
According to Burma, "the recent SimCLa Agreement has con t r i -
buted considerably to peace in Asia as a whole," And Burmese 
114 
leaders appreciated th i s agreement. 
The Special Correspondent of Press t r u s t of India 
(PTI) in I^ngoon who was the only Indian correspondent in 
Rangoon, had to leave tha t country a t nine hours not ice . I t 
i s guessed that the order may have some connection with 
Bangle Desh s t o r i e s and reports of a c t i v i t i e s of the recent ly 
formed All Burma Pakistan Association to mobilise opinion 
in support of the s t ruggle in Bangladesh sent by Mr.Roy, a 
116 
spec ia l correspondent of PTI, 
Arakan Hi l ls in Burma touching the Bay of Bengal and 
the borders of India and Bangla Desh have become the hot-bed 
113. The Times of India, (Delhi : 10 April 1973). 
114. United Nations Chronicles, a^jjsli . , p. 93. 
115. The Times of India, (Delhi ; 25 May, 1971). 
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of in t e rna t iona l conspiracy agains t India, Bangladesh and 
Burma according to highly r e l i a b l e sources. It is qui te 
c lear tha t China, U.S.A. and Pakistan have ganged-up against 
India and Bangla desh and can not forgive India for helping 
in the emergence of independent Bangla Desh, 
Viien the Pakistan army surrendered in Bangladesh, 
huge quan t i t i e s of sophis t ica ted arms and ammunition were 
given to Mizo, Naga h o s t i l e s and some Pakistan troops who 
fled to Arakan Hi l l s with Chinese Ins t ruc t ions In Chlttagaong 
Hi l l t r a c t s . These amrriunleations were taken away to Arakan 
H i l l s . Ihe Burman Muslim population Is also crea t ing 
troubles for the Burman Government. Recently, a gang of 
Burmese Muslims c a l l i n g themselves as men of socal led ilrakan 
Independent Army passed through India-Burma border from 
Kachi area a f t e r receiving mi l i t a ry t r a in ing , china and 
Pakistan would continue to increase t he i r ass i s tance in the 
shape of mi l i t a ry hardwares and t ra in ing f a c i l i t i e s and 
rebels of India and Burma and other elements viiich could 
116 
work agains t India, Bangladesh an& Burma. 
General Newin and Mrs, Gandhi scanned the world scene 
from tile Asian-angle. Both emphasised that the p o l i t i c a l 
116. yhe Hindustan Standards, (Calcutta : 28 March 1872). 
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set t lement of the Vietnam question vas necessary. They also 
117 
greated the set t lement of Vitnam war and agreement. Mrs. 
Gandhi said, " i t i s eagy to throw-up the old and take to 
something new we are t rying to find t h i s th i rd path 
which i s the most d i f ferent but which in the long run, wi l l 
118 
be the most s a t i s fy ing , " 
Recently, the Union of Burma Airways stopped operation 
of a l l i t s f l i g h t s to India and cancelled i t s three f l i gh t s 
a week from Rangoon to Calcut ta , The U.B.A, ac t ion was under-
stood to be a follow-up of Burma's u n i l a t e r a l withdrawal on 
landing r igh t s to Indian Air l ines f l i g h t s over Burma t e r r i -
119 
tory . The suspensioh of t h e i r own f l i g h t s was to probably 
meant emphasis t h e i r point of view. But t h i s ac t ion was with-
drawn soon and Burma Government allowed the Indian Airl ines 
Calcutta - Port Blair f l i g h t a f t e r discussion between the two 
120 
countr ies . 
After three days goodwill v i s i t by the External Affair 
Minister Sardar Swaran Singh and on his re turn to India he 
said, "Burma agrees with India tha t the problems in the 
317. Ih^ N^t;i0hal Herftld, (Delhi : 1 Apri l 1969). 
118. SelPcted Speeches of Indira Gandhi^ Qp .g i t . , p.392. 
119. The Hindustan Times^ (Delhi i 14 May, 1973). 
120. The Hindustan Timesj (Del^i : T5 May, 1973). 
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Indian s u b - c o n t i n e n t should be r e so lved by mutual d i scuss ions 
and agreements among the c o u n t r i e s of the s u b - c o n t i n e n t them-
s e l v e s . Both s i d e s agreed t h a t every e f f o r t should be made 
to ma in t a in the Indian ocean as an a r ea of peace and t ranqu-
i l l i t y . " He f u r t h e r s a i d , "The good ne ighDour l iness and 
t r a d i t i o n a l f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s pro-
vided scope fo r f r u i t f u l coope ra t ion in the economic, t ech -
n i c a l and c u l t u r a l tB± f i e l d s . " Mr. Singh a l s o d i scussed 
b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s between the ifita two c o u n t r i e s with General 
121 
Newln and o t h e r s l e a d e r s . 
We can say t h e r e f o r e t h a t India p lays the r o l e of e lde r 
b ro the r to Buima. Taking mutual goodwil l and t r u s t f o r 
g ran ted India and Jurma have been peacefu l ne ighbours . There 
a r e no s e r i o u s d i f f e r ences o r c o n t r a d i c t o r y i n t e r e s t s between 
the two c o u n t r i e s . The minor sources of c o n f l i c t w i l l be 
r e so lved by amicable n e g o t i a t i o n s as the proper atmosphere 
122 
f o r t h a t s o l u t i o n e x i s t s in both the c o u n t r i e s . 
121 . The Times of Ind ia , (Delhi ; 10 ^ ,pr i l 1973) . 
122. The Pa t r i o ty (Delhi : 21 December 196o) . 
C H A P T E R V 
BURI^ AND THK UNIOED NATIONS 
lA,llllam, C.Johnstone has r i g h t l y commented_,"the 
r eco rd of any n a t i o n ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the United Nations 
i s a good t e s t of t h a t n a t i o n ' s a p p l i c a t i o n of i t s fo re ign 
p o l i c y . " \<hen the d i f f e r e n t problems and i s sue s come up 
before the General Assembly, each member n a t i o n has to take 
i t s own s tand on them. "There i s a sharp focus of pub l i c 
a t t e n t i o n on p o s i t i o n s taken on r e s o l u t i o n s before the 
General Assembly or i t s Standing Committees v^hich i s found 
with r e s p e c t to s p e c i f i c ac t ions , taken Dy a na t ion o u t s i d e 
of the United N a t i o n s . " For the more powerful na t i ons j u s t 
l i k e U.S.A., " the Uni ted Nations i s a t once a pub l i c forum, 
a l ocus of power p o l i t i c s and an ins t rument fo r the conduct 
of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . " But f o r Burma, a smal l n a t i o n in the 
world, " the United Nat ions i s a p u b l i c forum, a convenient 
machanism f o r conduct of diplomacy, a source of economic and 
o t h e r k inds of a s s i s t a n c e and, only on occas ion , an ins t rument 
1 
of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . " 
In ,his opening speech UNU, Former Prime Min i s t e r of 
Union of Burma, a t the Conference of the Heads of S t a t e and 
1. William, C.Johnstone, Burma's F o r e i ^ Po l icy , Massachusetts 
Havard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963, p . 2 0 1 . 
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Government of the non-aligned countr ies a t Belgrade on 1st 
September 19@1, said, "we believe t h a t peaceful co-existence 
and successful U.N. go hand idband. Burma has therefore 
been, and continues to oe a staunch supporter of the United 
Nations. The ideals and pr inc ip les of the United Nations 
represent mankind's best hope for the fu ture . More than 
ever in i t s h i s to ry , the world today needs an agency "to 
harmonise the act ions of na t i ons . " And we believe tha t th is 
need i s greater for the smaller, weaker, countries than for 
the big, powerful ones. l\fe think i t would be a olack day 
indeed for the world and p a r t i c u l a r l y for the smaller coun-
t r i e s than for the big, powerful ones^ if the United Nations 
were to suffer the fa te of the League of Nations. This being 
so, we cannot help but deplore and express our concern with 
the a t t i t u d e adopted towards the United Nations by some of 
the great powers, since i t goes without saying that the United 
Nations would be no United Nations without the pa r t i c ipa t ion 
2 
of the great powers." 
On February 27, 1948 U So Nyun, then Ambassador to 
the United States from the Union of Burma, submitted a l e t t e r 
to the Secretary General of the United Nations applying for 
2, The Guardian^ (Rangoon , 8th September 196l)t 
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meniDership, He said tha t , iuima firmly believes that 
she can most e f fec t ive ly v/ork, towards t h i s goal of world 
peace by p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the de l ibera t ions and a c t i v i t i e s 
of the United Nations organisat ion, and she is both wil l ing 
and able to carry out the obl igat ions contained in the 
char te r , Burma's app l ica t ion was quickly and unanimously 
approved on March 29, 1948, by the Securi ty Council Committee 
on Admission of Nisw Members, I t i s en teres t ing to note that 
the f r iendly represen ta t ive of the Republic of China, whose 
government was l a t e r accused by Burma of aggression, submitted 
the dra f t - re solut ion approving Burma's appl ica t ion . During 
the Security Council discussion on April 10th, there was 
general support for Bui'ma's admission and the committee 
approved draf t reso lu t ion was quickly adopted with the 
aff irmative votes and one aos tent ion . 
On r ece ip t of the Security Council 's recommendation 
tha t Burma be admitted, the General Assembly, a t i t s i S i s t 
Plenary Session Apri l 19, 1948, decided to consider the ques-
tion without reference to a Committee. Ihe neighbours of 
Burma such as India, Thailand, Pakistan, spoke br ie f ly and 
e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y of t h e i r country 's h i s t o r i c t i e s with Burma 
and expressed support for her admission. Ihe General Assembly 
unanimously approved 5i3-0, the Securi ty Council recommenda-
t ion to admit the Union of Burma as a member of the United 
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Nations. Use Nyun commented, " I t i s most auspicious that 
Burma, so soon a f te r re-emergence as an independent nation, 
should oe given the opportunity to contr ibute i t s share to 
3 
the cause of Ivb.rld peace," Thus Burma became the 58th member 
of the in te rna t iona l A^ssembly of na t ions . 
Burma has;S sent a delegation to New ifork to work for 
such a world, including many high ranking Jurraese e lec ted 
and appointed Government o f f i c i a l s . The delegs-tes have served 
regular ly on the six suosidiary committee of the General 
Assembly-the f i r s t ( P o l i t i c a l ) , second (Economic ;^ th i rd 
( soc ia l ) , fou r th (^rusteeship}_,fifth (Administration;,.and sixth 
( legal ) ,and the Ad hoc p o l i t i c a l committee which deals i^dtb 
membership questions and other thorny East-West prooitms. 
3urma also joined e ight of the Specialized Agencies of the 
United Nations. 3urma was one of the sponsors of the Inter-
na t iona l Finance Corporation, and the Burma Government was 
an o r i g i n a l party to the General Agreement on trade and 
4 
tcAJff^. 
3 , Frank, N. Irager, r a t r i c i a , Wohlgemuth, Lu, lu, Kiang, 
Burma's hale in the United Nations 1948-1955^ New Zoxk; 
I n s t i t u t e of Paci f ic Relations, 1956, pp. 1-3, 
4. Villiam, C.Johnstone, o p . c i t . j p . 206, 
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In 1950, Burma was elected to theCDllectlve iMeasures 
Committee, es tabl ished by the uni t ing for peace resolut ion 
a t the f i f t h session of General A.ssembly to consider c o l l e c -
t ive measures for peace and secur i ty , the Additional pleasures 
Committee composed of members of the Collect ive Measures 
Committee, vas to deal spec i f i ca l ly with the problem of 
Korea, and met from February 16, 1951, however, a t i t s f i r s t 
meeting Burma informed the Committee tha t she would not be 
aole to pa r t i c ipa t e due to her preoccupation with the secu-
r i t y pro Diem a t home. 
She was also admitted to the Food and Agricol tural 
(Organisation (F.A.O. ) in 1947 and has pa r t i c ipa ted ac t ive ly 
in i t s commissions and sub-commissions, espec ia l ly the 
In terna t ional Rice Commission the committee on commodity 
problems, and the Indo-i 'acific F isher ies Council. Burmese 
delegates have also taken act ive i n t e r e s t in the In ter -
nat ional Labour Organisation (ILO) from 1948, the Vfcrld x^Iealth 
Organisation (1/,H0^  of iiftiich Burma is an o r ig ina l member from 
1948, and the United Nations Educational Sc ien t i f i c and 
Cultural^ Organisation (UNESCO) to which Burma was admitted 
in June 1949. In January 1952, Burma joined the Internat ional 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRDJ) and In ter -
5 
na t ional Monetary Fund (IMF;. 
b . Frank, N.Trager, P a t r i c i a , l^hlgemuth, Lu,Yu,Kiang, 
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Burma Government, generally followed the posi t ion 
taken by other n e u t r a l i s t members before 1954, but i t s vot-
ing was more often based on independent reasoning qui te 
d i f ferent from that of India. But a f t e r 1964, when closer 
r e l a t ions had been es tab l i shed between U.S.S. R. and communist 
China, there was a tendency for the Burma delegation to 
ioin with India and not take a posi t ion contrary to that 
6 
of the majority of the Afro-Asian bloc. 
The n e u t r a l i s t pol icy of Burma and the hard r e a l i t i e s 
of the domestic s i t u a t i o n in Burma are re f lec ted in the 
pr inc ip les which guide her vot ing. There has consis tent ly 
Deen (a) "desire to avoid involvement in power Dloc po l i -
t i c s , (b) disapproval of colonialism, and will ingness to 
support peoples who are t rying to cast-off i t s l a s t rem-
nan ts ; (c^ support for humanitarian measures, (d) Total 
r e j ec t ion of war as a so lu t ion of in t e rna t iona l disputes 
and the creat ion and gradual expansion of a 'no war area ' 
7 
as a s tep towardSca f i n a l and complete abo l i t i on of war." . 
The in te rna l s i t u a t i o n of Burma, made her anxious to 
take precautions aga ins t external aggression. As i t is out 
6^ William, C.Johnstone, aiU&ii»> P» 233, 
7. Dr. Maung, Maung, Burma in The Family of nations^ 
Amsterdam : Dijambatan Ltd., Internaional Publishing 
House, 1966, p. 147. 
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of question for a country of Burma's s ize and economy to 
build and maintain huge armed forces , Burma placed hope on 
the United Nations and on fr iendly r e l a t i o n s with^countries . 
Burma is a nat ion of only 17 mil l ion people, the nations 
across Bui-mese borders can boast of populations ranging from 
40 to 400 mi l l ion . To think of successfully stemming the 
aggression from such quar ters is simply impossible. 
Die reason why Burma joined a world organisat ion was to 
avoid jo ining a power bloc since I t was against^pol icy and 
p r a c t i c a l l y unwise, so the only course l e f t was to enter the 
United Nations and place hope on i t . Former Prime Minister 
UNU said , "when we joined tha t great organisat ion, we were 
not prdmpted by considerat ions of f i n a i c i a l aid, medical aid 
education missions to plan our educational programme and 
such other benefits l i k e l y to accrue from our membership. 
These things, however, des i rab le , are immaterial, l*hat was 
foremost in our mind was the expectation of the United Nations 
ass is tance when our country is subjected to aggression by a 
8 
stronger power." 
Another advantage Burma has as a member of the United 
Nations is tha t v^en the representa t ive of Burma speaks in 
&. Ib id . , p. 144, 
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the General Assemoiy or in i t s Committee, he has a much la rger 
o f f i c i a l and public audience. An i l l u s t r a t i o n of th is is 
found a t the time of the Hungarian Cr is is in the f a l l of 
1956. The Burman representa t ive in the Assembly spoke in 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of Surma's strong stand condemning soviet 
in tervent ion in Hungary. 
Surma is a small country and she has a » l imited 
numoer of diplomatic missions in other countr ies , and news 
report ing from Burma is spot ty and in the hands of loca l 
representa t ive of only a few in te rna t iona l news se rv ices . 
For Burma, the General Assembly i s , therefore , a d i s t i n c t 
advantage as a means of publ ic iz ing Burma's policy on a 
given i ssue . Many issues have oeen discussed before the 
Assembly Committee on which the Burma Government did not wish 
to take stand, aoout which Burmese leaders knew very l i t t l e 
and perhaps cared evenless . During the Assembly sessions, 
Burma representat ives vote, almost da i ly , duping Assembly 
sessions on a whole host of problems and i ssues . Sometimes, 
Burma Government can i n s t r u c t i t s delegation to abstain on 
question with i t is not fami l ia r . 
Another advantage for Burma is the f ac t that the 
United Nations is one cen t r a l , almost worldv;ide diplomatic 
mission. At United riatlons head-quar ters , ^ i t is possible 
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for the 3ui'ma representa t ives to undertake o f f i c i a l or semi-
o f f i c i a l business v:ith representa t ives from a l l of the 
member nat ions .9 Foreign off ice o f f i c i a l s in Rangoon have 
s ta ted that ^3urma can not afford too many diplomatic missions 
abroad and, a t present does not need them because of the 
f a c i l i t i e s afforded a t the United Nations head-quarters in 
New xork.^ 
United Nations, not only provides a means of easy 
and inexpensive o f f i c i a l contact with many nations but also 
enables the 3uima representa t ives a t the United Nations to 
become acotuaint with the problems of other nations and Isxs 
learn mucn more about them than would otherwise be the case/^. 
Likewise, the f a c i l i t i e s of the United Nations s e c r e t a r i a t , 
as well as those of the United Nations specia l ized Agencies, 
provide the Burma Government with a vast amount of information 
tha t i t would be d i f f i c u l t to obta in .through b i l a t e r a l means. 
All of the United Nations agencies of which 3urma is 
a member, are providing some kind of ass i s tance to Burma. 
The united Nations s p e c i a l i s t s have to work closely with 
o f f i c i a l s in the government, but as advisers and smssAft consul-
t an t s . That Burma achieved benefits from the services of 
these technicians, there is no doUbt out tha t lack of 
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coordination of the i r services and only p a r t i a l u t i l i z a t i o n 
of tiieir s k i l l s have reduced the benefi ts tha t might be 
expected. The Burman o f f i c i a l s have complained pr iva te ly 
that e i the r they could not find time to use these spec i a l i s t s 
e f fec t ive ly or t ha t time spent on helping the s p e c i a l i s t s 
do the i r job prevented them from carrying out the i r own 
assignments e f f i c i e n t l y . I t does not do to have a Burma 
representa t ive to a United Nations meeting,, ignorant of the 
suDject under considerat ion, or lacking in ins t ruc t ions from 
the Burma Government on important questions tha t come-up 
for a vote. 
F inal ly , for a small nat ion, j u s t l ike Burma, the 
United Nations, may oe u t i l i z e d as an instrument for $xis 
project ing i t s foreign pol icy. Using the United Nations for 
th is purpose is something that has ndt been careful ly consi-
dered by Burman o f f i c i a l s as to how Burma can use i t s United 
Nations membership to advance Jtsc i t s f o r e i ^ policy objec-
t ives in general . This has been due to lack of able s taff 
9 
and sca rc i t y of time for long-range policy planning. 
Chairman General Nevin s t a t ed tha t "in a world steeped 
in poverty, hunger, ignorance, desease and in jus t i ce , the 
9. William, C.Johnstone, o o . c l t . , pp. 203-209, 
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United Nations vas attempting to harmonize the interests and 
actions of nations toifards that long range attainment of 
the security and common veal of mankind.*' General Nevin 
appealed to the Mem tier-Nat ions to address themselves with 
fai th and confidence to the two fold challenges of the 
United Nations upon entering the third decade of i t s l i f e 
and s t r ive for the United Nations to become a force for 
greater economic and social equality in the viorld as veil 
as for peace. 
Foreign minister of Burma U Thi Han, \^o presided 
over the celebrations, said that, the United Nations vas 
creating to save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of var; the member s ta tes could by mutual cooperation and 
endeavour help tovards the search for the betterment of 
human relationships. The United Nations had continued i ts 
peace.keeping ac t iv i t i e s in the past year vith conscious 
effort, and i t s record vas one of commendable accomplishment 
in s tabi l iz ing and maintaining peace. U Thai Han also 
appealed for humanity and shoved his keen desire for peace 
in the hearts and minds of the peoples of the vorld and he 
expressed that United Nations developed into a really e f f ec 
tive instrument for the performance ofthe functions in the 
charter, and urged the Member Nations to endeavour to be more 
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wrthy of the principles and more loyal to the purpose of 
10 
ttie charter. 
Burma's record In the United Nations on the Korean war 
issue I l lus t ra tes the proh^em of a neutral nation in the 
arena of power pol i t ics Burma also presented the KMT problems 
before the United Nations and also I l lus t ra tes the dlfflcuL. 
t ies of cold-var pol i t ics for a small nation ^ I c h takes the 
charter a t i t s face value* 
KOBRMf CBXSXSt 
The Korean Crisis was one of the many international 
issues in >idiich Burmese Government had taken some interest . 
Uien the Korean Crisis broke out, the AFPFL leaders were 
attempting to formulate their foreign policy concepts and 
events within Burma were of overriding importance to them. 
On December 8, 1948, in committee I (The Po l i t i ca l and 
Security Committee) Burma voted in favour of U.S.A. -
Australian - Chinese (Nationalist) sponsored resolution "to 
regard the Seoul (Southern) Government as the only legal 
government of the Republic of Korea." Burma opposed a 
Soviet effort to challenge the legal i ty of the Seoul Govern-
ment, The Burmese delegate said, "his government would not 
10. The Guardian^ (Bangoon , 25th October 1966^ 
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recognize either goverrunent in Korea since i t did not vant 
to contribute to the division of a country." Since Burma's 
primary concern was unification of Korea, The Burmese 
delegate U Pe Kin expressed his nation's sympathy vi t^ the 
Korean people vlao were suffering as a result of a zjpallx 
s i tuat ion which was not of their own making. U Pe Kin said 
that his Government "was extremely perturbed at the tendency 
among certain powers to take the eas ies t course In solving 
a d i f f i c u l t s ituation l ike that in Koz*ea, by proposing ^ e 
11 
partit ion of a country into separate zones** 
The Burmese Government always opposed any measure 
v^ich might create the differences and divis ion between 
North and South Korea. The Burmese delegate U Pe Kin desired 
nothing more than to see Korea united. But he believed that 
the only solution which could bring about such unity was 
withdrawal, leaving the Korean people free to deteiotine 
12 
their own destiny. 
In the 1949 session of the General Assembly, the 
report of the United Nations Commission for Korea was not 
11. vrllliam, C.Johnstone, o p . c i t . , pp, 209-210* 
12, United Nations, Gyerai Assembly^ Third Session Part I 
^Committee l , 232 Meeting, ^December 7, 194^ p.976. 
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optimistic and was c r i t i c a l of the Republic of Korea as well 
as the North Korean regime, "Debates in Committee I were a 
clear reflection of the contest between ttie two power blocs 
and of the conditions which had caused the division of Korea 
into two zones, Ck>mmittee I voted to continue and strengthen 
the United Nations Ck>fflmisslon over s t i f f Soviet opposition* 
Burma supported this move. Burma also Joined a large majority 
of committee I to defeat a Soviet proposal to abolish the 
United Nations Commission and brand i t s work i l legal inter-
13 
ference in Korean a f f a i r s , " 
Ihe North Korean forces attack on the Republic of 
Korea, began on June 2&, 19&0 and was followed iQr the welL. 
known immediate action of the United Nations Security Council. 
The Security Council requested a l l the United Nations member 
nations to render a l l assistance to the United Nations in 
repelling the North Korean attack. The Burma Government 
replied by a cable, "In acknowledging receipt of your xAm 
cab leg rams , , , , , , , ! have tiie honour to say that the government 
of the Union of Burma supports the stand taken by Security 
Council in regard to Korea at i t s meeting of 25 and 27 June 
I960. My Government very much regrets , however, that i t is 
13, William, C.Johnstone, op-cllf.j pp. 210-211. 
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14 
not in a position to r«nd«r any effect ive assistance,** 
But la ter , Burma sent 400 tons of r ice valued at £ 49,943 
to Korea, 
Again, Burma supported the U.S. sponsored proposal 
to establish a co l l ec t ive Measure Committee. At the f i f th 
Session of General Assembly, Burma supported the resolution 
to continue the committee I, despite the strong oi^osit ion 
of the Soviet bloc and India abstained. Although Buima 
supported the original United Nations condemnation of Nortii 
Korea "because i t vas c learly a case of aggression,** She 
vas unhappy over the ms. crossing of the 38th paral lel by 
United Nations troops, fearing this would make a negotiated 
settlement^more d i f f i c u l t . 
On KM. October 4, 1950, Committee I adopted **by a 
thunping vote of 47 to 5** **a Joint Western proposal \^ich 
contained an *'in direct but clear authorization for General 
Mac Arthur to move across the 28th paral le l , in order to 
repeal North Korean forces , Ihe same resolution established 
14* Sfi^wUy GpymcAl, Off 3>gJlfti Rg<?nrdgt supplement for (June, July, August, 195Q)y(CbcuBent;, p, 74, 
15, Frank,N,Trager, Patricia^U>hlgemuth, Lu,Yu,Kiang, 
tUU£l&»» PP* 7-8. 
. 232 . 
a new United Nations Coamlsslon for the Unification and 
Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCUBK)." Burma was with the majo-
r i ty of Committee I to re jec t the f i r s t Soviet resolution, 
abstained on the vote which defeated the second, and Joined 
the majority against defeat the third Soviet resolution. To 
take this step, Burma Government set an example for persuing 
i t s policy concepts of "independence" and "non-alignment,** 
and a t the same time reflecting a certain suspicion of the 
16 
Vsstern nations, a natural a t t i tude for any colonial country* 
U Tin, the Burmese delegate called upon the House to support 
the government's stand on Korea and said, " that foremost 
among the reasons for Joining tiie United Nitions was that 
Burma would receive assistance if subjected to aggression and 
that, therefore, i t f e l t obliged to make some contribution 
yti&n. the United Nations opposed any aggression. Consequently, 
the Burmese delegation would support any measures designed 
to prevent threats to the peace or acts of aggression, which 
section C of the draft resolution, not so much from a legal 
point of view but rather as an instrument to make the United 
Nations effective in i t s primary function of preventing 
16. William, C.Johnstone, okjJiJbiM Pp. 211-212. 
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threats to the peace in any part of the viorld." On account 
of Some Internal reasons Buima vould be unable for some time 
to implement part C of the resolution. U Tin has rightly 
said that, *his government, therefore, for the present and 
foreseable future, vould be unable to take any action to 
implement that paragraph but i t trusted that fac t vould not 
v i t i a t e i t s acceptance of the principles embodied in the 
17 
draft resolution," The Arab^Asian bloc, including Buma 
made efforts to ease tension and to work toward a peaceful 
settlement of the Korean var through compromise. On December 
5th, the delegation of thirteen countries (including Burma), 
headed by Sir Bengal Rau of India, appealed to Communist 
China and North Korea immediately to declare that i t i s not 
their intention that any forces under their control should 
crossto the South of the 38th paral le l . 
India informed Committee I, on January 22nd that the 
Chinese communists had agreed to the poss ib i l i ty of a limited 
Korean cease . f ire as a preliminary step in a Seven.pover 
conference on the settlement of general p o l i t i c a l problems, 
^Over American opposition. Committee I adopted an Indian 
17, United Nations General Assembly Committee I, f i f th 
session, 367th meeting, (October 18, 1960^ 
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motion for a forty-eight hour adjoanuicnt In view of the 
nev deTelopnent, and the Arab-Asian bloc vent Into action 
immediately.^ 
The Buiaiese delegate Mr* Barrington said that, "the 
problem at hand, extended for beyond a mere finding of 
vAiether or not Communist China siul had committed an act of 
aggression, for this reason Burma and other Asian nations 
had not given up **attenpt8 to seek a peaceful and honourable 
settlement of a l l existing issues in the Far East, throu^ 
direct and free discussion betveen the governments most 
directly concerned." 
There were to many representatives \iao participated 
in the debate of the Committee. Til l 17 January 1961, at 
least f i f ty delegations had favoured negotiations >ihich vould 
not be confined to the Korean question but would extend to 
the question of Formosa. The delegation of Burma would be 
unable to vote in favour of the United States draft resolution 
and would support the Twelve-Power draft resolution. 
According to the opposition of the United States draft 
resolution, the delegation of Burma stood i ts goverrynent*s 
status with regard to i ts representation on the committee to 
be composed of the members of the Collective Measure Committee 
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under the eighth paragraph of that draft resolution, a l thou^ 
Burma •« had been appointed a memher of that Ck>ounittee. 
Burma is the staunch supporter of the policy of 
"non-allgpment with power blocs" ^ i c h often led i t s United 
Nations representatives into voting on both sides, Ihis is 
found in the resolution presented in committee I on January 
7, 1962, On January 6 the Soviet Union introduced a resolu-
tion call ing for a "high-level meeting" of Security Council 
members in a special session with the objective of bringing 
an end to the Korean h o s t i l i t i e s and promoting a settlement. 
In Ciommittee I, the Burmese representative stated on January 
8 that one reason ^ y his delegation, ^ i c h had taken part 
in tile work of the Ck^llectlve Mfiasure Committee, had not been 
a sponsor ofthe eleven-nation resolution was that i t wished 
to hear the views of the delegations which had not been 
represented on that committee. According to Burmese Govern-
ment, the Collective measures were necessary and would 
support the eleven-natlon draft resolution. The Burmese 
delegate said that "he qualified this support, however, by 
s ta t ing that Burma would find i t necessary to abstain on 
some par ts , such as paragraph I and II ofthe operative part , 
18. Unitad Ifatlons General Assembly^ Fifth Session Committee 
I, 434th Meetings Vol. III,(>January 29,196^ pp, 678-679. 
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but i t particularly welcomed paragraph lo . In giving 
support to this eleven-nation draft resolution, ho\ifever, 
the Burina delegate stated that ^he wished to make i t clear 
that Buma was not ali:gyv4jig i tsel f with any "bloc" but 
was only interested in the promotion of collective Security,' 
ttien the final vote came in Ck>mmittee I on the eleven* 
nation resolution, calling for members of the United Nations 
to take preliminary steps, Burma voted with the Western 
powers, %dill6 only Argentina, India and Indonesia abstained* 
In the Voting on e^ch part of the resolution, Burma abstained 
on the "Second operative" part of the resolution, calling 
on United Nations members to have armed forces units availabe 
for service as United Nations units, A Soviet proposal for 
a Special Security Ck>uncll session in committee I ai^roved 
on January 9th, but the )festem powers imposed some definite 
restrictions. Burma voted in favour of the resolution as 
finally amended but abstained from voting on the Vfestern 
amendment when i t was offered. 
During the latter part of January, ^^en the discussions 
started on the Korean armistice problem in Committee I, 
Burma took the stand as a small nation because Burma did not 
want to get involved in the two big power blocs. On Feburary 
2^ a Joint Session of Committee I, II and III met on Korean 
. 237 • 
problems, and Burma, along with almost a l l of the Irab-Aslan 
na t ions , voted in favour of Vfestern-sponsored resolut ions 
postponing Security Council discussion while armis t ice nego-
t i a t i o n s were in progress and agains t Soviet-sponsored reso-
lu t ions onthe same subject . In the same meeting of the 
^sembly , the Burma delegate joined the ilmerican delegate 
In urging the Soviet Union not to make a p o l i t i c a l propaganda 
forum out of the ECAFE meeting then in . sess ion; and >^en 
the Soviet delegate accused the United States of America 
of economic aggression in A.sia, the Burmese delegate act ing, 
as Chairman, ruled him out of order . 
130.9 voting record of Buima shows tha t Burma s t i l l did 
not follow India on a l l quest ions, because Burma was more 
aware of i t s posi t ion as the small neighbour of a large 
Communist China, Burmese Government was also a f ra id of the 
h o s t i l i t i e s in Indo-China, which could e f fec t t h e i r country. 
The speeches made, as well as evidence co l lec ted in th i s 
study, indicate tha t Burma tended to abs ta in on votes where 
Communist pressure was exerted and on resolu t ions sponsored 
by the U.S.S.IU or Communist bloc s t a t e s , Burma always 
supported for a peaceful set t lement of the Korean a f f a i r . 
"On 28 resolu t ions in committee I between February 1, 
1951 and December 8, 19&4s 
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Burma voted with the U.S. 12 Times 
India voted with U.S. 4 Times 
Burma abstained 10 Times 
Burma voted with U.S.S.R. • • . . . 6 Times 
India voted with the U.S.S.B. 6 Times," 
^^  Afterwards, Burma was also elected to the col lect ive 
Measure Ck>fflmlttee but did not participate in this committee 
after the cease . f lre in Korea, On subsequent resolutions 
regarding Korea, the Burmia voting pattern was maintained 
with constant jus t i f i ca t ion statements by Burma delegates 
that their votes demonstrated "non-alignment** and "independence 
19 
of action." 
THR ISSUE OF KUQMINTAG TROOPS IN BUBMJL: 
After the establishment of Communist China regime, the 
KQdffllntang (KMT} debacle took place, because KMT troops, 
>diich were led by Republic China, had f led towards the South, 
west and Indo-China. Early in 1950 some 1700 crossed the 
border into the Kentung state of Burma, They also demanded 
food, transport and services from the inhabitants of the 
l o c a l i t y . The Burmese Army demanded that these troops should 
19. William, C.Johnstone, aajjiii .» PP» 221-.225, 
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either leave Burmese territory or subnit to disarmsuBent 
and intemaent in accordance with international law* Accord-
ingly, the KMT troops were withdrawn westward and estab-
l ished new headquarters at Mon^sat as tiie base of KMT 
troops, under the Command of K.M.T.General Li Mi. 
Until about the end of 1962, the KMT troops had 
limited their a c t i v i t i e s to the areas East of the Stlveen 
Biver, In the l a t t er part of 1952, the freshly trained and 
re-equipped KMT troops began to eztend their a c t i v i t i e s 
to areas south of i t and they had ilfio established contact 
with elements >^o were engaged in active rebel l ion against 
the Qovemment of the union of Buxma. At the same time, 
a unit of KMT troops moved Northwest ward crossing the 
Salween and attacking isolated Government outpost on their 
way. Another unit of KMT troops crossed the Salween River 
to attack Monghsu State from which they are now being 
20 
driven out by the units of the Burmese Aimy, 
At the Seventh General Assembly Session of 1962-1963, 
Burma submitted a complaint against the Nationalist Chinese 
Government, charging that her troops were committing 
20* United Nations Ganeral Assembly^ Seventh Session (March 26, 1963J^  pp. 1-3. 
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aggression against Burmese territory* 
"Having considered the complain submitted to i t 
by the Delegation of Burma Ck>ncerning the presence and hos t i l e 
a c t i v i t i e s of the armed troops of the KMI Cbvemnent of 
Forfflosa within the terr i tor ies of the Union of Burma, their 
fa i lure to submit to disarmament and internment ai^equired 
by international lav, their acts of h o s t i l i t y against the 
axmed forces of the Union of Burma and their depredations 
against the civ Ulan population therein the axmed troops 
of the KMT Government of Formosa have committed acts of 
infrlngment against the terr i tor ia l integrity of the Union 
22 
of Burma and acts of v io lat ion of i t s front iers ,* 
Ihe resolution also appealed to the Assembly to respect 
the t err i tor ia l integrity and the p o l i t i c a l independence of 
the Union of Burma and to be guided by the principles of the 
charter in their relations vlth Burma. The||complaint also 
charged that 12000 KMT troops "were now on Buioese territory. 
It i s clear that in engaging in these i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s the 
KMT troops are being directed and supported by the Crovemment 
of Formosa," It declared^ "Nationalist troops were accused 
21, Maung, Maung, aj;i«iL2Ji«, p« 9* 
22* United Nations, General Assembly, oiUfil i . , p« 3# 
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of carrying on a -veritable reign of terror , looting, pellag-
23 
ing, raping and murdering," 
The General Assembly, a t i t s 420th Plenary Meeting 
on March 31, 1953 agreed to include Burma»s complaint as 
item 77 on i t s agenda. The|!request vas approved. In any 
case, Justice U Mylnt Thein, chairman of the Burma United 
Nations delegation, presented Burma's complaint against the 
Chinese Nationalist Ciovemment before the Uiited Nations 
Po l i t i ca l Committee on April 17th. !Ihe Burmans also intro-
duced, a resolution call ing for the condemnation of Nationa-
l i s t China as an aggressor nation and also appealed to, 
Che United Nations to take appropriate action to bring 
about the disarming and internment or vlthdraval of Chinese 
Nationalist troops in Burma. 
Replying to Burma's charges the Chinese Nationalist 
representatives, Dr. Isiang Hing.Fu, stated "My government 
has no control over the Yunnan Anti.Communist and National 
Salvation Army." Admitting paracbxlcally that "ve do have 
some Influence over General LI Ml," Dr. Islang promised in 
conclusion that his government would exercise i t s "moral 
23. Ihe NBw York Time^^ (March 27, 1953). 
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influence'^ to bring about a solut ion to the problem, but 
opposed the Burma d ra f t reso lu t ion and re jec ted Burma's 
24 
monstrous charge of Nationalist-aggression,* ' 
Many compromise resolu t ions were subsequently d i s . 
cussed, and on ^Aprll 22 and amended Mexican proposal vas 
adopted by a vote of 68-0 with Na t iona l i s t CSiina abs ta in ing, 
Bunaa decided to vote for i t in recognit ion of " the so l id 
26 
moral backing of the United Nations given her complaint." 
I t a lso provided t h a t the United Nations should,* 
(1) "deplore and condemn the presence of foreign forces in 
Burma, 
(2) declare t h a t these foreign forces must be disarmed 
and e i t h e r agree to internment o r have the union of Burma 
for thwith, 
(3) Request a l l s t a t e s to respect the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e -
g r i ty and p o l i t i c a l independence of the Union of Burma. 
(4) Urge a l l s t a t e s , on the request of Burma, to a s s i s t 
in the peaceful evacuation of these 
(6) re f ra in from furnishing any ass i s tance to these 
forces v,hich may enable them to remain in the t e r r i t o r y of 
26 
the union of Burma." 
24, William, C.Johnstone, aiLuCJU*, PP. 226-227, 
25, The New York Times ^  (24 April 1953). 
26, tfnitea N^ttofig Q^ft^gftl j^ flg^fflfaly, Ibcunent 1/2391 Agenda 
item 77, Report of the f i r s t Committee, (22 Apri l ; 1953J; 
p, 6, (See also : William C. Johns tone^ oP. f>i t . y p. 2P7"). 
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But the reso lu t ion fa i l ed t o t a l l y to name the Chinese 
Na t iona l i s t Government as aggressor as Burma vanted. The 
Burmese delegate a lso voted for the Mexican reso lu t ion lAien 
i t came-up before the General Assembly a f t e r having abstained 
in the P o l i t i c a l Ck>mmittea vote • 
After t h i s , an Argentine resolu t ion vas introduced 
but did^ not take Burma's s ide so s t rongely as did Mexican 
27 
r e so lu t i on . By t h i s reso lu t ion the General Assembly vould 
c a l l upon a l l s t a t e s to respect the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t eg r i ty 
and the p o l i t i c a l independence of the Union of Burma. General 
Assembly a lso requested "the Government of the Union of Burma 
and Government of the Republic of China and the o ther par t ies 
d i r e c t l y concerned to en ter into negot ia t ions with a view to 
bringing about the immediate withdrawal of the troops from 
28 
the t e r r i t o r y of Burma," 
The United Sta tes also proposed a four.power (Burma, 
Republic China, Thailand and the U.S . ) Conference to discuss 
means of solving the g u e r r i l l a problem on May 8 th , In r e s -
ponse to t h i s , the Four-NAtions United Nations Commission 
27. New York Times/Apr i l 24, 1963> 
28, United Nations, General Assembly, Document, ftjftjj^,,p,6. 
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met in Bangkok on May 22, 1963. At f i r s t , the Burmese dele-
gate refused to s i t with idieir Chinese Nationalist counter-
parts. By the middle of June, however, the Burmans were 
reported to have been impressed by the s inceri ty of American 
efforts to bring about the evacuation of Li Mi's forces, 
Representatives of a l l four-powers oe^n meeting as a 
coDsmittee of the viiole, and declared f u l l accord on evacua-
29 
tlon procedure, 
OSie evacuation of KMT troops started very slowly a^ jsJui 
Chinese protestations that they had no control over the forces 
in Buitna and washed their hands of the "irregulars" \ho 
30 
refused evacuation. The Premier of Nationalist China Dr, 
T,F.Tsiang said that "the troops _ the original units 
retreated into Burma after the Communist victory in China —» 
were not under the command of the Formosa Government the 
Chinese troops in x3urma commanded by General Li Mi were 
fighting for home and family for their national l iberation. 
The idea of aggression against Burma never entered our mind* 
The Li Mi Army . known as the National Anti.Communist Salva. 
tlon Army - was not apart of the regular Chinese Nationalist 
31 
forces ," 
29, William,C»Johnstone, QJOMSH** PP. 227-228« 
30, Frank, N.Trager, Patricia ifchlgemuth, Lu, Yu,Kiang, 
a&ju£JU*> P« 1^ « 
3 1 , Wftv YArk Times, TAprll 18, 1 9 5 ^ 
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At eighth and ninth General Assemoly Session, Burma 
brought the subject again and again. The General Assembly 
resolution merely cal led for continuation of the good off ices 
of the United States and Thailand. The United States and 
S2 
Thailand continued their negotiations. 
Evacuation negotiations continued t h r o u ^ u t the 
summer as did sporadic fighting between Burman and KMT troops. 
On September l6 , 1963 Buz-ma's Ambassador to Thailand, U Pe Khin 
f ina l ly submitted a demand to the Chinese representatives 
on the Joint Military Commission that '^Nationalist China 
agree to the evacuation of 5,000 of the 12,000 Nationalist 
troops in Burma within three weeks and the remainder within 
three months. The demand was designed to counter the possi-
b i l i t y of a "token withdrawal stretched" out during the 
coming General Assembly Session. But the representative of 
Chinese Nationalist refused to accept botfe the Burman demand 
and the comproaise proposal >diich was put up by the Ubited 
States . The American Chairman, "severely censured" this 
attitude while the Burmese delegate walked out ofthe Conference. 
Myint Thein, the Buimese delegate told the po l i t i ca l 
and Security Committee of the General Assembly that "12000 
32. Frank- N.Trager, Patricia,W)hlgemuth, Lu,Yu Kiang, 
33, William, C. Johnstone, afijJLUt-* P» 229. 
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Cblnose txx>ops commanded by the Nationalists and supplied 
from Formosa, had been terrorizing Eastern Burma and trying 
to overthxow the Burmese Government. Burma also accused 
Nationalist China of "dishonesty and Insincerity" in four 
nations negotiations for the evacuation of an estimated 
12,000 Nationalist Guerrilla troops from Burmese s o i l . Defence 
Minister U Baswe said that a l l the participants except 
Nationalist China, had agreed on an evacuation plan, but 
that i t became "more and more apparent" that the Nationalist 
sought only "token" evacuation. On October 31, U Mylnt 
!Iheln outlined his government's att i tude towards the proceed-
ings. Speaking before the United Nations P o l i t i c a l Committee, 
the Buima delegate ackngvledged with "deep gratitude" American 
efforts towards a solution, but said, "without meaning to 
be ungrateful, I venture to state that in dealing with the 
authorities on Formosa, moral pressure isnot enough, , . , • If 
the United States would go a step further and threaten to 
suspend aid, I assure you the Kuomintang aimy wi l l disappear 
over night," On Novem1»er 5th, he stated before the same 
Committee that "the evaluation of only 2,000 mei]|and d i s . 
avowal by Formosa;!: of the remainder was no consolation and 
not the semblance of a solution," 
34. Wflv XcirJt I4fflg6, (October 6, I953;t 
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Ihe evacuation proceeded In a manner hardly s a t i s -
35 
factory to the Burma Government. I t Is openly revealed 
tha t American supplied arms and communltlon to these Chinese 
Nat iona l i s t t roops. General LI Ml, head of these troops 
has openly t r ave l l ed by a i r between Formosa and Ban^ok 
and then on to the head quar ters In Burma. I t Is a well 
es tabl ished fac t tha t no sovereign nat ion can t o l e r a t e 
foreign troops on I t s s o i l . So Burma taok a f l m decision 
to terminate a l l United States a s s i s t ance . I t Is due to 
the f a c t tha t they are I r r i t a t e d a t the United States 
because of continued American support fo r the Chinese 
Na t iona l i s t on Formosa. 
Now, Burma does not bother vi^ether the United States 
stops or Increases I t s a id , m i l i t a r y or economic to the 
Chinese Na t iona l i s t in Formosa. But Burmese Government 
hopedthat "the United Sta tes Government should use I t s good 
off ices to stop k i l l i n g , raping arson and dest ruct ion of the 
Burmese people and Burmese t e r r i t o r y by Chinese Na t iona l i s t 
troops now in Burma." 
35 . William, C.Johnstone, a£UieiJ:*iP«^0. 
3 6 . Nav York Times, ( A p r i l 9, 1953> 
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Observers in te rp re ted Burma's move to drop United 
States a id as an e f fo r t to assure an independent posi t ion 
in the "cold war** e spec ia l ly since Communist China is 
37 
Burmats next door neighbour. The United Sta tes Govemgitnt 
is t ry ing best to vork out a set t lement of Burma's complaint 
agains t Nat iona l i s t (2iina tha t would Involve the t ransfer 
to Formosa of thousands of Na t iona l i s t troops now on Burmese 
t e r r i t o r y . The United States»s Ambassador Mr.William J. 
Sebald had approached Prime Minister UNU with a proposal 
tha t the Burmese Army h a l t i t s compaign aga ins t the Chinese 
Na t iona l i s t g u e r r i l l a s in nor theas t Burma. ISie American 
envoy a l so promised tha t "h is Government vouid exer t i t s 
Influence with the Chinese Nat iona l i s t Government on Formosa 
to have the Guerr i l las withdrawn. The gue r r i l l a s f led into 
the rugged f ron t i e r region of Buima to escape the Chinese 
38 
Communist armies during the c i v i l war in China.''' 
Eight countr ies j o i n t Commission questionedjthe 
United Sta tes to work for the evacuation of a l l pro-nat iona. 
l i s t Chinese troops on Burmese s o i l . !Qie aim of th is meeting 
was to put before the p o l i t i c a l and Securi ty Committee of the 
General Assembly the Burmese complaint tha t the recent 
37. «QV fort riffles, (March 29, 1963> 
38. NW forfe I1^§8, (April 20, 1 9 5 ^ 
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agreenent to remove 2000 So troops to Formosa voold s t i l l 
leave aoout 18000 Chinese jungle f i gh t e r s on Burmese s o i l . 
The six-powers reso lu t ion expresses concern tha t 
"few arms have been surrendered so fa r , i t thanks the United 
Sta tes and Thailand fo r t h e i r e f for t s and urges them to 
Continue s t r i v i n g f o r , " "evacuation o r intermaent of these 
39 
foreign fo rce s . " Burmese delegate James Barrington to ld the 
General Assemoly's Special P o l i t i c a l Committee tha t Burma 
was g ra t i f i ed tiiat atx>ut 5,600 Chinese troops already had 
been removed but t ha t s i t u a t i o n was in to l e r ab l e , he also 
declared the remaining t roops, s t i l l have a peaceful a l t e r -
nat ive to get-out "under t h e i r own steam" or sutmit to d i s -
40 
armament and interment," 
The discussion before the P o l i t i c a l Committee centered 
around an e ight -na t ion draf t resolu t ion which had been 
presented on the same day. The reso lu t ion expressed concern 
over the f a i l u r e of the evacuees to surrender t h e i r arms 
and requested the United States to work for the evacuation 
of Mie estimated 10,000 Nat iona l i s t troops s t i l l in Burma. 
Ihe r e so lu t ion was adopted by a vote of 51-0 with 6 abstentions 
39. NflV Xoifc Iifl§S, (November 28, 1963), 
40. fffiV fork XtftgP> (October 12, 1954> 
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Burma agreed to extend cease- f i re and the Issue x vas 
dropped from the l i i i ted Nations agenda. General Ll Mi, the 
former commander of Chinese Na t iona l i s t G u e r r i l l a ' s came back 
in Burma and dissolved h i s "Yunnan Province Anti-Communist 
41 
National Salvation Army." OSie Four-Nations Jo in t Mil i tary 
Commission had announced on July 30, tha t the programme had 
been completed with the evacuation of 7,000 men and the i r 
dependents. In viev of the d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered in 
the evacuation of those troops, even the p a r t i a l r e s u l t s 
obtained through the good of f ices of the Jo in t Mi l i ta ry 
Committee and the effect ive cooperation of the Government 
of the Union of Burma with that Committee were a source 
of g r a t i f i c a t i o n , within f i f t e en months, 7,000, foreign 
troops had been evacuated from Burmese t e r r i t o r y , and large 
amounts of arms and ammunations had been handedbver to the / 
Jo in t Mi l i ta ry Committee to be destroyed or l a t e r shipped 
to Formosa, In s p i t e of ^11 economic, p o l i t i c a l and geogre. 
phical d i f f i c u l t i e s , the members of the Committee, par t icu-
l a r l y OSiaiiand and the IMited S ta tes , should be congratulated 
on having achieved success on evacuation problems* 
48)* Nev IQIHL Xlffl?§, (May 31 , 1 9 5 ^ 
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A th i rd United Nations reso lu t ion revealed the f ac t 
tha t nunaerous foreign force sterna ined in Burma and tha t they 
were t>etter armed and equipped than vhen the evacuation 
42 
began. i3ut the Burmese represen ta t ive acknowledged tha t 
the evacuation \^ ich had already ue^n car r ied out "represen-
ted the l i m i t of %^at could be accomplished by in te rna t iona l 
a c t i o n , " and tha t the d i spos i t ion of the remaining Nat ional is t 
troops was the i r own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . !I3ie Burmese Government 
requested tha t no fur ther ac t ion took place and on October 
15, 1954, the issue was discussed fo r the l a s t time in the 
United Nations. 
The Burmese Government could hardly regard tha t United 
Nations ac t ion had taken a s a t i s f ac to ry s t e p . According to 
the Burmese point of view, the case was c l ea r . There vas, 
body of foreign troops on Burmese s o i l ac t ing as Insurgents 
agains t the government and openly being supplied arms from 
a na t ion (Taiwan) with which Burma had no formal diplomatic 
or o ther r e l a t i o n s . 
Hence, most Burman leaders have s t a r t e d to fee l tha t 
the i r o r i g i n a l hopes t h a t "membership in the United Nations 
offered a small nat ion l i k e the i r s p ro tec t ion and success 
42, United Nations, General Assembly. Ninth-Session, AD,HOC, 
"Po l i t i ca l Ctoamittee, 6th meeting. Agenda item 63, 
(October 14, 1964^ p . 
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Such r eso lu t ions by ins is tence tha t recommendations should 
involve an order ly process and be designed to re l ieve ten-
45 
sions ra the r than provoke fur ther t rouble . Burma always 
favours self government for non-self governing t e r r i t o r i e s . 
This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true of the question of independence 
fo r Morocco and Tunisia, when Burma in concert with the 
other Arab-Asian count r ies , had taken the lead in requesting 
General Assembly discussion of these items. 
l ^ i l e most of the countr ies have re jec ted , the South 
African aparthjeid pol icy, i t i s the Afro-Asian blocs (includ-
ing Burma) which has fought most s t rongly and cons i s ten t ly 
for United Nations condemnation of i t . Since the Sixth 
Session, Burma has been associated with t h i s bloc and "a 
spr inkl ing of Latin American Nations in sponsoring resolut ion 
ca l l i ng for the establishment and continuation of the United 
Nations good off ices commission on the treatment of Indians 
in the Union of South Africa and on the r a c i a l s i tua t ion 
46 
in tha t country.** 
Burma has continuously taken the pa r t of the indige-
nous inhabi tants as assoc ia te members in the t rus teesh ip 
45. William, C. Jol?nstone, ajufiiii.i P. 233. 
46, Frank, N. Trager, Patrica^ Vbhbgemuth, Lu, Yu Kiang 
QS*£H*i P* 1^* 
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agains t outs ide Interference were misplaced." The Burman 
leaders have often asse r ted tha t " re l i ance on the United 
Nations for protec t ion of the i r sovereignty and secur i ty i s 
a dubious foundation and tha t Burma does not want to become 
43 
another Korea or a Congo," 
Burma*s pa r t i c ipa t i on as a member of the United Nations 
has been closely a l l i e d to tha t of o ther Arab-Asian na t ions . 
Like many other na t ions , she has achieved independence a f te r 
a great s t ruggle and a lso has a b i t t e r experience of colonial 
period, so her sympathy l i e s for those nat ions \rfio are now 
trying to reach the same goal. On Colonial quest ions, how-
ever, she i s throughly committed and never n e u t r a l . Her 
represen ta t ives have s t a t e d tha t "we consider i t a great 
duty to f i gh t for freedom, for our freedom as well as for the 
freedom of a l l those peoples viio are l e s s fortunate there <vo 
44 
we are,** So Burma supported the Indonesian Government's case 
aga ins t the Netdier lands on Vjisst I r i an . This general posi t ion 
on colonial questions often resu l ted in the Burma delegation 
"voting aff i rmat ively for Soviet bloc r e so lu t ions , but even 
here the Burma delegation oftenjj qual i f ied i t s support for 
43. William, C.Johnstone, o p . c i t . j pp. 232-233. 
44. Frank, N.Trager, P a t r i c i a Wjhlgemuth, Lu,Yu,Kiang, 
ftP'C^t.j p . 3 . 
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Ckjuncil. Burma Is a member of the t rus teesh ip council and 
she w i l l take even more of a leadership pos i t ion in the 
Eleventh General Assembly debates on colonial mat te rs . Buima 
takes pa r t a ser ious ly and matters r e l a t i n g to the non-
47 
sel f governing peoples. 
On the question of disaitnament and control of nuclear 
veaponS) the Burman stand has been cons i s ten t ly tha t of a 
small na t ion , having no r e spons ib i l i t y in t h i s f i e l d of 
in t e rna t iona l r e l a t i ons and therefore able to express f ree ly 
48 
vhatever view points appeal to i t . Burma al-ways welcomes 
a l l i n i t i a t i v e tov/ards disasrmament, but as long as nations 
can not d ispel t he i r sense of mutual d i s t r u s t , fear and 
suspicion and so long as the balance of t e r r o r is the order 
of the day, general and complete disarmament i s a far-off 
dream. 
Ihere is no a l t e rna t i ve to general and complete 
disarmament under e f fec t ive in te rna t iona l control which 
presui-pposes an ef fec t ive system of Universal Collective 
Securi ty and would necessa r i ly take tin;*.. Bie promt effor ts 
should be d i rec ted tovards agreement on c o l l a t e r a l or p a r t i a l 
47. HiM*, p . 17. 
48. William, C.Johnstone, aa*.£ii . , p . 234. 
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measures of disarmament, those on weapons ofmass destruct ion 
siaouid De given f i r s t p r i o r i t y . Burma also urges a can 
on underground nuclear t e s t s to compliment the p a r t i a l 
49 
t e s t i»n Treaty. Burma urges that the concerted ef for ts 
of the a l l memoer nat ions must oe to stop the development, 
production and s tockpi l ing of chemical and Diological weapons. 
Burma has been " p a r t i c u l a r l y encouraged oy the f ac t that 
the presenta t ion by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. before the 
£ighteen.Nation Committee on Disarmament, represents a 
welcome departure in procedure from the previous p a r t i a l 
Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty in tha t a wider cooperation and 
consensus i s being sought. The opinion of Burma is that 
tile element of balanced mutual r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and ob l iga . 
t ions as betwven the nuclear powers and non-nuclear nations 
has been omitted. But t h i s ommission, the absence of a 
comprehensive nuclear Test ban Treaty, and with increased 
nuclear t e s t i n g by two major nuclear powers, r a i s e s some 
doubt as to v^ether the forv/ard s tep of the two-power agree . 
ment might not , in f a c t have oeen counteracted by several 
re t rograde s teps in o ther d i r ec t i ons . 
49. United Nations^ Mnnthlv Chmnlcl^.^ Vol. IX, No.10, 
November 1972, p. 93. 
60. United Nations Monthly Chrnnlcle, Vol. IV, No. 10, 
November 1967, p . 6 l . 
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Burma's s t a tus on the problem of peace and secur i ty 
has been "uncommitted" I t has also been c lea r and construc-
t i v e , Burma has always supported co l l ec t ive act ion, advocated 
negot ia t ion of d i f ferences , and opposed mi l i t a ry force. 
Comparison of Burma's votes on se lected major questions of 
th i s type with those of the United S t a t e s , U.S.S.R. and other 
Asian countr ies indica tes a voting pa t t e in s imilar to tha t 
of India and uncommitted na t ions . Wien Burma's votes in 
the united Nations d i f f e r from those of India, than she 
r e f l e c t s her desire to prolong negot ia t ions if there is the 
l e a s t l ike l ihood tha t she might succeed. I t should be noted, 
too, tha t '*Burma has voted with the U.S. somewhat more than 
has India, which may r e f l e c t a g rea te r Burmew awareness of 
the r e a l i t i e s of communism learned in the long struggle to 
put-down the in t e rna l insurrec t ion of the Burmese Communist 
61 
Par ty . " Burma s t rongly believes t h a t the Securi ty Council 
has the primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for maintaining peace and 
secur i ty , should the council be unaole to i n i t i a t e , a peace 
keeping operation in face of a veto, then the General Assembly 
has X no other a l t e r n a t i v e than to tQke effect ive co l l ec t ive 
52 
measures. ]}ie view of Burmese XKDK delegate i s tha t where 
6 1 , Frank, N.Trager, Patricia^\fohlgemuth, Lu,Yu,Kiang, 
afiA£l&., p. 6. 
52. United Nations Monthly Chronic;i^j Vol. I l l No.9, 
(October, 196ej^  p .£8; 
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the Security Coimcil i s unable or unwill ing to i n i t i a t e 
peace keeping opera t ions , then General Assembly has the 
duty and r e spons ib i l i t y to seek a l t e r n a t i v e vays and means 
to keep the peace and repress aggression. Peace-keeping 
costs should be the r e spons ib i l i t y of a l l Member S ta tes , 
including the permanent members of the Security Council 
which have subs tan t i a l pr iva te or public i n t e r e s t s in the 
area concerned, should assume correspondingly higher r e s -
pons ib i l l t y in the f inancing of peace keeping opera t ions . 
U Thai Han, Foreign ^Iffairs Minister of Burma sa id , "Peace 
i s maintained not through co l lec t ive ac t ion but t h r o u ^ 
mutual t e r r o r . Mankind has arr ived a t a cross-roads and i t 
must choose between d r i f t i n g along the same old path and a 
new d i rec t ion towards a more order ly world." 
Establ ishing the peace requires tha t means must be 
found to strengthen the ground-rules of peaceful co-existence, 
t h i s Includes the recogni t ion of the r i g h t of a l l nations 
f ree ly to choose t he i r own socia l systems without external 
in te r ference . In seeking the strengthen the United Nations, 
the lack of un ive r sa l i ty of membership must be recognized 
as one of i t s shortcomings. The main purpose for peace 
53 . United Nations Monthly Chroniclft^ Vol.17, No.10, 
(November, 1967J^  p . 8 8 . 
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c a l l for co l l ec t ive ac t ion to r a i se l i v ing standards throvQgh-
out the world. Vtiolesale poverty, vant and disease continue 
to scourges more than two th i rds of the human race, ^ i l e 
54 
the remainder enjoy unprecedented aff luence. 
I t i s a wellknown fac tor tha t the Burmese Government 
continuously supported membership for Communist China in the 
United Nations. So Burma did welcome the membership of 
Communist China recent ly , because, according to the Buzmese 
Government, Communist China i s l e g a l l y e n t i t l e d to the pos l . 
t i on . On the issues of membership for Communist bloc nat ions , 
however, the Burman Government has taken a more **neutral" 
stand or followed the lead of the " n e u t r a l i s t " majori ty. They 
have refused to endorse membership for e i t h e r the North 
55 
Vietnam or Sduth Vietnam or North Korean regimes, 
After the Second Wbrld War, the world was v i r t u a l l y 
divided into two camps, "Bipolar iza t lon went on a t an 
accelera ted pace and small s t a t e s found themsevles a t the 
mercy of Super-Powers, The non-aligned pol icy, once held to 
be synonymous with Immorality, has proved to be cor rec t . 
Super powers, in sp i t e of t he i r immense s t rength and power. 
54. United Nations Monthly Chmnicle, Vol, II ,No. 16, (^November. 
1965J^  pp. 82-83. ' 
55. William, C.Johnstone, op .c i t . ^ p , 236. 
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find themselves he lp less In solving problems In which they 
66 
are d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y involved." 
Burma, l i ke India, refuses to jo in e i t he r s ide In 
the cold war. This does not mean tha t Burma i s uninterested 
in p o l i t i c a l quest ions . But she r ea l i ze s that Iter g rea tes t 
contr ibut ion can be by s taying "neutral ,•• Mr. Barrington 
explains Burma's pos i t ion tha t , " the emergence in the United 
Nations of two antagonis t ic blocs has , in our views, seriously 
undermined the system of co l lec t ive Securi ty • • • • • some 
members of the organizat ion have Joined ne i the r of tiiese 
an tagonis t ic blocs we think . . • • • tha t we serve best 
the cause of world peace hy adhering to th i s a t t i t u d e • • « . • 
those who accuse us of t imid i ty l i t t l e know how much moral 
57 
courage i t requires for us to remain uncommitted " 
Buima also very much in te res ted in programmes of 
the United Nations and i t s Special ized agencies, dealing 
with technica l a s s i s t ance , development f inancing and world 
t r ade . Burma has voted aff i rmat ively on a l l measures which 
promised expansion of the United Nations technica l ass is tance 
programme. Burmese delegate to the Seventh General Assembly 
56. United Nations Monthly Chronicle, Vol.VI, 
No.9, October 1969, p . 169. 
67. Frank. N.Trager, Patricia^Vbhlgemuth, Lu,i:u Kiang, 
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summed up Burma's a t t i t u d e s ^ y delegat ion s incere ly 
re l ieves that the expanded prograiame of technical ass is tance 
has demonstrated, i s s t i l l demonstrating, and w i l l continue 
to demonstrate i t s value as an ef fec t ive in te rna t iona l means 
of a c t i v i t y in economic development of under developed 
ix coun t r i es , and my delegation i s f u l l y convinced that 
the continuat ion and expansion of t h i s programme can make 
an Important contr ibut ion to the achievement of higher 
standards of l i v i n g for the peoples of the under developed 
^reas ,^ 
A. ' 'Resident Representative of the Technical Jissistance 
Board* has Deen in Burma since 1951, to coordinate the 
programmes of the various agencies involved and to a c t as 
the channel through which Burmese requests for ass is tance 
are sen t . United Nations and i t s spec ia l ized agency experts 
have made Important contr ibut ion fo r the development of 
Burma in various spheres . They have made basic surveys 
and prepared recommendations for such broad development 
f i e ld s as education, soc i a l se rv ices , i n d u s t r i a l development, 
public heal th and f o r e s t r y . Recommendations of a 1952, 
United Nations Social Services Mission, including experts 
from several agencies under Dr. Bulsara, formed tiie basis 
of Burma's o f f i c i a l plans in the f i e l d and led to e s t ab l i sh -
ment ofa separate Department of Social Malfare within the 
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Government of Burma to Implement the programme. 
I t i s qui te wrong to say tha t Burma* s r e l a t i ons 
with United Nations and specia l ized agencies have been 
introuble) even in the sphere of technica l ass is tance* The 
United Nations spec ia l ized Agencies do not always give 
su f f i c i en t importance to Southeast Asia in general and Buma 
in p a r t i c u l a r . 
Burma's r e l a t i ons with the United Nations and i t s 
spec ia l ized Agencies are not , however, r e s t r i c t e d to the 
rece iv ing of a id . Xhe Burmese were a lso hosts in 1950 for 
the meetings of the F.A.o* In te rna t iona l Rice Commission 
and the S u t r i t i o n Committee for South and Southeast Asia. 
I t i s qui te c lear tha t Burma has supported those ac t ions 
in lluct the U.N.O. which might help her i n t e r e s t s as an 
exporter of r i c e . So Burma i s a lso r e l a t e d with several 
Important F.A.O. projects of r i c e production and d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
In 1955 a r i c e mi l l ing expert advised the Burmese technical 
means fo r improving r i c e processing to help bring Burmese 
r i c e cons i s t en t ly to the standards of the world market. 
Burma's i n t e r e s t in the United Nations in economic 
matters has been typ ica l ly t ha t of an underdeveloped primarily 
58. IiM»i PP* 18-19. 
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a g r i c u l t u r a l country emoarked on an important programme of 
a g r i c u l t u r a l , i ndus t r i a l and soc ia l development, ^ i l e 
the Burmese see in the U.N. a source of aid and encourage-
ment, they recognize tha t United Nations f a c i l i t i e s a t 
59 
present anifar from adequate to the vas t needs. 
The General A.ssembly session of 1966 and 1961 may 
well go dovn in h i s to ry as the turning point for the 
United Nations. Xt the I960 Session, thefi* were more heads 
of s t a t e and prime minis te rs present than ever before. 
"Even more important was the vigorous attempt of the U.S.S.R. 
to gain control of the organizat ion with i t s " t ro ika" 
proposals.** Although non-al igied nat ions refused to accede 
to the Russian proposals , the Soviet Veto on the Go a reso-
lu t ion in the Security Council and t h e i r general sjLlence 
and inac t ion on Indians invasion of Goa showed c l ea r ly some 
^»iport«nCa for the future of the United Nations as an organ 
60 
designed to maintain in t e rna t iona l peace and secu r i ty . 
Burma welcomed the acceptance of the s t a n d - s t i l l 
ceasef i re agreement in Middle East . This appears to r e i n , 
force the w i l l fftor a p o l i t i c a l se t t lement on the oasis of 
59, JJKI^LM PP* 21-24. 
60. William, C.Johnstone, QO.cit . , p , 237. 
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the 1967 Security Council r e so lu t ion . Burma i s also aware 
of the grave s i t u a t i o n , now imper i l l ing the peace of Middle 
East or of the d i f f i c u l t i e s inherent in the s i t ua t i on , 
expresses i t s confidence tha t a j u s t so lu t ion can be for-
mulated under the term of t ha t r e so lu t ion , Burma has a 
f a i t h t ha t the United Nations and the powers concerned with 
the Arab-Israel c o n f l i c t w i l l continue t h e i r e f for ts to 
avoid the eruption of another devastat ing con f l i c t . 
U.Soe Tin, the permanent represen ta t ive of United 
Nations from Burma sa id , " the delegation of Burma is con-
cerned that the development in Vietnam may involve r i sks 
of a wider conf l i c t and hopes tha t greater ef for ts w i l l be 
made towards f inding Jus t so lu t ion enabling the Vietnamese 
people to determine t h e i r own future , free from a l l outside 
61 
in ter ference and p ressure . " 
Burma appreciates the current peace-talks over 
Vietnam, and Burma i s op t imis t ic m t ha t they wi l l pave the 
way to a future of t h e i r own choosing for the Viefaiamese 
people free from a l l ex terna l in te r fe rence . I t i s immoral 
to c l ing to adamant pos i t ions %diile innocent c i t i zens are 
62 
being subjected to indiscr iminate bombing and bru ta l she l l ing . 
61. yB,it?d]yftt;loRs..Mofimiy CfarQnjLas, voi . iv , NO.IO, 
November 1967, p , 6 l . 
62, United Natlnns Monthly Chmnicle, Vol.VI, No.2, 
October 1969, p , g 
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U.Lwin, Chairman of Burma's delegation in United 
Nations, said, "A nev era in the i n t e rna t iona l order i s tak-
ing shape, the meetings betveen the U.S. pres ident and the 
leaders of China and the U.S.S.R. vere of major p o l i t i c a l 
s ign i f icance . Bie recent Simla Agreement has con t r i tu ted 
63 
considerably to peace in Asia as a whole,* 
Die manner in which U Thant, the former United Nations 
General A Secretary, had successful ly handelled the Dutch. 
Indonesian conf l i c t over Vest Guinea Commands our respect 
and admiration. By h i s bold and diplomatic s tep , he was 
successful in bringing together the two b i t t e r opponents 
and persuaded them to s i t round a t ab le with a th i rd party 
ac t ing as a f r iendly umpire. Always, he and his s e c r e t a r i a t 
XMSM. rendered such help and guidance to the pa r t i e s to the 
con f l i c t whenever required, 
U Thant was also able to solve with the help of 
Securi ty Council so many problems such as , the Cublan c r i s i s , 
the Civi l Vi&r in Congo, the cldjLm of Indonesia to New Guinea, 
the disputed t e r r i t o r y of North Borneo between Malaysia and 
Indonesia and the cea se . f i r e between India and Pakistan over 
KashiQlr, 
63. United Nations Monthly Chrpnicle^ C p ^ v />• '<>• 
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U Thant also had expressed his deepest concern as 
to the possible Implications of the alaimlng developaents 
in the Middle Ea»t in 1967. U Thant said that "for more 
than ten years UN£F, acting as a buffer between tiie opposing 
forces of Israel and the U.A.R. on the Amist ice Demarcation 
Line in Gaza and the International Frontier in Sinai, has 
been the principal means of maintaining quiet in the area* 
Its removal inevitably restores the armed confrontation of 
the U.A.B« and Israel and removes the s tab i l i z ing influence 
of an international force operating along the boundaries 
64 
between the two nations**' 
After submitting his report, U Ihant then flew to 
Cairo and conferred with Major General Ihdar J i t Rlkhye 
Commander of UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force). U Thant, 
lUce his predecessor, Mr. HamDarskJold hasf followed the 
policy of "Preventive Diplomacy." 
It i s to state that in the "Sensitive areas" around 
the world, U Thant's unfailing efforts at maintaining inter-
national peace and security have been fu l ly appreciated. 
64. 3fte fluardlaft, Vol. XVIII, No.4, (Rangoon , April 197T), 
p. 47. 
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Some times I he f e l t frustrated and disappointed In fa l l ing 
to make many Member Nations, especially the great powers, 
fu l f i l their obligations under the Charter, This will 
require a l l the diplomatic acumen and positive efforts of 
the Secretary General, so that , with tiie help of the 
Security Council and the General Assembly, International 
65 
peace and security may be maintained* 
65, Il2iil,, p, 48. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
-^ s indicated e a r l i e r Burma is s i tua ted between the 
two big countr ies of jilast, India and China which are obviously 
more povjerful than herse l f . This i s also t rue tha t very l i t t l e 
i s heard or known about t h i s country which remained for a long 
period^ a par t of Indian empire. In spi te of a l l t h i s , Burma 
gradually acquired great importance not only for India but 
a lso for Southeast Asia and Singapore. The defence system 
of Southeast Asia r e s t s to a great extent upon Burma. Any 
dis turbing factor in the control of the Bay of Bengal i s 
l i k e l y to imperil the secur i ty of India. The self Imposed 
I s o l a t i o n of Burma, some times puzzles the outside world. The 
Second World War increased the s t r a t eg i c Importance of Burma, 
The great s ignif icance of 'Burma Road' and use of the port 
of Rangoon transfused th i s skeleton with l i f e and blood. The 
closing of th i s road proviked p ro tes t s not only from China 
but a lso from U.S.A. and the Soviet Union. I t was used as a 
passage frcxn Thailand to India and China to India , 
I t i s also a fac t that geographically, Burma i s an 
i so la ted country. Over-land communication with India are 
d i f f i c u l t because of the mountains and the jungle covered 
r i dges . The mountains play a very important rola as they 
cons t i tu t e f ron t i e r s and serve as a boundary which separates 
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Buiaa from China. I t also makes a nat-ural boundary with 
Burma's eas tern neighbour, Thailand. In the border area of 
Burma and India l i v e the Nagas x^ rho became a great source of 
t rouble to the Indian government. The neu t r a l i t y of the 
government of Burma i s therefore necessary for India. In view 
of Indo-Pak h o s t i l i t y r e l a t i ons with Burma were more s ign i f i -
cant and important to India for several secur i ty reasons, 
Burma became important af ter the pa r t i t i on of India and the 
crea t ion of Pakistan whose h o s t i l i t y towards India posed acute 
secur i ty problems. But by the emergence of Bangla-i^esh as a 
f r iendly s t a t e on the eas tern border of India , th i s threa t has 
been removed. The f i r s t and foii-most effor t of Burma i s seek-
L 
ing a pro tec t ive cetrdon of sympathetic s t a t e s around her 
borders , j u s t l i ke that which-Kussia has managed to achieve 
in tl)^ :?.astern ^.'iurope. 
Burma's h i s t o r i c a l ro le begins with the great ru le r 
ca l led Anawrahta who founded the Burma's f i r s t nat ional king-
dean Pagan in 1044, Burma came under the Br i t i sh rule in the 
19th century af te r the th i rd war. Burma was administered as 
a province of India u n t i l 1937 when i t became a separate 
colony, k wave of nationalism svrept across Burma, when the 
congress p a r t y led by Gandhi and Aehru in India influenced 
t h e i r p o l i t i c i a n s . But rea l nat ional asp i ra t ion caiiie frcan 
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Burmese themselves when Burmese founded the "Young Ken 
buddhist i issociation" in 1B08. 
Many governmental reforms had taken-place in Burma as 
a par t of India. Kinto-Morley and I.ontague-Chelmsford reports 
had also been introduced in Burma in the same manner as they 
were p a r t i a l l y introduced in India, Ihe Simon ^anmission of 
1P28 gave the report in favour of the separat ion of Burma 
from India , because Burma feared tha t t h i s country might one 
day becane a "vassal s t a t e " of Ind ia . 
After the Japanese occupation in the Second -/orld 
VJar, Burma declared herse l f an independent s t a t e , receiving 
recognition from a l l the ajcis power. But af ter the reoccupa-
t ion by Br i t a in , the actual administrat ion of Burma was handed 
over to the Supreme-i^-llied commander of southeast i.sia, Admiral 
Mountbatoen, the IXI-Attlee agreement recognised the republic 
of the Union of Bur-ma as a fu l ly indepandent sovereign s ta te 
on January 4, 1948. 
^ f t e r gaining independence tiie new Union of Burma 
plunged into a c i v i l war. But the rebels no longer stood as 
a l t e rna t i ve s to the ii/Pj'ii (.mti-x^acist People's federation 
League) government under the leadership of Premier UlNlI. Jhen 
AJ'Pi^ 'jj par ty became div/ided in to two, the s i tua t ion beccJiio 
uoTse. consequently UI'JU cal led Kewin for premiership, who 
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\/as e l e c t e d InoppoGed. I'he l e l ig io -us p o l i c y of LUU fJ.so 
provicJeo c. cause x'or tli2 c a r p . ..o^-rn goveinntir^ \ . . c r i l j 
. ( J : i n i s t r a t i o n . 
hu t in uhe ^er.ert-l e l e c t i o n ox 1960, cuno overvhe l r in^ 
v j c t o r y for UR' br.d h i s ; a i ' ty . Eut in !':arch 1^62, C. ' j r : : ' l . "1. 
c£.£--r. took ovei c o n t r o l .-ir c' UIX" vtic ti-'sr":?-"'. ~c\eT came i n 
t h e hands of i^evolutionary Oomci l v.'hich was formed under the 
Jhairmanship of General liewin. The General hewln Kegime vas 
b a s i c a l l y t o t a l i t a r i a n . The Revolu t ionary Goverrrnent is based 
on a system of s o c i a l i s t democracy and soc ia l i s t econ&ny. 
Burma's r e l a t i o n s v;ith U.i: . have been c o r d i a l wi th the 
:;ominonwealth c o u n t r i e s of ivsia, UiiU's Government worked i n the 
c l o s e s t coope ra t ion in f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . UiJl. a t t e r d e d the 
oouthet is t ^-^sic i - .H. ' s Coni'erence in Colombo or the eve of 
the Geneva^ ta±i.s on IndoaChina i n 1954. 
Unl ike Inaic , Buima l e f t the j s r i t i s h Commonwealth, 
because the Lurmese l e a d e r s thought t h a t Burma would not 
remain independent i n Gommom'/ealth, However, so many t imes , 
Burmese government accepted f i n a n c i a l aid frcrn the Conmonweulth 
c o u n t r i e s . The Commonwealth Corii'erence of De lh i proposed 
c o n c i l i a t i o n of a "ivaren" (a t r i b e ) d i f f e r e n c e s through 
Commonwealth mediai:ion through a good o f f i c e s committee of 
Commonwealth r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s in Rangoon. Though Buma i s no 
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longer a member of Gonmora^realth, she has remained a very 
close friend of Commonwealth count r ies . 
xa'ter independence, Burma hecarae the member of the 
ij.K, and other U.N. specia l ized agencies. Burma's role in 
the U.K. as an uncommitted, an t i - co lon ia l and under developed 
nat ion i s what one might expect of a newly independenee Asian 
country. Though her basic p o l i t i c a l philosophy offers novel-
t i e s , the readiness of her representa t ives to seek the funda-
mentals of a problem and to search for negotiated p a r t i a l 
so lu t ions v;ithout v io la t ion of adopted p r i n c i p l e s , are cont i -
nuing hallmarks of her f a i t h in the U.K. and instrument of 
the promotion of world peace and progress . In the U.K. Burma 
has t r i e d her bes t to follow an independent po l icy , judging 
each case on the meri ts as i t ccmes up on Korean v;ar. On 
Korean '.«ar, Buima supported the U.K., but the cost of decision 
paid by Burma was heavy. Burma supported the resolut ion of 
un i ty for peace in the f i f t h session of the U.K. General 
xi.ssembly. Burma has been active member and a beneficiary of 
the specia l ized agencies of the U.K. 
Burma's role in the U.K. has been closely a l l i ed to 
t h a t of other Arab and ^.fro-Asian na t ions . Burma supported 
the membership of U.K. for Communist China. U Thant of Burma, 
the former Secretary General of the U.K. also played a very 
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important ro le in solving many in te rna t iona l problems. He 
maintained s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y as an important digni tary of the 
U.K. V/hile maintaining diplomatic r e l a t ions with Russia and 
China, the Bunnese Government supported U.K. action in Korea, 
and UNU also organized in Rangoon in 1953, the f i r s t session 
of Asian Soc ia l i s t Conference, which Mr. Attlee attended. 
Burma's policy of non-alignment with power blocs often led i t s 
U.K. represen ta t ives in to votir^g on both s ides . Burmese 
Governnent brought the KMT problem kefore the U.N. Through 
the e f for t s of the U.K. Commission, t h i s problem was solved. 
At l a s t Burma had agreed to the cease f i r e . On disarmament 
and control of nuclear weapons, Burmese pos i t ion i s that of a 
small na t ion , i . e . , of having no r e spons ib i l i t y in th i s area 
of in te rna t iona l r e l a t i o n s , ^ a l l y , Burma is very s i l e n t 
sepectator in the nuclear armament jtr race as i t can not hope 
to enter the nuclear club or influence i t s po l i c i e s due to i t s 
economic backwardness and absence of s c i e n t i f i c know-how. 
Burma's foreign policy has been d i s t i n c t l y neutralists^ 
eiifrost since independence. Burma presents an excel lent example 
of how a small na t ion can enable i t to maintain i t s independence 
in a world dominated by tv/o r i v a l power blocs and clashing 
ideologies . Burma i s a major cosmopolitian centre in Sijuth-
eas t Asia. The Revolutionary council has balanced eastern 
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and western influences in Burma. Because Burma wants to 
avoid the agony of a Vietnam type 'Var of National Liberation. " 
So Burma continues to maintain good econcxnic re la t ions with 
the v/est and p a r t i c i p a t e s in many in te rna t iona l organisat ions. 
Burma also receives foreign aid from Western as well as 
communist na t ions . 
The Burmese a t t i t u d e towards Asian conf l ic t s such as 
Vietnam, Kashmir, Malcisia, Indonesia, i s tha t of peaceful 
se t t lement , on the bas is of the 1964 Geneva accords and a 
new Geneva type conx'erence. The a t t i tude of Burma towards 
ijaos and Combodia is not very clear and de f i n i t e . But soon 
these doubts vanished. Durma gave formal recognit ion to 
both s t a t e s . Burma has been sympathetic towards Yugoslavia 
and I s r a e l . Jus t recent ly Buraia took a n e u t r a l i s t posture over 
Langla-iJesh but v/hen Bangla-Desh emerged as a p o l i t i c a l 
r e a l i t y , liurma was among the f i r s t few to accord recognition 
to i t even at the r i s k of diplomatic rupture with Pakistan. 
Burma also greeted the recent Simla Agre 3ment and believed 
tha t i t contributed consider..bly to peace in Asia as a whole. 
The t e s t i ng aspect of i^urraa's foreign policy has been 
the mar.ner in vrfiich the world-giants l i k e China, ^.ussia and 
U.3..i . remain f r iendly towards huima. j^urma is one of the 
Colombo powers v/ho have come together in f ie lds of cooperation 
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and development to expand the area of peace and economic 
progress . 
I t Is remarkaole tha t most of the Burmese in p o l i t i c s 
are firm supporters of t he i r governments neu t ra l pol icy, 
because i t has permitted them to t r ave l to I s r a e l , to 
U.A.R. to the U.S.A., tii« Communist China, to the Soviet 
Union and to Japan and Western Europe as v e i l as Afro-
Asian count r ies , mrma plays a very successful and s i g n i . 
f l ean t r o l e of meditator between the U.S.A., and Communist 
China in the U.N, The r e l a t i ons with India, Pakistan, 
Geylon and China have remained close and co rd i a l . But i t 
i s qu i te^c lear tha t Burma's geog;raphic cont igui ty with 
Communist China has always involved spec ia l consideration 
for the Burmese foreign policy makers. Her r e l a t i ons with 
Pakis tan might receive^ a set .back due to the circumstances 
refer red to aoove. 
The foreign policy of Burma i s one of the posi t ive 
n e u t r a l i t y even in the desperate t imes. Burmese Government 
r e a l i s e s tha t i t i s the correc t foreign pol icy for h-ls 
country to make fr iends aoroad and no enemies. The non-
alignment with power ulocs, and the pol icy of n e u t r a l i t y 
is defensive. 
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Burma stayed out from SEATO, because i t never 
believed tha t tbe defence organisa t ion l i k e SEATO wt t i 
be successful . The formation of SEATO increases the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of conf l i c t instead of peace and secur i ty . 
Owing to her aloofness from any m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e , she 
enjoys the worldwide confidence because of her n e u t r a l i s t 
stand. As an outcome of her n e u t r a l i s t pol icy, Burma is 
receiving no s izeaole economic a id from the two countries 
that might have provided i t . 
In sp i te of her r e l a t ionsh ip wltii China, she has 
no sof t corner for communism a t home. Burma i s worried 
aDout the possible expansionist character of £hlnese 
communism and profoundly unse t t l i ng effect i t would have 
on the approaches of Burma's f r o n t i e r s . I t i s also deeply 
concerned about the continued i n f i l t r a t i o n of Indians and 
Chinese across the borders of YUnnan. 
Ihspl te of the Communist r ebe l l ion a t home, Burma's 
r e l a t i ons with Communist China have remained cordia l s ince^ 
the time of the founding of the PRC. Burma recognised the 
People 's RepuDlic of China and agreed to e s t ab l i sh diplomatic 
r e l a t i ons with her . The expansion of the Burma-China friend-
ship associa t ion in Rangoon in tne autumn of 1953 symbolised 
the beginning of new developments in Slno-Burmese re la t ions 
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In March, caore trade contracts were signed oy vhlch Peking 
began to export i n d u s t r i a l i n s t a l l a t i o n s and equipment 
to Buim^. 
Burma's r e l a t i ons with C3iina have always been 
guided by the five pr inc ip les of co-existence which enjoin 
good r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e s with d i f fer ing p o l i t i c a l and 
soc ia l systems on the basis of mutual respect for each 
o t h e r ' s sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , mutual non-
aggression, non-interference in each o t h e r ' s in te rna l 
a f f a i r s and set t lement of dispute between nations oy peace-
ful means, scruplous observance of these pr inc ip les has 
enabled Burma and China to conclude a permanent boundary 
set t lement and promotion of f r iendly r e l a t i o n s . At Bandung 
Chou £n Lai made a spec i f ic pledge tha t Peking would 
never v io l a t e Burma's f r o n t i e r s . Although, border trouble 
f i n a l l y f la red up when a la rge number of Chinese communist 
troops penetrated into an extensive area inside Burma, but 
t h i s pro Diem soon got pacif ied due to constant ef for ts 
by i^rma^ince tiien a peaceful boundary set t lement has 
been concluded to t h e i r mutual s a t i s f a c t i o n , 
The Ciovernment of the Union of Burma and the Govern-
ment of the People 's Republic of China genuinely desired 
to maintain ever las t ing peace and cord ia l fr iendship between 
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the Union of Burma and the People 's Republic of China. In 
1961 a t r e a ty of f r iendship was a t l a s t concluded between 
the two countries in accordance with the Five pr inc ip les 
of Peaceful Co.exlstence Jo in t ly i n i t i a t e d by the two 
count r ies , 
A r i f t in Burma.China r e l a t i ons p rec ip i t a t ed by the 
Chinese in 1967 was perhaps a menifestat ion of Peking's 
f r u s t r a t i o n over f a i l i n g to become p o l i t i c a l l y or economl. 
ca l ly dominant in Burma. Rangoon signed the Test Ban Treaty 
of 1962, Peking opposed i t , Burma has r e c o g n i s e d ^ Indian 
t e r r i t o r y claimed by China in the Sino-liidian border d i s . 
pute. Burma favoured the formation of Malaysia which China 
at tacked i t as a neo -co lon ia l i s t p lo t and supported Indo-
n e s i a ' s "confrontrat ion po l icy ," 
Burma has maintained n e u t r a l i t y where as China has 
been vehemently an t l -U.S , and Pro-NLF and North Vietnam, 
Rangoon maintains cord ia l r e l a t ions with Moscow with which 
Peking i s engaged in a b i t t e r ideologica l d ispute , f i n a l l y , 
Burma has maintained n e u t r a l i t y on the Laotian i s sue , while 
China supports the Pa the t Lao, So the Sino-Burmese re la t ions 
sank to the lowest point a t the middle of the year over the 
r io tous behaviour of the Jpro-Peking ChiiBse l i v ing in Burma. 
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I t is d i f f icul t to explain Peking's aim in supporting 
cultural Bevolution to Burma. Its "Bed Guard" diplomacy 
may have been an unintended aspect of i t s ovn chaotic 
internal revolutionary si tuat ion, Peking's aim may have 
been to force levin to accept Communist participation in 
a united front government. Perhaps China believed Burma 
was so weakened aconomicaliy and divided pol i t ica l ly that 
i t s government could easi ly be toppled. 
A marked s i ^ of the improvement of relations 
after 1967 is injevidence* Both nations had agreed some. 
J 
I 
time in 1970 to send back their ambassadors to their posts. 
Because Burma was anxious to Improve i t s trade and financial 
si tuation by acquiring abundant supplies of cheap Chinese 
goods. Since than relations between Barm« and China have 
continued to Improve. Burma has been notably successful 
in diminishing Chinese and other foreign influences. 
The f i r s t contact between India and Burma started 
merely twenty five centuries ago "vdien Buddhism began to 
spread i t s message of love, peace and right conduct beyond 
the confines of India. Burma is not onlyy close neighbour 
of India in Southeast Asia, but also has connection, with 
India since ancient times. The migration of Indians into 
Buzma is as old as the history of these two countries which 
goes back to pre .h ls tor lc age. 
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The Burmese pol icy of Buxmlzatlon affected Indians 
very much. Buxmlzatlon of services Is another such measure. 
Under the Immigration policy of Burma, thousands of Indians 
have been forced out of lousiness and so out of the country. 
Indian leaders became s i l e n t iaecause they vjanted to continue 
fr iendship between Burma and India, Both ttie countries did 
not vant to snap the oonds of mutual f r iendship . The 
representa t ives of tsoth the countries kept t h e i r heads cool 
and showed a s p i r i t of negot ia t ion to s e t t l e th i s problem. 
In f a c t , the Burmlzatlon programme has been one sided and 
p a r t i a l . I t has not applied with equal force against the 
people of Communist countr ies l i ke China, 
The f ron t i e r r e l a t ions oetween India and Burma 
have been without any events . The Indo-Burmese Boundary 
Commission had been formed in terms of boundary agreement. 
Both the coun t r i e s , a f t e r t h e i r Independence, have 
followed the policy of non-alignment and n e u t r a l i t y . I t is 
a well known fac t tha t Nehru and UNU were p r inc ipa l a rch i -
t ec t s of the policy of the non-alignment for the new nat ions , 
Burmese leaders looked to India and the Indian leaders with 
admiration. Some observers even go to the extent of saying, 
"Burma's foreign policy i s nearly a d lp l l ca t lon or carbon 
copy of Ind ia ' s foreign policy.»* But t h i s observation is 
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wrong because Burma does not follow India in a l l respec ts , 
B'or example the membership of the Commonwealth, In view 
of happy re l a t ions between both countr ies a t r ea ty of 
fr iendship was signed between them in 1961, The t rea ty 
was firm and has l a s t i n g foundation for brotherly re la t ions 
between the two count r ies , Indian leaders t r i e d the i r 
best to es tab l i sh extensive diplomatic r e l a t ions with 
Burma to strengthen the economic and commercial contacts 
with her . 
The m i l i t a r y coup in Burma shocked and surprised 
India but she welcomed the declarat ions by the Revolutionary 
Council with regard to domestic p o l i c i e s . There are many 
in te rna t iona l problems which India and Burma faced together, 
when the Chinese volunteers entered into the Korean W&r, 
both the countr ies in the U,N, charged North Korea of 
aggression against South Korea, Bot^ the countries did 
not believe in co l l ec t ive defence arrangements such as 
SSATO, On the Hungarian problem a l sd , Burma and India 
disagr ied in the U,N. India and Burma s incere ly desired to 
avoid war and to maintain the i r s o l i d a r i t y with Araos and 
Afro-Asian world* 
The Gandbian t r a d i t i o n ok non-violence and the 
ancient Buddhist p r inc ip le of ••Ahimsa" has been re f lec ted 
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in the Burmese foreign pol icy. Being a "Buffer Sta te" 
Burma is highly conscious of her pos i t ion In Southeast Asia. 
The Chinese th rea t has been "worrying India as well as Burma, 
A.S regards the border d i sputes , i t is the opinion of the 
Burmese leaders that the time i s not r ipe for any firm mo^e 
in regard to the border d ispute . Both the countr ies accepted 
Nehru's p r inc ip les of "Panchsheela" The public opinion of 
Asia has been awakened now to the "creeping yellow p e r i l 
of China." Die aggressive posture of China has posed a 
danger for the neighbouring count r ies , more pa r t i cu l a r l y 
India and Burma. The era of Hindi-Chini and Burmese-Chini 
Bhai Bhai came to an abrupt end due to a ggressive and 
ezponsionist designs of China and some misunderstanding 
ex i s t ing on v i t a l Dorder i s sues . 
India and Burma remain as s/peaceful co .ex i s t ing 
neighbours with mutual good wi l l and t r u s t . In Sino-Indian 
border dispute , Burma was sympathetic towards India and 
Burma appealed to Indian and Chinese to stop from any action 
over the present f ight ing between India and China. 
General Ne Vin and Mrs, Indra Gandhi scanned the 
warld scene from the Asian angle. Both India and Buima 
wanted p o l i t i c a l set t lement of the Vietnamese question within 
the frame work of Geneva Agreement. 
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Thus we see tha t isoth the countr ies have a great 
s i m i l a r i t y of ideas Deiiefs and i n t e r e s t s . iJie aims and 
object ives of t he i r po l i c i e s are a lso s imi la r . Burma and 
India can cons t i tu te the corner-stone of regional cooperation 
in economic p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l f i e l d s . The emergence 
Bangla Desh in th i s region as a free democratic, s o c i a l i s t i c 
and secular repuiOiLic, f r iendly to both India and Burma, vould 
provide an addi t ional l ink in the long chain of f r iendly and 
peace-loving s t a t e s in t h i s region. The quick recognit ion of 
Bangladesh by India and Burma augers well fo r the future of 
t h i s region, Burma i s for tunate ly conscious of the f ac t 
tha t i t is t iny country, s t i l l in the process of development 
and therefore i t should not hazard any estrangement with any 
of b i s big neighbours. I t also r e a l i s e s the fac t tha t i t is 
not dest ined to play any ef fec t ive ro le in the event of a 
clash of g ian ts , A pol icy of aloofness i s therefore consid-
ered best in the preva i l ing cire ins tances . However as an 
Independent sovereign s t a t e i t i s Dound to express i t s view, 
on t rans -na t iona l issues without antagonising any big power 
or without i r r i t a t i n g any neigh dour ^ ^mall countries, usually -
play a very v i t a l ro le in the U,N,0. in resolving bigger issues 
facing the memoer coun t r i e s . Burma has a lso played such a 
role successful ly . Due i t s neu t ra l pos i t ion and uncommlted 
s tance, i t has t r i ed to mediate between bigger nations with 
cer ta in amoimt of success . 
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